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Abstract: In this thesis we explore two recent topics in behavioral ﬁnance, namely port-
folio optimization by non-expected utility insiders and existence of equilibria in ﬁnancial
markets populated by heterogeneous agents. In the introduction, we brieﬂy review a num-
ber of theories which have been used to model behavioral decision makers' preferences. In
particular, we describe Prospect Theory and Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), Yaari's
Dual Theory of choice and the Security-Potential/Aspiration theory. In the second chapter,
we set and solve a portfolio optimization problem in continuous time for an insider trader
following CPT. We provide a complete analysis in the strong as well as partial and weak in-
formation cases. The mathematical tools we exploit are Choquet integration, enlargement
of ﬁltrations and ﬁltering theory. Furthermore, we extend our results to Dual Theory and
Goal Reaching maximizers and we perform a detailed comparison with respect to a classical
Expected Utility (EU) decision maker. In the third chapter, we study equilibrium models
in a one-period stylized ﬁnancial market where agents with diﬀerent preference structures
can interact. The novelty thus stands in a game theoretical notion of equilibrium. We
give suﬃcient conditions for existence when a large EU, a large CPT investor and an ac-
commodating market maker trade. Speciﬁcally, large traders have a non-negligible impact
on the expected return and the volatility of the risky asset. We explicitly model such
impact functions in a linear fashion. Subsequently, the case of many EU and many CPT
agents is presented. We complete our analysis with an exhaustive numerical investigation
of equilibria.
Keywords: Behavioral ﬁnance, insider trading, weak information, Cumulative Prospect
Theory, loss aversion, heterogeneous agents.
Riassunto: In questa tesi analizziamo due argomenti recenti della ﬁnanza comportamen-
tale: l'ottimizzazione di portafoglio da parte di un insider di tipo utilità non-attesa e
l'esistenza di equilibri in mercati ﬁnanziari popolati da agenti eterogenei. Nell'introduzione,
ripercorriamo brevemente una serie di teorie sviluppate per descrivere le preferenze di de-
cisori comportamentali. In particolare, introduciamo la Prospect Theory e la Cumulative
Prospect Theory (CPT), la Teoria Duale di Yaari e la teoria Security-Potential/Aspiration.
Nel secondo capitolo impostiamo e risolviamo un problema di ottimizzazione di portafoglio
in tempo continuo per un insider che agisce secondo la CPT. Forniamo un'analisi nei
casi di informazione forte, parziale e debole. Gli strumenti matematici che usiamo sono
l'integrazione di Choquet, l'allargamento delle ﬁltrazioni e la teoria del ﬁltraggio. Inoltre,
estendiamo la trattazione alla Teoria Duale e al problema Goal Reaching e confrontiamo
dettagliatamente i risultati con il caso di un decisore che aderisca alla teoria dell'Utilità
Attesa (UA). Nel terzo capitolo, studiamo modelli di equilibrio in un mercato ﬁnanziario
uniperiodale stilizzato in cui gli agenti con preferenze eterogenee possono interagire. La
novità risiede nell'utilizzo di una nozione di equilibrio basata sulla teoria dei giochi. Diamo
delle condizioni suﬃcienti per l'esistenza nel caso di un mercato popolato da un agente
UA inﬂuente, un agente CPT inﬂuente e un market maker accomodante. Per agente in-
ﬂuente, intendiamo un investitore che abbia un impatto non trascurabile sul rendimento
atteso e sulla volatilità del titolo rischioso. Modelliamo esplicitamente tale impatto con
funzioni lineari. Successivamente, presentiamo il caso di molti agenti UA e molti agenti
CPT. Completiamo la nostra analisi con un'estesa analisi numerica degli equilibri.
Parole chiave: Finanza comportamentale, insider trading, informazione debole, Cumula-
tive Prospect Theory, avversione alle perdite, agenti eterogenei.
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Résumé: Dans cette thèse nous abordons deux sujets récents de la ﬁnance comportemen-
tale qui concernent l'optimisation de portefeuille et l'existence d'équilibres dans les marchés
ﬁnanciers. On introduit d'abord les diﬀérentes théories qu'ont été développées dans la lit-
térature pour modéliser les préférences des agents comportementals : la Prospect Theory
et la Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), la théorie duale des choix de Yaari et la théorie
dite Security-Potential/Aspiration. Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous étudions un prob-
lème d'optimisation de portefeuille en temps continue pour un agent initié qui suit la CPT.
Nous donnons une solution dans les cas d'information forte, incomplète et faible. Les out-
ils mathématiques employés sont l'intégrale de Choquet, le grossissement des ﬁltrations
et la théorie du ﬁltrage. En outre, nous généralisons nos résultats à la théorie duale de
Yaari et au problème Goal Reaching et nous faisons une comparaison détaillée avec un
agent qui maximise son utilité espérée (UE). Dans le troisième chapitre, nous étudions des
modèles d'équilibre statique dans un marché ﬁnancier à une période où nos agents ont
des préférences hétérogènes et ils interagissent entre eux. Nous utilisons une approche qui
s'inspire de la théorie des jeux. Nous donnons des conditions suﬃsantes pour l'existence
dans le cas d'un agent UE inﬂuent, un agent CPT inﬂuent et un market maker complaisant.
En particulier, nous supposons que ces agents inﬂuencent le rendement et la volatilité des
actifs de façon linéaire. Enﬁn, le cas de plusieurs agents UE et CPT est considéré. Nous
complétons notre étude par une analyse numérique et graphique des équilibres.
Mots clés: Finance comportementale, délit d'initié, information faible, Cumulative
Prospect Theory, aversion aux pertes, agents hétérogènes.
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Chapter 1
Introductions
As speciﬁed by the agreement between Università di Pisa and Université Paris-Dauphine,
we present a brief introduction for this thesis in English and in the original languages of
the two universities, that is to say Italian and French respectively.
1.1 Introduction (in English)
As the title of this document says, the two main topics of this thesis are information
asymmetry and equilibrium models in ﬁnancial markets. Both issues have an existing huge
literature which is hard to summarize in a few pages. Furthermore, it is not diﬃcult to ﬁnd
papers and articles which study information asymmetries in equilibrium models. However,
most of the research concentrated on the analysis of the optimal policies or strategies of
classical agents. By the word classical, we mean that the representative person of the
economy is an Expected Utility maximizer (EU in what follows) and everything she cares
about is the expected utility of her terminal wealth or ﬁnancial position. What is somewhat
new in this thesis is the attempt to model information asymmetry and equilibrium settings
when our agents are not of the EU type. The natural questions which come readily after are:
how does the optimal strategies of the representative investor change? And how equilibria
are aﬀected by the presence of agents which are not of EU type? We tried to give answers
to these questions and our results are presented in this manuscript.
This introduction condenses the historical development of the issues of this thesis.
Obviously, we just want to give an idea of the main ﬁndings of the past decades and which
led me and many other researchers to work on these extremely interesting topics. More
detailed discussions can be found in the introductory sections of the following chapters.
1.1.1 Non-expected utility theories
As we said before, solely EU investors have always been considered by researchers for many
decades. In fact, one of the earlier systematic studies on the behavior of economic agents
was the axiomatic theory of Expected Utility due to von Neumann and Morgenstern in
1944, [51]. Thanks to its simple and mathematically sound formulation, EU theory imme-
diately became the favorite framework of the economic and ﬁnancial scientiﬁc community.
Mathematically speaking, if we suppose to evaluate the uncertain ﬁnancial position X with
cumulative distribution function (c.d.f. in what follows) FX(·) using the EU paradigm, then
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its value would be
E [u(X)] =
∫ +∞
−∞
u(x) dFX(x), (1.1.1)
where u(·) is a utility function supposed to be globally concave on R in order to capture
risk aversion. Loosely speaking, EU distorts the absolute payment x through the function
u(·) and linearly adds over probabilities. Now, as it happens for every theoretical model,
it was necessary to analyze whether this facts were actually put into practice.
In a brief period, the lack of a deep testing made it possible for the scientiﬁc community
to accept EU as the actual paradigm of choice. However, it took just a few years to realize
that something was eﬀectively wrong with EU theory. A number of diﬀerent choice patterns
by economic agents came into light and systematic deviations from the EU axioms were
empirically observed. This phenomena are nowadays usually referred to as paradoxes or
puzzles, and the most famous ones are the Friedman and Savage puzzle (1948, [26]), the
Allais paradox (1953, [1]), the Ellsberg paradox (1961, [24]) and the Equity Premium
puzzle (1985, [48]). The most criticized points of EU theory were (and still are) the overall
concavity of the utility function u(·) and the perfect rationality in estimating probabilities.
To overcome this ﬂaws, new paradigms of choice began to rise and diﬀerent axioms were
postulated in order to correctly frame the behavior of ordinary people.
In 1979, Kahneman and Tversky [36] entered the scene with their revolutionary Prospect
Theory (PT hereafter). In their language, a prospect is nothing but a lottery. Starting from
laboratory experiments, what they observed was a systematic violation of the tenets of EU
theory and they accounted for several inconsistencies which led them to reject EU theory
as a descriptive model of decision making under risk. In particular, they highlighted the
fact that people tend to distinguish between gains and losses, hence they evaluate their
ﬁnancial positions w.r.t. a wealth reference level. Not only, the value function (which
replaces the utility function) was conjectured to be concave over gains, convex over losses1
and steeper for losses than for gains; this fact would imply risk aversion in choices involv-
ing gains and risk seeking in choices involving losses. Finally, actual probabilities could
be observed during the experiment by the decision makers; however, when choosing the
preferred lottery people behaved as they attached decision weights to events and those
weights were generally lower than the corresponding probabilities, except in the range of
low probabilities. It is important to highlight the fact that such decision weights have not
to be considered as measures of degree of belief. Instead, they are a way to reveal attitude
toward risk, which is no more only captured by the value function.
Mathematically speaking, a prospect can be viewed as a vector X = (x1, p1; . . . ;xn, pn),
that is a contract which provides the wealth level xi with probability pi, where p1+· · ·+pn =
1, pi ≥ 0. By her nature, a PT agent possesses a wealth reference level L ∈ R, a value
function v(·) which is concave for x ≥ L and convex otherwise, and a probability weighting
function pi(·) which is increasing and such that pi(0) = 0 and pi(1) = 1. Hence, the value
that such an agent would attach to the prospect X is
VPT (X) = v(x1 − L)pi(p1) + · · ·+ v(xn − L)pi(pn). (1.1.2)
This discrete formulation follows faithfully the original framework by Kahneman and Tver-
sky in [36], whereas its continuous counterpart has been modeled by Rieger and Wang in
1As Kahneman and Tversky point out in [36], they were not the ﬁrst ones in supposing a non globally
concave utility function and the existence of a wealth reference level. Markowitz in [47] already tried to
explain these features but he still retained the linearity in probabilities, hence expectation w.r.t. additive
measures.
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2008, [53]. The mathematical diﬀerences w.r.t. EU theory are easily seen if we compute
the EU of the same prospect X:
E [u(X)] = u(x1)p1 + · · ·+ u(xn)pn. (1.1.3)
As it is obvious from equation (1.1.2), the novelty of PT is that it allows for distortion on
adjusted payments w.r.t. L and linearly adds over distorted probabilities.
In 1987, a new paradigm appeared in order to explain human behavior when facing
risk. Yaari's dual theory of choice [59] was an attempt to solve some of the paradoxes
originated by the EU theory. On one hand, it was able to correct them and to better
explain how choices are made; on the other hand, its assumptions gave rise to a number
of dual paradoxes. Speciﬁcally, Yaari's criterion eliminated the distortion on payments
while admitting a weighting function w(·) over the decumulative distribution function of a
lottery X2. From a mathematical point of view, given a non-negative ﬁnancial position X
with c.d.f. FX(·), an agent who follows Yaari's principles evaluates X as
VY (X) =
∫ +∞
0
w (1− FX(x)) dx. (1.1.4)
Formally, supposing that every technical condition is satisﬁed in order to use integration
by parts, we see that (1.1.4) is nothing but
VY (X) =
∫ +∞
0
x d [−w (1− FX(x))] , (1.1.5)
where it is obvious to note the absence of a utility function but at the same time one
considers a distortion applied to 1−FX(·). A comparison between the previous expression
and the analogous for the EU theory in (1.1.1) easily explains the naming of non-expected
utility for Yaari's criterion. Another interesting feature of Yaari's measure stands in the
fact that it is able to easily capture the risk aversion or risk loving behavior of an agent. As
a matter of fact, Yaari [59] shows that a convex probability distortion w(·) characterizes a
risk averse person, whereas a concave w(·) identiﬁes a risk lover one. Intuitively, a convex
w(·) lies below the identity function over [0, 1] and it reveals an overweighting of relatively
small payoﬀs and a simultaneous underweighting of relatively high payoﬀs, thus suggesting
risk aversion.
Another diﬀerent approach to decision making also appeared in 1987 by means of
Lopes [46]. From a mathematical point of view, the new paradigm was similar to Yaari's,
although its economical interpretation is more involved and subtle. Lopes's framework is
widely known as SP/A theory, where the acronym stands for Security-Potential/Aspiration.
Loosely speaking, this time an individual's objective is to obtain as much as possible from
a lottery X while satisfying her own aspiration of a minimal wealth level with a given
positive probability α. A proper mathematical framing for a non-negative continuous
ﬁnancial position X is
VL(X) =
∫ +∞
0
w (1− FX(x)) dx
subject to 1− FX(A) ≥ α,
(1.1.6)
2Given a c.d.f. F (·), the decumulative distribution function (d.d.f. from now on) is deﬁned as D(x) :=
1− F (x), x ∈ R.
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where A ∈ [0,+∞) represents the aspiration level and w(·) is once again a probability
weighting function. However, Lopes's purpose was to model w(·) as a weighted average of
a convex and a concave function, where the ﬁrst one should guarantee the security through
risk aversion and the second one should highlight the potential through risk seeking.
Next, a crucial breakpoint in the history of paradigms of choice took place in 1992 with
Kahneman and Tversky's Cumulative Prospect Theory [57] (CPT hereafter; CPT agent
will also be called behavioral). As a matter of fact, its importance was widely assessed with
the Nobel Prize winning by Kahneman in 2002. This updated version of PT contains two
crucial new features. Firstly, it is cumulative in the sense that probability distortions now
act over the d.d.f. as in Yaari's and Lopes's theories. Secondly, CPT allows for two distinct
probability weighting functions, one for the gains and one for the losses. The motivation
of such a framing obviously came from laboratory observations of risk attitude patterns.
The resulting mathematical formulation is undoubtedly much more involved. If we denote
with u+(·) and u−(·) the value functions for gains and losses respectively, with w+(·) and
w−(·) the distortion functions on gains and losses respectively and with L ∈ R the wealth
reference point, then a CPT agent evaluates a prospect X with the underlying probability
measure P as
VCPT (X) =
∫ +∞
0
w+
(
P
{
u+
(
(X − L)+) > x}) dx
−
∫ +∞
0
w−
(
P
{
u−
(
(X − L)−) > x}) dx, (1.1.7)
where (X − L)+ and (X − L)− denote the positive and the negative part of the lottery
(X − L) respectively. To conclude, we recall that in [57] the authors observed so called
reversed S-shaped weighting functions w±(·), i.e. people tended to overweight relatively
large gains and losses of small probabilities. Moreover, if we merge the value functions
u+(·) and u−(·) we obtain a so called S-shaped value function due to the concavity on
gains and the convexity on losses.
We limit ourselves to the analysis of these paradigms, as our opinion is that they are
the cornerstones of the evolution of modeling human behavior towards risk. Now, let's
pause a little over the technicalities concerning such problems.
As we said before, one of the main reasons of the success of EU theory is its relative
mathematical simplicity, which stems from the global concavity of the utility function and
the linearity in probability. These facts make it possible to exploit the powerful duality
theory when maximizing EU; moreover, the strict concavity of u(·) would also lead to
uniqueness of optimization problems. Furthermore, in a dynamic setting linear expecta-
tions allow on one hand to employ dynamic programming principles, HJB equations and
veriﬁcation theorems; on the other hand, a so called martingale approach has been devel-
oped when facing constrained optimization problems and the original problem reduces to
an easier static optimization one.
What happens if we abandon the concavity of the utility function? In Yaari's model
(1.1.4), we see that linearity in payments is a reduction of the problem. On the contrary, in
PT and in CPT the S-shaped version of the value function sharply increases the complexity.
Loosely speaking, the optimization problem has to be split into two distinct parts to be
independently analyzed; unfortunately, when merging these two sides of the problem one
can run up against ill-posedness issues, as the trade-oﬀ between the two parts is not always
set up right.
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And what happens when we remove the linearity in probabilities? This time, both
Yaari's and CPT model share this lack of linearity. Obviously, stochastic control is no
more exploitable as dynamic programming principles aﬀord on the linearity of conditional
expectations. However, an ad hoc mathematical theory has been developed during the 50's
to cope with non-linear expectations. Choquet's works [19] on the so called capacities w◦P
allow to diﬀerently frame our problems and exploit comonotonicity properties of random
variables to reach the optimal solution. For more details on Choquet's problems see Section
2.13.
A comprehensive method to solve most of the optimization problems which arise from
the previous paradigms has been showed by He and Zhou. In [27], the authors exploit a
technique known as quantile formulation. By a series of equivalent transformations, they
are able to change the domain of the problems from a set of random variables (lotteries or
prospects) to a set of inverse c.d.f., i.e. the quantiles.
1.1.2 Portfolio optimization with information asymmetries
Now we shift our attention to the history of information asymmetry in ﬁnancial markets.
In particular, we will focus on the methods of modeling the presence of diﬀerent informed
agents who have to maximize the EU obtained from their terminal ﬁnancial positions.
A widespread feature of this type of models is to assume a speciﬁc multidimensional
Stochastic Diﬀerential Equation (brieﬂy, SDE) driving risky asset prices and interest rates
under the so called historical probability P. This measure is the one which governs prices
and which is known by the representative agent in the full information case. Without loss
of generality, one can suppose prices to be Brownian motion driven semi-martingales and
a fully informed investor knows the drift and the diﬀusion parts. Now, one can distinguish
among less or more informed traders w.r.t. the representative one.
If an agent is less informed than usual, we place ourselves in the partial or incomplete
information case. Here, the investor is usually assumed to observe only asset prices and
interest rates but she does not know the underlying drift process and the driving Brownian
motion under P. Obviously, all she can do is to infer those processes from her market
observations. Mathematically, the techniques mostly used are based on ﬁltering theory
(see for example [52] and more recently [12] and [21]). Given a ﬁltration smaller than that
of the full information case, the problem reduces to ﬁnd a new probability measure and
a ﬁltered SDE which describes the observable prices. After that, the optimal portfolio
strategy and the optimal terminal wealth can be computed using the martingale approach
or stochastic control theory.
On the contrary, if the investor is more informed than the representative agent, then
we are facing an insider trading problem. Intensive research on this subject started in the
last part of the 90's and the literature has been unceasingly growing during the following
decade. The seminal paper concerning this issue is by no doubt the one by Karatzas and
Pikovsky in 1996, [37]. Here the authors study a strong information problem, that is to say
an insider who knows P-a.s. the realization of a random variable related to the prices of
the risky assets. In considerably many examples, optimal investment policies and optimal
terminal wealths are found and a general solution scheme is proposed. This is substantially
based on enlargement of ﬁltration techniques, as the insider bases her decisions on a wider
information set. Not only, the authors are able to explicitly quantify the so called insider's
gain, i.e. the diﬀerence between the expected utility of an informed and a non informed
trader.
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An even more general approach has been suggested by Amendinger, Imkeller and
Schweizer in 1998, [4]. Once again enlargement of ﬁltration is the core of the theory;
however, it is used more subtly and it leads to an entropy characterization of the insider's
gain thanks to the particular choice of a logarithmic utility function. In the following
years, slightly diﬀerent versions of this problem have been analyzed using a variety of new
techniques. Just to give an idea, dynamical arrival of new information has been considered
instead of the initial knowledge of a random variable; besides this, large insiders able to
inﬂuence the market prices and mean-variance optimization are some of the topics un-
der study. Moreover, Malliavin calculus, forward stochastic integral and optimal stopping
theory was the used machinery (see [40] for a comprehensive treatment).
In 2002, Baudoin [8] proposed an alternative framing of an insider's problem. In his
setting, the informed investor only observes prices under the equivalent martingale measure
and she is not supposed to know the historical probability P. Hence, she does not possess an
almost sure information under P but her extra knowledge consists in the law (under P) of a
random variable related to the stock prices. Aﬀording on the theory of Conditioned SDEs,
Baudoin was able to study complete and arbitrage-free Markovian ﬁnancial markets and
to quantify the insider's gain. This framework is usually referred to as weak information
case and its economical implications are better studied in [9].
In Chapter 2, we consider the full, the strong, the partial and the weak information cases
in a complete and arbitrage-free continuous time ﬁnancial market where the representative
agent behaves as in CPT or Yaari's dual theory. Nonetheless, it contains a further section
concerning an investor facing the goal reaching problem; for an extensive treatment of such
a problem, see [15].3
1.1.3 Equilibrium models in ﬁnancial markets
Finally, we brieﬂy (and partially) consider the evolution of equilibrium models in simple
ﬁnancial markets. Once again, EU maximizers were the only type of agents considered
during the ﬁrst decades of research. Concerning general equilibrium models, a fundamen-
tal work on this topic was Sharpe's Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) in 1964, [55],
where he considered a pure competition ﬁnancial market populated by risk-averse investors.
Employing the equilibrium constraint of demand equating supply and introducing a risk-
free asset, the author found out a linear dependence between the risk premium of one's
optimal portfolio and that of the market portfolio. Further development of the CAPM led
in the following years to alternative models like Consumption CAPM (CCAPM), where
the equilibrium risk premium is derived using a no-arbitrage condition. A diﬀerent at-
tempt to illustrate how equilibrium risk premium is engendered is the Arbitrage Pricing
Theory (APT), where a number of risk factors are linearly combined under a no-arbitrage
condition.
The role played by distinct information levels in ﬁnancial market is clearly highlighted
in Kyle's seminal paper in 1985, [42]. Considering a stylized one risky asset market made
up of a risk neutral market maker, a risk neutral insider and a population of noise traders,
the author looks for an equilibrium represented by a pair of demand (by the insider) and
pricing (by the market maker) strategies. Employing game theory tools, a linear equilib-
rium is eﬀectively obtained in a one period, a discrete multi-period and a continuous time
3The content of Chapter 2 is substantially an extended version of the submitted article Weak Insider
Trading and Behavioral Finance by me and my co-supervisor Prof. L. Campi. I apologize for possible
repetitions on the subjects contained in this introduction.
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setting. The strength of Kyle's results lie in their simplicity and clarity; as a consequence,
a considerable stream of research started in the mid 80's with the hope to better investi-
gate the interaction of diﬀerent informed agents and the way information is incorporated
in market prices. Just to mention a few, we recall Wu's Ph.D. Thesis in 1999, [58], where
several extensions of the original model are studied (for example, the case with two insiders
or when the informed agent faces information costs; the interested reader can ﬁnd more
references to these topics in the bibliography in [58]); Cho's paper in 2003, [18], where a
risk-averse insider is considered, and Campi and Çetin's work in 2007, [16], where pricing
of ﬁrms' defaultable zero coupon bonds is studied.
After the success of diﬀerent preference criteria like CPT, some researchers tried to
incorporate those performance measures in equilibrium models. A summary of these at-
tempts can be found in Section 3.1; brieﬂy, the main steps consisted in extending CAPM in
an economy populated by homogeneous CPT investors, that is to say that all agents share
the same preference parameters like value functions and probability distortions. About this
topic, positive and negative results alternated as the proofs of existence of equilibria are
extremely dependent on the market and the preference assumptions. In other words, they
show a critical lack of robustness.
To avoid this striking problem, the models we propose in Chapter 3 are built on a
game theoretical basis. Moreover, the presence of an accommodating market maker or
the assumption of sensible constraints allow equilibria to be proof against slight changes
of the market and/or preference parameters. Not only, that chapter contains an extensive
sensitivity analysis over market parameters which has been carried out employing numerical
and graphical tools.4
1.2 Introduzione (in Italiano)
Come si evince dal titolo, i due argomenti principali di questa tesi sono le asimmetrie
informative e i modelli di equilibrio nei mercati ﬁnanziari. Per entrambi i problemi esiste
una enorme letteratura che è sostanzialmente impossibile riassumere in queste poche righe.
Inoltre, non è diﬃcile trovare degli articoli che studiano le asimmetrie informative calate nei
modelli di equilibrio. Tuttavia, la maggior parte della ricerca accademica si è concentrata
sull'analisi delle strategie ottime degli agenti classici, ovvero il soggetto rappresentativo
dell'economia considerata è un agente che mira a massimizzare la propria utilità attesa (EU
in seguito, dall'inglese Expected Utility) poiché tutto ciò che le interessa è esclusivamente
l'utilità attesa derivante dalla propria ricchezza ﬁnale o posizione ﬁnanziaria. Ciò che è
in parte nuovo in questa tesi è il tentativo di descrivere le asimmetrie d'informazione e i
modelli di equilibrio quando gli agenti economici non sono del tipo EU. Alcune domande
sorgono spontanee: come cambiano le strategie ottimali dell'investitore tipico? Ed in che
modo sono inﬂuenzati gli equilibri dalla presenza di agenti non EU? Abbiamo provato a
dare delle risposte a questi problemi e i nostri risultati sono qui di seguito esposti.
Questa introduzione condensa l'evoluzione storica dei problemi che andremo a trattare.
Ovviamente, è nostra intenzione dare soltanto un'idea di massima delle maggiori scoperte
degli scorsi decenni ed illustrare ciò che ha portato me e molti altri ricercatori a lavorare
su questi argomenti estremamente interessanti. Discussioni più dettagliate possono essere
4Analogously to Chapter 2, Chapter 3 is an extended version of my working paper Market equilibrium
with heterogeneous behavioral and classical investors' preferences. I apologize once again for possible
repetitions.
7
1.2. Introduzione (in Italiano)
trovate nelle sezioni introduttive dei capitoli seguenti.
1.2.1 Teorie dell'utilità non attesa
Come già anticipato, per molti decenni gli studiosi hanno considerato esclusivamente in-
vestitori di tipo EU. Infatti, uno dei primi studi sistematici sul comportamento degli agenti
economici in condizioni di incertezza è stata proprio l'impostazione assiomatica dell'utilità
attesa dovuta a von Neumann e Morgenstern nel 1944, [51]. Grazie alla sua formulazione
matematica relativamente semplice ed al tempo stesso sensata da un punto di vista eco-
nomico, la teoria dell'utilità attesa divenne immediatamente lo schema di base su cui la
comunità scientiﬁca iniziò a costruire modelli ﬁnanziari. In termini matematici, se suppo-
niamo di valutare la posizione ﬁnanziaria aleatoria X con funzione di distribuzione (c.d.f.
in seguito, dall'inglese cumulative distribution function) FX(·) utilizzando il paradigma
dell'utilità attesa, allora il suo valore sarà
E [u(X)] =
∫ +∞
−∞
u(x) dFX(x), (1.2.1)
dove u(·) è una funzione di utilità su R, supposta globalmente concava aﬃnché l'agente
considerato sia avverso al rischio. In altre parole, calcolare l'utilità attesa signiﬁca distorcere
le quantità monetarie x attraverso la funzione u(·) e contemporaneamente sommarle con le
rispettive probabilità di realizzo. Ora, come accade per ogni modello puramente teorico, si
rese necessario indagare sulla eventualità che questa descrizione del comportamento degli
investitori si materializzasse nei mercati reali.
Ad ogni modo, la mancanza di test accurati rese naturale, da parte della comunità
scientiﬁca, l'adozione dell'utilità attesa come il vero paradigma descrittivo e normativo
delle scelte in condizioni di incertezza. Tuttavia furono suﬃcienti pochi anni per rendersi
conto della presenza di alcune falle in tale teoria. In particolare, misurazioni e veriﬁche
empiriche portarono alla luce una serie di comportamenti estranei a tale paradigma; inol-
tre, tali deviazioni erano sistematiche e non frutto di accadimenti puramente casuali o
circostanziati. Questi fenomeni sono oggi universalmente conosciuti come paradossi o puz-
zles, e i più famosi sono senz'altro il puzzle di Friedman e Savage (1948, [26]), il paradosso
di Allais (1953, [1]), il paradosso di Ellsberg (1961, [24]) and il cosiddetto Equity Premium
puzzle (1985, [48]), ovvero il fatto che la diﬀerenza di rendimento atteso tra titoli rischiosi
e titoli privi di rischio è considerabilmente e persistentemente più elevata di quanto la teo-
ria preveda. Le caratteristiche più criticate della teoria dell'utilità attesa furono (e sono
tuttora) la concavità globale della funzione di utilità u(·) e la razionalità perfetta nella
stima delle probabilità. Per superare questi difetti sono stati formulati nuovi paradigmi
di scelta in condizioni di incertezza e diversi assiomi sono stati postulati per descrivere
correttamente il comportamento delle persone.
Nel 1979, Kahneman e Tversky, [36], introdussero la rivoluzionaria Prospect Theory (in
seguito PT). Usando la loro terminologia, la parola prospect indica una lotteria, o variabile
aleatoria. Utilizzando dati provenienti da esperimenti condotti in laboratorio, Kahneman
e Tversky osservarono una violazione sistematica dei cardini della teoria dell'utilità attesa
e si accorsero di numerose inconsistenze che portarono ad un riﬁuto di tale teoria quale
modello descrittivo delle scelte in condizioni di incertezza. In particolare, i due studiosi
sottolinearono il fatto che le persone tendono a distinguere tra guadagni e perdite, ovvero
valutano la propria posizione ﬁnanziaria rispetto ad un livello di ricchezza preso come punto
di riferimento (reference level). Non solo, la funzione valore (che sostituisce il concetto
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di funzione di utilità) viene ipotizzata concava sui guadagni ma convessa sulle perdite5 e
più inclinata sulle perdite che sui guadagni; questo fatto implica avversione al rischio nelle
scelte concernenti solo guadagni e propensione al rischio nelle scelte riguardanti solo perdite.
Inﬁne, le vere probabilità degli eventi potevano essere osservate durante gli esperimenti dai
partecipanti; tuttavia, nello scegliere la lotteria preferita i decisori si comportavano come
se attribuissero dei pesi (diversi dalle vere probabilità) agli eventi e questi pesi erano in
genere inferiori alle corrispondenti probabilità oggettive, eccetto che per le probabilità
suﬃcientemente basse. E' importante evidenziare il fatto che questi pesi non devono essere
interpretati come misure del grado di verosimiglianza degli eventi. Al contrario, questi
sono parte integrante del comportamento nei confronti del rischio, che non è più rivelato
esclusivamente attraverso la funzione valore.
In termini matematici, una lotteria/prospect può essere vista come un vettore X =
(x1, p1; . . . ;xn, pn), ovvero un contratto che garantisce il pagamento xi con probabilità pi,
dove p1 + · · · + pn = 1, p1 ≥ 0. Inoltre, un agente PT possiede un livello di riferimento
L ∈ R, una funzione valore v(·) concava per x ≥ L e convessa altrimenti, e una funzione di
distorsione delle probabilità pi(·) crescente e tale che pi(0) = 0, pi(1) = 1. Dunque, il valore
che un tale agente PT attribuisce alla lotteria X è dato da
VPT (X) = v(x1 − L)pi(p1) + · · ·+ v(xn − L)pi(pn). (1.2.2)
Questa formulazione discreta ricalca fedelmente il lavoro originale di Kahneman e Tversky
in [36], mentre una sua versione con variabili aleatorie continue è stata proposta da Rieger
e Wang nel 2008, [53]. Le diﬀerenze tra la teoria dell'utilità attesa e la PT possono essere
ben viste calcolando l'utilità attesa della stessa lotteria X:
E [u(X)] = u(x1)p1 + · · ·+ u(xn)pn. (1.2.3)
Come si evince dall'equazione (1.2.2), la novità della PT è che essa include la possibilità
di distorsioni sui livelli monetari adattati rispetto a L; inoltre, la somma è eﬀettuata sulla
probabilità distorte.
Nel 1987, un nuovo paradigma è stato proposto per spiegare il comportamento in con-
dizioni di incertezza. La teoria duale delle scelte dovuta a Yaari, [59], è un tentativo di
risolvere alcuni dei paradossi originati dalla teoria dell'utilità attesa. Da una parte, le idee
di Yaari sono state in grado di correggerne alcuni difetti; dall'altro lato, le ipotesi della teo-
ria duale hanno portato ad una serie di paradossi duali. In particolare, il criterio proposto
da Yaari non prevede una distorsione delle quantità monetarie ma ammette la presenza di
una funzione di distorsione w(·) sulla funzione di distribuzione decumulata di una lotteria
X6. Da un punto di vista matematico, data una posizione ﬁnanziaria X con c.d.f. FX(·),
un agente che si attiene al paradigma di Yaari valuta X come
VY (X) =
∫ +∞
0
w (1− FX(x)) dx. (1.2.4)
5Come notato da Kahneman e Tversky in [36], loro non furono i primi a supporre una funzione di utilità
non globalmente concava e l'esistenza di un livello di riferimento. Markowitz in [47] aveva già provato ad
introdurre queste varianti, mantenendo però l'ipotesi di linearità sulle probabilità, dalla quale seguivano
speranze matematiche rispetto a misure additive.
6Data una c.d.f. F (·), la funzione di distribuzione decumulata (in seguito d.d.f., dall'inglese decumula-
tive distribution function) è deﬁnita da D(x) := 1− F (x), x ∈ R.
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Formalmente, in presenza delle necessarie ipotesi tecniche possiamo utilizzare la formula
di integrazione per parti e osservare che (1.2.4) non è altro che
VY (X) =
∫ +∞
0
x d [−w (1− FX(x))] , (1.2.5)
dove è immediato notare l'assenza di una funzione di utilità ma al tempo stesso la presenza
di una distorsione applicata a 1 − FX(·). Un confronto tra la precedente equazione e la
sua analoga nel caso di EU (1.2.1) spiega la dicitura di utilità non attesa per il paradigma
di Yaari. Un'altra caratteristica interessante della teoria duale risiede nella sua semplicità
nell'esprimere l'avversione o la propensione al rischio di un agente. Infatti, Yaari in [59] di-
mostra che una distorsione delle probabilità w(·) convessa caratterizza un soggetto avverso
al rischio, mentre una w(·) concava identiﬁca un amante del rischio. Intuitivamente, una
funzione w(·) convessa giace al di sotto della bisettrice del primo quadrante sull'intervallo
[0, 1] e rivela una sovrastima dei guadagni relativamente piccoli ed una simultanea sot-
tostima dei guadagni relativamente grandi; in altre parole suggerisce un pessimismo che si
concretizza in avversione al rischio.
Un approccio diverso alla teoria delle decisioni apparve, sempre nel 1987, ad opera
di Lopes, [46]. Da un punto di vista matematico, il nuovo paradigma è simile a
quello di Yaari; nonostante ciò, la sua interpretazione economica è più intricata e sot-
tile. Il modello proposto da Lopes è maggiormente conosciuto come teoria SP/A,
dove l'acronimo sta per Security-Potential/Aspiration, verosimilmente traducibile come
Certezza-Potenziale/Aspirazione. In altre parole, in questo scenario l'obiettivo di un
soggetto economico è ottenere il massimo valore possibile (da deﬁnire esattamente) da una
lotteria X soddisfacendo al tempo stesso un vincolo di aspirazione ad un livello minimo
di ricchezza con una predeterminata probabilità positiva α. Una corretta formulazione
matematica per una posizione ﬁnanziaria non-negativa continua X è
VL(X) =
∫ +∞
0
w (1− FX(x)) dx
sotto vincolo 1− FX(A) ≥ α,
(1.2.6)
dove A ∈ [0,+∞) rappresenta il livello di aspirazione e w(·) è ancora una funzione di
distorsione delle probabilità. Tuttavia, l'obiettivo di Lopes era modellare w(·) come una
media ponderata di una funzione convessa ed una concava, dove la prima dovrebbe garantire
la certezza grazie all'insita avversione al rischio, mentre la seconda dovrebbe mostrare la
ricerca di un più elevato potenziale sfruttando la propensione al rischio.
Una svolta cruciale nella storia dei paradigmi di scelta si ebbe nel 1992 con la Cumu-
lative Prospect Theory (CPT in seguito) ancora ad opera di Kahneman e Tversky, [57].
La rilevanza della CPT è stata inoltre sottolineata dalla consegna del Premio Nobel per
l'economia nel 2002 a Kahneman. Questa versione aggiornata della PT contiene due novità
fondamentali; in primo luogo, è cumulata, nel senso che le distorsioni di probabilità vengono
ora applicate alla d.d.f. come nei modelli di Yaari e Lopes. Secondo fatto, la CPT consente
di utilizzare due distinte distorsioni di probabilità, una dal lato dei guadagni e l'altra dal
lato delle perdite. La motivazione di una tale formulazione proviene ancora una volta da
osservazioni di esperimenti condotti in laboratorio circa il comportamento in condizioni di
incertezza. La risultante struttura matematica è indubbiamente molto più complessa. Se
indichiamo con u+(·) e u−(·) le rispettive funzioni valore per i guadagni e per le perdite,
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con w+(·) e w−(·) le rispettive funzioni di distorsione delle probabilità per i guadagni e per
le perdite e con L ∈ R la ricchezza di riferimento, allora un agente comportamentale valuta
una lotteria X con la sottostante probabilità P come
VCPT (X) =
∫ +∞
0
w+
(
P
{
u+
(
(X − L)+) > x}) dx
−
∫ +∞
0
w−
(
P
{
u−
(
(X − L)−) > x}) dx, (1.2.7)
dove (X − L)+ e (X − L)− indicano rispettivamente la parte positiva e la parte negativa
della lotteria (X−L). Per concludere, ricordiamo che in [57] i due autori osservarono delle
funzioni di distorsione w±(·) cosiddette reversed S-shaped (ovvero a forma di S invertita);
altrimenti detto, gli agenti tendono a sovrastimare i guadagni e le perdite relativamente
maggiori e con minor probabilità di realizzo. Inoltre, congiungendo le funzioni valore u+(·)
e u−(·), otteniamo una singola funzione valore cosiddetta S-shaped (ovvero a forma di S),
dovuta in sintesi alla concavità sui guadagni ed alla convessità sulle perdite.
Limitiamo la nostra analisi a questi paradigmi, in quanto è nostra opinione che essi
siano le pietre miliari dell'evoluzione dei tentativi di modellare il comportamento umano
nei confronti del rischio. Ora ci soﬀermeremo brevemente su alcune questioni tecniche
riguardanti questi modelli.
Come detto in precedenza, una delle ragioni fondamentali del successo della teoria
dell'utilità attesa è la sua relativa semplicità matematica che scaturisce dalla concavità
globale della funzione di utilità e dalla linearità applicata alle probabilità degli eventi.
Queste caratteristiche permettono di sfruttare la teoria della dualità nei problemi di mas-
simizzazione dell'utilità attesa; non di meno, la stretta concavità della funzione u(·) conduce
all'unicità della soluzione per tali problemi di estremo vincolato. Inoltre, in un contesto
multiperiodale o in tempo continuo, la linearità delle speranze matematiche permette da un
lato di utilizzare i principi di programmazione dinamica, le equazioni di Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman e i teoremi di veriﬁca; dall'altro lato, è stato sviluppato un approccio ad hoc basato
sulla teoria delle martingale per risolvere problemi di ottimizzazione vincolata e ricondurre
il problema originario ad una più semplice ottimizzazione statica.
Ora, cosa accade se abbandoniamo l'ipotesi di concavità della funzione di utilità? Nel
modello di Yaari (1.2.4), notiamo che la linearità nelle quantità monetarie è una sempli-
ﬁcazione del problema. Al contrario, nella PT e nella CPT la forma ad S della funzione
valore aumenta notevolmente la diﬃcoltà del problema. A grandi linee, il problema di
ottimizzazione deve essere diviso in due parti distinte da analizzare separatamente, una
per i guadagni e l'altra per le perdite; sfortunatamente, quando si ricongiungono questi
due sotto-problemi è possibile imbattersi in questioni di cattiva positura dovuta al fatto
che non sempre il bilanciamento delle due parti può essere eﬀettuato.
E cosa accade se rimuoviamo la linearità nelle probabilità? Stavolta, sia il modello di
Yaari che la CPT mostrano mancanza di linearità. Ovviamente, la teoria del controllo
stocastico non è più utilizzabile poiché i principi di programmazione dinamica si basano
proprio sulla linearità delle speranze condizionali. Tuttavia, una teoria matematica ad hoc
è stata sviluppata negli anni '50 del secolo scorso ad opera di Choquet, [19]. La teoria delle
cosiddette capacità w ◦ P permette di riformulare i nostri problemi e sfruttare le proprietà
di comonotonicità delle variabili aleatorie al ﬁne di ottenere la soluzione ottima, se una
esiste. Per maggiori dettagli sui problemi di Choquet si veda la Sezione 2.13.
Un metodo suﬃcientemente generalizzato per risolvere la maggior parte dei problemi
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di ottimizzazione che scaturiscono dai precedenti paradigmi è stato proposto da He e Zhou
nel 2011. In [27], i due autori sfruttano una tecnica conosciuta come formulazione tramite
quantili. Con una serie di trasformazioni equivalenti, gli autori sono in grado di cambiare
il dominio dei problemi da un insieme di variabili aleatorie (le lotterie ammissibili) ad un
insieme di inverse di c.d.f. utilizzate per esprimere i quantili.
1.2.2 Ottimizzazione di portafoglio con asimmetrie informative
Ora rivolgiamo la nostra attenzione alla storia delle asimmetrie d'informazione nei mercati
ﬁnanziari. In particolare, ci soﬀermeremo sui metodi sviluppati al ﬁne di modellare la
presenza di agenti in possesso di diversi livelli di informazione che si preﬁggono l'obiettivo
di massimizzare l'utilità attesa della propria posizione ﬁnanziaria ﬁnale.
Una caratteristica condivisa di questa classe di modelli risiede nell'ipotizzare una parti-
colare equazione stocastica diﬀerenziale (SDE in breve, dall'inglese Stochastic Diﬀerential
Equation) che descriva l'evoluzione dei prezzi dei titoli e dei tassi di interesse in riferi-
mento alla cosiddetta probabilità storica (o di base) P. Questa misura altro non è che
quella che guida i prezzi ed è conosciuta dall'agente rappresentativo della nostra econo-
mia nel caso di informazione piena. Senza perdita di generalità, si possono supporre delle
dinamiche dei prezzi descritte da moti Browniani aritmetici, geometrici oppure generiche
semi-martingale. Un investitore pienamente informato conosce sia la parte di deriva (an-
che detta drift o trend) che quella di diﬀusione di tali SDE. A questo punto, è possibile
distinguere tra agenti più o meno informati rispetto a quello rappresentativo.
Se un investitore è meno informato, allora ci riconduciamo al caso di informazione
parziale o incompleta. Stavolta si suppone che l'agente osservi esclusivamente i prezzi dei
titoli ed i tassi di interesse presenti e passati; tuttavia, non è in grado di conoscere né il
drift né il moto Browniano sottostante rispetto alla probabilità P. Ovviamente, ciò che
è possibile fare è un'inferenza su tali processi a partire dalle osservazioni del mercato.
Matematicamente, le tecniche maggiormente utilizzate si basano sulla teoria del ﬁltraggio
(si veda ad esempio [52] o più recentemente [12] e [21]). Data una ﬁltrazione più piccola di
quella disponibile nel caso di piena informazione, il problema può essere ricondotto a quello
della ricerca di una nuova probabilità ed una SDE ﬁltrata che descriva i prezzi osservabili.
Dopo di ciò, la strategia di investimento ottimale e la ricchezza ottima ﬁnale possono essere
calcolate usando le proprietà delle martingale o il controllo stocastico.
Al contrario, se l'investitore è più informato dell'agente rappresentativo, allora stiamo
aﬀrontando un problema di insider trading. Su questo problema è stata condotta un'intensa
attività di ricerca iniziata nella seconda metà degli anni '90 e la letteratura a riguardo
ha incessantemente proceduto nel decennio successivo. Un inﬂuente articolo su questo
argomento è senza alcun dubbio quello ad opera di Karatzas e Pikovsky nel 1996, [37].
Nel loro studio, gli autori analizzano un problema di informazione forte, ovvero il caso
di un insider che conosca P quasi certamente la realizzazione di una variabile aleatoria
legata ai prezzi dei titoli rischiosi. In un'ampia serie di esempi gli autori sono in grado
di esibire le strategie di investimento ottimale e le relative ricchezze ottime ﬁnali; inoltre
viene proposto uno schema generale per la soluzione di tale problema. Questa soluzione è
sostanzialmente fondata su tecniche di ampliamento delle ﬁltrazioni, dato che l'insider è in
grado di prendere le proprie decisioni basandosi su un più ampio insieme di informazioni.
Non solo, gli autori sono in grado di quantiﬁcare esplicitamente il cosiddetto guadagno
dell'insider, cioè la diﬀerenza tra l'utilità attesa ottima di un insider e quella di un agente
pienamente informato.
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Un approccio ancora più generale è stato suggerito da Amendinger, Imkeller e Schweizer
nel 1998, [4]. Ancora una volta il nocciolo della teoria si basa sull'ampliamento delle ﬁl-
trazioni; tuttavia, queste tecniche sono utilizzate in maniera più particolareggiata e con-
ducono ad una caratterizzazione del guadagno dell'insider che sfrutta l'entropia delle misure
di probabilità, grazie anche alla particolare scelta della funzione di utilità logaritmica. Negli
anni seguenti sono state prese in considerazione versioni leggermente diverse di questo pro-
blema ed è stata proposta una nuova gamma di tecniche risolutive. Brevemente, invece di
supporre la conoscenza di una variabile aleatoria sin dall'inizio si è ipotizzato un processo
graduale di acquisizione di nuove informazioni; inoltre, sono stati analizzati i casi di insider
in grado di inﬂuenzare l'evoluzione dei prezzi di mercato e problemi di ottimizzazione fon-
dati sul criterio media-varianza. Gli strumenti matematici utilizzati spaziano dal calcolo di
Malliavin all'integrazione stocastica anticipante e alla teoria dell'arresto ottimale (per una
trattazione esaustiva si veda [40]).
Nel 2002, Baudoin [8] ha proposto una formulazione alternativa dei problemi riguardanti
l'insider trading. Nella sua impostazione, l'investitore privilegiato osserva solamente i prezzi
rispetto alla misura martingala equivalente e si suppone che non conosca la misura storica
P. Di conseguenza, non può possedere un'informazione quasi certa rispetto a P ma la sua
informazione privilegiata consiste nella conoscenza della legge (rispetto a P) di una variabile
aleatoria legata ai prezzi dei titoli rischiosi. Basandosi sulla teoria delle SDE condizionate,
Baudoin è stato in grado di studiare mercati ﬁnanziari completi e privi di possibilità di
arbitraggio e di quantiﬁcare il guadagno dell'insider. Questa formulazione va sotto il nome
di informazione debole e per uno studio delle sue implicazioni economiche si veda [9].
Nel Capitolo 2, consideriamo i casi di informazione piena, forte, parziale e debole in
mercati ﬁnanziari completi e privi di possibilità di arbitraggio in tempo continuo dove
l'agente rappresentativo segue la CPT o la teoria duale di Yaari. Non solo, tale capitolo
contiene una ulteriore sezione riguardante un investitore che aﬀronta il cosiddetto goal
reaching problem (ovvero il suo obiettivo è massimizzare la probabilità di ottenere un livello
minimo di ricchezza ﬁnale); per una trattazione più estesa di tale problema si veda [15].7
1.2.3 Modelli di equilibrio nei mercati ﬁnanziari
Per concludere questa introduzione, consideriamo brevemente (e solo in parte) l'evoluzione
dei modelli di equilibrio in mercati ﬁnanziari semplici. Ancora una volta, l'unico tipo
di agenti considerati nei primi decenni di ricerca accademica è stato quello di soggetti
massimizzanti la propria utilità attesa. Per quanto riguarda i modelli di equilibrio generale,
un lavoro fondamentale su questo argomento è senza dubbio il CAPM (dall'inglese Capital
Asset Pricing Model, traducibile come modello di prezzaggio dei titoli basato sulle ricchezze
investite) risalente al 1964 ad opera di Sharpe, [55]. Nel suo lavoro, l'autore considera
un mercato ﬁnanziario in condizioni di concorrenza perfetta popolato esclusivamente da
investitori avversi al rischio. Sfruttando il vincolo di chiusura del mercato, cioè domanda
totale dei titoli coincidente con l'oﬀerta totale degli stessi, e introducendo un titolo privo
di rischio, Sharpe ottiene una dipendenza lineare tra il premio per il rischio del portafoglio
ottimo di un generico investitore ed il premio per il rischio del portafoglio di mercato.
Ulteriori sviluppi del CAPM hanno portato negli anni seguenti a modelli alternativi quali
il CCAPM (dall'inglese Consumption CAPM), dove il premio per il rischio in equilibrio
7Il contenuto del Capitolo 2 è sostanzialmente una versione estesa dell'articolo Weak Insider Trading
and Behavioral Finance ad opera mia e del mio correlatore Prof. L. Campi. Mi scuso per eventuali
ripetizioni degli argomenti contenuti in questa introduzione.
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è ottenuto utilizzando una condizione di non arbitraggio. Un tentativo diverso di illustrare
il modo in cui si forma il premio per il rischio è l'APT (dall'inglese Arbitrage Pricing
Theory), dove si aﬃanca all'ipotesi di assenza di possibilità di arbitraggio la presenza di
un certo numero di fattori di rischio inseriti in una combinazione lineare.
Il modo in cui diversi livelli di informazione degli agenti inﬂuiscono sui mercati ﬁnanziari
è ben evidenziato nell'articolo del 1985 ad opera di Kyle, [42]. Considerando un mercato
stilizzato con un unico titolo rischioso, un market maker neutrale al rischio, un insider
neutrale al rischio ed una popolazione di agenti non strategici, l'autore si preﬁgge l'obiettivo
di trovare un equilibrio rappresentato da una coppia di strategie di domanda (da parte
dell'insider) e di prezzaggio (da parte del market maker). Sfruttando risultati propri della
teoria dei giochi, Kyle riesce ad ottenere un equilibrio con strategie lineari sia in un contesto
uniperiodale, sia in uno multiperiodale discreto, sia in tempo continuo. Il punto forte dei
risultati di Kyle risiede nella semplicità, chiarezza ed eleganza del modello; di conseguenza,
un notevole ﬁlone di ricerca è stato avviato nella metà degli anni '80 con l'obiettivo di
indagare in profondità sull'interazione tra agenti diversamente informati ed il modo in
cui l'informazione è incorporata nei prezzi di mercato. Ricordiamo, tra gli altri lavori,
la tesi di dottorato di Wu del 1999, [58], dove vengono studiate diverse estensioni del
modello originale (ad esempio, il caso con due insiders oppure il caso in cui l'insider debba
sostenere dei costi per acquisire informazioni privilegiate; il lettore interessato potrà trovare
più riferimenti nella bibliograﬁa della tesi di Wu); l'articolo di Cho nel 2003, [18], dove viene
considerato un insider avverso al rischio ed inﬁne il lavoro di Campi e Çetin nel 2007, [16],
in cui si studia il prezzaggio di zero coupon bonds emessi da un'azienda soggetta al rischio
di default.
In seguito all'aﬀermarsi di diversi paradigmi di scelta quali la CPT, alcuni ricercatori
hanno provato ad incorporare questi criteri di misurazione dei risultati ﬁnanziari nei mo-
delli di equilibrio. Una sintesi di questi tentativi si trova nella Sezione 3.1; brevemente,
gli sviluppi maggiori consistono nell'avere esteso il CAPM ad un'economia popolata da
investitori CPT omogenei, ovvero tutti condividenti gli stessi parametri usati per descri-
vere la funzione valore, il livello di ricchezza di riferimento e le distorsioni di probabilità.
Non solo, in merito a tali modelli di equilibrio si sono alternati risultati positivi e negativi,
poiché le dimostrazioni di esistenza di equilibri sono estremamente sensibili alla struttura
del mercato ed alle preferenze degli agenti; in altre parole, questa classe di modelli mostra
una totale mancanza di robustezza.
Proprio al ﬁne di evitare tale problema, i modelli che proponiamo nel Capitolo 3 sono
innanzitutto formulati in maniera idonea ad essere risolti mediante la teoria dei giochi.
Inoltre, la presenza di un market maker accomodante o di opportuni vincoli imposti sui
parametri del problema permettono di ottenere equilibri stabili rispetto a piccole variazioni
di tali parametri. Non solo, tale capitolo contiene una dettagliata analisi di sensitività
rispetto ai parametri di mercato eﬀettuata utilizzando analisi numerica e graﬁca.8
1.3 Introduction (en Français)
Comme le titre de ce document l'indique, les deux sujets de cette thèse sont les asymétries
d'information et les modèles d'équilibre dans les marchés ﬁnanciers. Pour ces deux prob-
lèmes, il existe une énorme littérature scientiﬁque qui ne peut pas être résumée exhaus-
8Il Capitolo 3 è una versione estesa del mio working paper Market equilibrium with heterogeneous
behavioral and classical investors' preferences. Mi scuso nuovamente per possibili ripetizioni.
14
1.3. Introduction (en Français)
tivement ici. Toutefois, la plupart des articles est focalisée sur l'analyse des stratégies
optimales des agents classiques, c'est-à-dire que l'agent représentatif de l'économie consid-
érée c'est un agent dont le but est de maximiser son utilité espérée (par la suite EU, d'après
l'anglais Expected Utility) parce que tout ce que lui intérêt est seulement l'utilité espérée
engendrée par sa richesse terminale ou sa position budgétaire. La nouveauté (en partie) de
cette thèse est le tentative de décrire les asymétries d'information et les modèles d'équilibre
dans le cas où les agents économiques ne sont pas forcement classiques. Or, les questions
suivantes s'imposent naturellement: comment les stratégies optimales des nos investisseurs
vont-elles changer? Et comment aﬀecteront-elles l'équilibre en présence d'agents qui ne
sont pas de type EU? Nous avons essayé a donner des réponses à ces problèmes et nos
résultats sont exposés tout de suite.
Cette introduction condense l'évolution historique des problèmes que nous irons anal-
yser. Évidemment, nous allons donner seulement les idées générales qui sont derrière les
découvertes les plus considérables des décennies passés et illustrer ce qui a conduit moi
et beaucoup d'autres chercheurs avant moi à travailler sur ces sujets qu'on estime très in-
téressants. Dans les chapitres suivants on pourra trouver une présentation détaillée de nos
résultats.
1.3.1 Théories de l'utilité non espérée
Comme nous l'avons déjà dit, pendant certains décennies les spécialistes ont considéré ex-
clusivement des investisseurs du type EU. En fait, un des premiers études systématiques
sur le comportement des agents économiques face au risque était l'approche axiomatique à
l'utilité espérée dûe à von Neumann et Morgenstern en 1944, [51]. Sa formulation math-
ématique relativement simple et au même temps judicieuse du point de vue économique
ont permit que la théorie de l'utilité espérée devienne tout de suite le principe sur lequel la
communauté scientiﬁque commençait a développer des modèles pour les marchés ﬁnanciers.
En termes mathématiques, si on suppose d'évaluer la position budgétaire aléatoire X avec
fonction de distribution (par la suite c.d.f., d'après l'anglais cumulative distribution func-
tion) FX(·) en utilisant le paradigme de l'utilité espérée, alors sa valeur sera
E [u(X)] =
∫ +∞
−∞
u(x) dFX(x), (1.3.1)
où u(·) est une fonction d'utilité sur R supposée globalement concave pour mettre en év-
idence l'aversion au risque de l'agent considéré. Autrement dit, calculer l'utilité espérée
veut dire déformer les sommes monétaires x par la fonction u(·) et en même temps les som-
mer en les pondérant avec les respectives probabilités de succès. Or, la théorie de l'utilité
espérée était un modèle totalement abstrait; donc, il faudrait vériﬁer si sa description du
comportement des investisseurs était exactement celui qui se réalisait dans les marchés
réels.
En tout cas, pendant les premiers années il manquait des soigneuses recherches sur
ce sujet; par conséquent il était logique pour la communauté scientiﬁque de considérer
l'utilité espérée comme le vrai paradigme descriptive et normative des choix face au risque.
Néanmoins, il faudrait seulement quelques années pour se rendre compte qui il y avait des
brèches importantes dans cette théorie. En particulier, nombreuses mesurages et vériﬁca-
tions empiriques ont mis en évidence beaucoup de comportements étrangers à ce paradigme;
de plus, ces déviations étaient systématiques et pas engendrée par des événements fortu-
its. Ces phénomènes sont aujourd'hui universellement connus comme paradoxes ou puzzles
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et les plus célèbres sont le puzzle de Friedman et Savage (1948, [26]), le paradoxe d'Allais
(1953, [1]), le paradoxe d'Ellsberg (1961,[24]) et le soi-disant Equity Premium puzzle (1985,
[48]), c'est à dire la constatation que le rendement espéré pour une action est considérable-
ment plus élevé que ce d'un placement sans risque. Les caractéristiques les plus critiquées
de la théorie de l'utilité espérée étaient (et sont encore) la concavité globale de la fonction
d'utilité u(·) et la rationalité parfaite supposée pour estimer les probabilités. Aﬁn de sur-
monter ces failles, des nouveaux paradigmes pour les choix face au risque ont été formulés et
nombreux nouveaux axiomes ont été postulés pour décrire correctement le comportement
de l'agent.
En 1979, Kahneman et Tversky [36] ont introduit la révolutionnaire Prospect Theory
(en suite PT); selon leur terminologie, prospect veut dire une variable aléatoire qui décrit
une position budgétaire incertaine. En exploitant des données obtenues par des expériences
de laboratoire, Kahneman et Tversky observaient une violation systématique des pivots de
la théorie de l'utilité espérée et ils se rendaient compte de nombreux inconsistances qui
conduisaient à refuser cette théorie comme modèle descriptif des choix face au risque. Par-
ticulièrement, les deux auteurs mettaient en évidence la tendance des hommes à distinguer
entre gains et pertes, c'est-à-dire que les agents évaluent ses positions budgétaire par rap-
port à un certain niveau de richesse qui agit comme point de repère (reference level). En
outre, la fonction valeur (qui remplace la fonction d'utilité) est supposée concave pour les
gains mais convexe pour les pertes9 et plus inclinée sur les pertes que sur les gains; ceci
implique une aversion au risque pour les choix qui concernent seulement des gains et une
propension au risque pour les choix qui concernent seulement des pertes. Enﬁn, les vraies
probabilités des événements pouvaient être observées pendant les expériences par les par-
ticipants; toutefois, quand les décideurs choisissaient leur prospect préférée, ils agissaient
en associant des poids (diﬀérent des vrais probabilités) aux événements et ces poids étaient
en général inférieurs aux probabilités objectives correspondantes, sauf pour les probabilités
suﬃsamment proche à zéro. Nous soulignons aussi que ces poids ne doivent pas être inter-
prétés comme une mesure du niveau de vraisemblance des événements. Au contraire, ils
sont une partie intégrante du comportement face au risque qui n'est pas révélé seulement
par la fonction valeur.
En termes mathématiques, un prospect peut être formalisée comme un vecteur X =
(x1, p1; . . . ;xn, pn), c'est à dire un contrat qui assure le payement xi avec probabilité pi, où
p1 + · · · + pn = 1, p1 ≥ 0. De plus, un agent PT possède un point de repère L ∈ R, une
fonction valeur v(·) concave pour x ≥ L et convexe autrement, et une fonction de distorsion
des probabilités pi(·) croissante et tel que pi(0) = 0, pi(1) = 1. Alors, la valeur qu'un agent
PT assigne au prospect X est
VPT (X) = v(x1 − L)pi(p1) + · · ·+ v(xn − L)pi(pn). (1.3.2)
Cette formulation discrétisée suit ﬁdèlement le travail original de Kahneman et Tversky in
[36], alors qu'une version avec variables aléatoires continues a été proposée par Rieger et
Wang en 2008, [53]. Les diﬀérences entre la théorie de l'utilité espérée et la PT peuvent
bien être analysées en calculant l'utilité espérée de la même variable aléatoire X:
E [u(X)] = u(x1)p1 + · · ·+ u(xn)pn. (1.3.3)
9Comme Kahneman et Tversky remarquaient en [36], ils n'étaient pas les premiers à supposer une
fonction d'utilité pas globalement concave et l'existence d'un point de repère. Markowitz [47] avait déjà
introduit ces modiﬁcations en laissant l'hypothèse de linéarité sur les probabilités qui implique une utilité
espérée par rapport à une mesure additive.
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Comme on peut s'en rendre compte à partir de l'équation (1.3.2), la nouveauté de la PT
consiste en la possibilité des distorsions sur les niveaux monétaires adaptés par rapport à
L; en outre, la somme est eﬀectuée sur les probabilités après leur distorsion.
En 1987, un nouveau paradigme à été proposé pour expliquer le comportement face
au risque. La théorie duale des choix formulée par Yaari, [59], est une tentative pour
résoudre quelques paradoxes provoqués par la théorie de l'utilité espérée. D'un côté, les
idées de Yaari ont pu corriger des failles; de l'autre, les hypothèses de la théorie duale ont
rajouté des nouveaux paradoxes. En particulier, le critère proposé par Yaari ne prévoit
pas une distorsion sur les sommes monétaires mais il admet une fonction de distorsion w(·)
sur la fonction de distribution decumulée de la variable aléatoire X10. D'un point de vue
mathématique, si on se donne une position budgétaire X avec c.d.f. FX(·), un agent qui
suit le paradigme de Yaari évalue X comme
VY (X) =
∫ +∞
0
w (1− FX(x)) dx. (1.3.4)
Sous certaines hypothèses techniques, nous pouvons utiliser la formule d'intégration par
parties et nous observons que (1.3.4) est équivalent à
VY (X) =
∫ +∞
0
x d [−w (1− FX(x))] , (1.3.5)
où il est facile de reconnaitre l'absence d'une fonction d'utilité mais en même temps la
présence d'une distorsion appliquée à 1− FX(·). Une comparaison entre l'équation précé-
dente et son analogue dans le cas d'utilité espérée (1.2.1) explique clairement les mots
utilité non espérée pour le paradigme de Yaari. Une autre caractéristique intéressante de
la théorie duale est sa simplicité de représenter l'aversion ou la propension au risque d'un
agent. En eﬀet, Yaari [59] démontre que une distorsion de probabilité w(·) convexe car-
actérise un décideur adverse au risque, alors que w(·) concave identiﬁe un agent favorable
au risque. Intuitivement, une fonction w(·) convexe est située au dessus de la bissectrice
du premier quadrant sur l'intervalle [0, 1] et elle révèle une sous-estimation d'obtenir un
niveau élevé de richesse et au même temps une surestimation d'obtenir des petits gains;
autrement dit, elle évoque un pessimisme qui se concrétise en aversion au risque.
Une approche diﬀérente de la théorie des décisions classique apparait, toujours en 1987,
grâce à Lopes, [46]. D'un point de vue mathématique, ce nouveau paradigme est très
semblable à celui de Yaari malgré son interprétation économique soit plus diﬃcile et cap-
tieuse. Le modèle proposé par Lopes est notamment connu sous le nom de théorie SP/A,
où l'acronyme signiﬁe Security-Potential/Aspiration, vraisemblablement traduisible comme
Certitude-Potentiel/Aspiration. Autrement dit, dans cette formulation le but d'un agent
économique est obtenir la valeur maximum (à déﬁnir exactement) associée à la variable
aléatoire X sous la contrainte d'aspirer à un niveau minimal de richesse avec une proba-
bilité positive α prédéterminée. La formulation mathématique précise pour une position
budgétaire non-négative et continue X est
VL(X) =
∫ +∞
0
w (1− FX(x)) dx
sous la contrainte 1− FX(A) ≥ α,
(1.3.6)
10Si on s'est donnée une c.d.f. F (·), la fonction de distribution decumulée (en suite d.d.f., d'après l'anglais
decumulative distribution function) est déﬁnie par D(x) := 1− F (x), x ∈ R.
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où A ∈ [0,+∞) représente le niveau d'aspiration et w(·) est encore une fonction de dis-
torsion des probabilités. Néanmoins, le but de Lopes était de modéliser w(·) comme une
moyenne pondérée d'une fonction convexe et d'une fonction concave, où la première de-
vrait assurer la certitude grâce à une aversion au risque innée, alors que la deuxième devrait
montrer la recherche d'un potentiel plus élevé en exploitant la propension au risque.
Un tournant crucial dans l'histoire des paradigmes de choix s'est produit en 1992 avec la
`Cumulative Prospect Theory' (en suite CPT), encore grâce à Kahneman et Tversky, [57];
les agents qui agissent selon la CPT seront aussi appelés comportementales. L'importance
de la CPT a été établie en 2002 avec l'attribution du prix Nobel pour l'économie à Kah-
neman. Cette version modernisée de la PT contient deux nouveautés fondamentales: en
premier lieu, elle est cumulée, c'est à dire que les distorsions des probabilités sont ap-
pliqués à la d.d.f. comme dans les modèles de Yaari et Lopes. En second lieu, la CPT
permet d'utiliser deux diﬀérentes distorsions de probabilité, une pour les gains et une autre
pour les pertes. La motivation de cette formulation découle encore une fois des observa-
tions d'expériences de laboratoire sur le comportement face au risque. Le résultat est une
structure mathématique sans aucun doute plus complexe. Si on indique u+(·) et u−(·)
les respectives fonctions valeur pour les gains et pour les pertes, avec w+(·) et w−(·) les
respectives fonctions de distorsion des probabilités pour les gains et pour les pertes et avec
L ∈ R le point de repère, alors un agent comportemental évalue une position budgétaire
aléatoire X sous la mesure de probabilité P de la façon suivante
VCPT (X) =
∫ +∞
0
w+
(
P
{
u+
(
(X − L)+) > x}) dx
−
∫ +∞
0
w−
(
P
{
u−
(
(X − L)−) > x}) dx, (1.3.7)
où (X − L)+ et (X − L)− dénotent respectivement la partie positive et la partie négative
de la variable aléatoire (X − L). En conclusion, nous rappelons que en [57] les deux
auteurs observaient des fonctions de distorsion w±(·) dites reversed S-shaped (c'est-à-dire
à la forme d'un S renversé); autrement dit, les agents tendent à surestimer les gains et les
pertes relativement élevés et peu probables. De plus, en joignant les fonctions valeur u+(·)
et u−(·), nous obtenons une seule fonction valeur diteS-shaped (c'est-à-dire à la forme d'un
S), dû à la concavité pour les gains et la convexité pour les pertes.
Nous limitons notre analyse à ces paradigmes parce qu'on pense qu'ils sont les plus
notables dans l'évolution des tentatives de modéliser le comportement des agents face au
risque. Or, nous nous arrêtons brièvement sur des questions techniques concernant ces
modèles.
Comme nous l'avons déjà observé, une des raisons principales du succès de la théorie
de l'utilité espérée est sa simplicité mathématique qui provient de la concavité globale
de la fonction d'utilité et de la linéarité appliquée aux probabilités des événements. Ces
caractéristiques permettent d'exploiter la théorie de la dualité dans les problèmes de max-
imisation de l'utilité espérée; en outre, la concavité étroite de la fonction u(·) conduit à
l'unicité de la solution pour ces problèmes de maximisation. De plus, dans un contexte
multi-période ou en temps continu, la linéarité des espérances mathématiques (avec la
propriété de Markov des dynamiques des variables d'état) permet d'un côté d'utiliser les
principes de la programmation dynamique, les équations d'Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman et les
théorèmes de vériﬁcation; de l'autre côté, un nouveau approche fondé sur la théorie des
martingales a été développé pour résoudre des problèmes de maximisation correspondants
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et ramener le problème original à une plus simple optimisation statique. D'ailleurs cette
dernière approche peut s'appliquer à des modèles qui ne sont pas forcément Markovien.
Or, qu'est-ce qu'il se passe si on abandonne l'hypothèse sur la concavité de la fonction
d'utilité? Dans le modèle de Yaari (1.3.4), nous observons que la linéarité pour les quantités
monétaires est une simpliﬁcation du problème. Au contraire, dans la PT et la CPT, la
forme à S de la fonction valeur augmente notablement la diﬃculté du problème. À grandes
lignes, le problème d'optimisation doit être séparé en deux parties à analyser séparément,
une pour les gains et l'autre pour les pertes; malheureusement, quand on rejoint ces deux
sous-problèmes on peut tomber sur un problème mal posé dû à l'impossibilité d'équilibrer
correctement les contributions (opposées) des deux sous-problèmes.
Une question naturelle est la suivante: qu'est-ce qu'il se passe si on enlève la linéarité
sur les probabilités? Cette fois, soit le modèle de Yaari soit la CPT montrent un manque
de linéarité. Évidemment, la théorie du contrôle stochastique n'est plus utilisable parce
que les principes de la programmation dynamique se basent sur la linéarité des espérances
conditionnelles. Toutefois, une théorie mathématique ad hoc a été développée dans les
années '50 du siècle dernier par Choquet, [19]. Sa théorie des capacités w ◦ P permet
de reformuler nos problèmes et exploiter le propriétés de comonotonicité des variables
aléatoires aﬁn d'obtenir la solution optimale, si elle existe. Pour plus de détails sur la
théorie de Choquet et son utilisation, nous renvoyons à la Section 2.13.
Une méthode suﬃsamment générale pour résoudre la plupart des problèmes d'op-
timisation qui découlent des précédents paradigmes a été proposé par He et Zhou en 2011,
[27]. Les deux auteurs exploitent une technique connue comme formulation par quantiles.
En utilisant une série des transformations équivalentes, He et Zhou parviennent à changer le
domaine de ces problèmes d'un ensemble des variables aléatoires (les positions budgétaires
admissibles) à un ensemble des c.d.f. renversées exprimées en termes de quantiles.
1.3.2 Optimisation de portefeuille avec asymétries d'information
Nous allons maintenant focaliser notre attention sur l'histoire des asymétries d'information
dans le marchés ﬁnanciers. En particulier, nous allons nous concentrer sur les méthodes
utilisés pour modéliser la présence des agents qui possèdent diﬀérents niveaux d'information
et qui ont le but de maximiser l'utilité espérée de leur position budgétaire terminale.
Une hypothèse partagée par ces modèles est celle selon laquelle l'évolution des prix des
actions et des taux d'intérêts suit une particulière équation diﬀérentielle stochastique (EDS,
par la suite) sous la probabilité historique P. Cette mesure est simplement celle qui règle les
prix et elle est connue par l'agent représentatif de notre économie dans le cas d'information
complète. Sans perte de généralité, on peut supposer des dynamiques des prix décrites
par des mouvements Brownien arithmétiques, géométriques ou semi-martingales générales.
Un investisseur avec information complète connait soit le drift soit la volatilité d'une telle
EDS. Or, on peut distinguer entre agents plus ou moins informés par rapport à l'agent
représentatif.
Si un investisseur est moins informé, alors on se ramène au cas d'information partielle
ou incomplète. Dans ce cas, on suppose que l'agent peut observer exclusivement les prix des
actions et des taux d'intérêts actuels et passés; toutefois, il n'est pas capable de reconnaitre
ni le drift ni le mouvement Brownien subjacent par rapport à la probabilité P. Évidemment,
tout ce qu'il peut faire est déduire des informations sur ces processus en utilisant les obser-
vations qui proviennent du marché. Mathématiquement, les techniques les plus utilisées se
fondent sur la théorie du ﬁltrage (par exemple, nous renvoyons à [52] ou plus récemment
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[12] et [21]). Si on se donné une ﬁltration plus petite que celle disponible dans le cas de
information complète, le problème peut être ramené à la recherche d'une nouvelle probabil-
ité et une EDS ﬁltrée qui décrit les prix observables. Ensuite, la stratégie d'investissement
optimale et la richesse optimale terminale peuvent être calculées en utilisant l'approche par
martingales ou le contrôle stochastique.
Au contraire, si l'investisseur est plus informé de rapport à l'agent représentatif, alors
on peut dire qu'on est face à un problème de délits d'initiés (insider trading en anglais).
Plusieurs auteurs ont focalisé leur attention sur ce problème à partir de la deuxième moitié
des années '90 et la littérature académique sur ce sujet a constamment grandie pendant
la décennie suivante. Un article inﬂuent sur ce problème est sans aucun doute celui de
Karatzaz et Pikovsky en 1996, [37]. Dans leur étude, les auteurs analysent un problème
d'information forte, c'est-à-dire le cas d'un initié qui connait P presque surement la réalisa-
tion d'une variable aléatoire liée aux prix des actions. Dans nombreux exemples, les deux
auteurs peuvent calculer les stratégies d'investissement optimales et les relatives richesses
optimales terminales; de plus, ils proposent une méthode générale pour résoudre ce prob-
lème. Cette solution est fondée sur des technique de grossissement des ﬁltrations, la ﬁltra-
tion grossie modélisant le fait que l'initié a accès à plus d'information que les autres agents.
En outre, les auteurs sont capables de quantiﬁer explicitement le gain de l'initié, c'est à
dire la diﬀérence entre l'utilité espérée optimale de l'initié et celle d'un agent ordinaire avec
information complète.
Une approche plus générale a été proposée par Amendinger, Imkeller et Schweizer en
1998, [4]. Encore une fois le c÷ur de la théorie se fonde sur le grossissement des ﬁltrations;
toutefois, ces techniques sont utilisées de façons plus poussée et elles conduisent à une
caractérisation du gain de l'initié qui exploite l'entropie des mesures des probabilités, grâce
au choix d'une fonction d'utilité logarithmique. Dans les années suivantes des versions
légèrement diﬀérentes ont été analysées et une nouvelle gamme de techniques de résolution
a été proposée. Brièvement, au lieu de supposer la connaissance d'une variable aléatoire dès
le début, il a été supposé un processus graduel d'acquisition des nouvelles informations;
de plus, il a été analysé les cas d'un initié qui peut inﬂuencer l'évolution des prix des
actions et des problèmes d'optimisations faisant intervenir le critère moyenne-variance. Les
instruments mathématiques utilisés sont le calcul de Malliavin, l'intégration stochastique
anticipative et la théorie de l'arrêt optimal (pour une description exhaustive de toutes ces
méthodes, nous renvoyons à [40]).
En 2002, Baudoin [8] a proposé une formulation alternative de ces problèmes d'opti-
misation. Dans son schéma, l'investisseur initié peut observer seulement les prix par rapport
à la mesure martingale équivalente et on suppose qu'elle ne connaisse pas la probabilité
historique P. Par conséquent, il ne possède pas une information presque sûre par rap-
port à P mais son information privilégiée consiste à connaitre la loi (par rapport à P)
d'une variable aléatoire liée aux prix des actions. En se basant sur la théorie des EDS
conditionnelles, Baudoin peut étudier des marchés ﬁnanciers complètes et sans possibilités
d'arbitrage et quantiﬁer le gain de l'initié. Cette formulation est appelée information faible.
Nous renvoyons à [9] pour un étude de ses implications économiques.
Dans le Chapitre 2, nous considérons les cas d'information complète, forte, partielle
et faible dans des marchés ﬁnanciers complètes et sans possibilités d'arbitrage en temps
continu où l'agent représentatif agit selon la CPT ou la théorie duale de Yaari. En outre, ce
chapitre contient une autre section concernant un investisseur face au goal reaching problem
(c'est-à-dire que l'agent doit maximiser la probabilité d'obtenir un niveau minimum pour
sa richesse terminale); pour un traitement plus détaillé de ce problème, nous renvoyons à
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[15].11
1.3.3 Modèles d'équilibre dans les marchés ﬁnanciers
Aﬁn de conclure cette introduction, nous considérons brièvement (et seulement en partie)
l'évolution des modèles d'équilibre dans des marchés ﬁnanciers très simples. Encore une
fois, le seul type d'agents considéré pendant les premiers décennies était celui des décideurs
maximisant leurs utilités espérées. En ce qui concerne les modèles d'équilibre général, un
travail fondamental sur ce sujet est sans aucun doute le MEDAF (CAPM en anglais) qui
a été proposé par Sharpe en 1964, [55]. Dans son travail, l'auteur considère un marché
ﬁnancier en concurrence parfaite avec exclusivement des agents adverses au risque. En
exploitant l'égalité entre demande globale et oﬀre globale et en introduisant un place-
ment sans risque, Sharpe obtient une dépendance linéaire entre la prime pour le risque de
portefeuille optimal d'un investisseur générique et le prime pour le risque de portefeuille
global du marché. Dans les années suivantes des modèles alternatives au MEDAF ont
été proposés, comme le CCAPM (d'après l'anglais Consumption CAPM), où la prime
pour le risque à l'équilibre est obtenue en utilisant une condition de non-arbitrage. Une
tentative diﬀérente pour montrer la formation de la prime pour le risque est l'APT (de le
mots anglaises Arbitrage Pricing Theory), où à l'hypothèse de l'absence d'opportunités
d'arbitrage on a rajouté la présence d'un certain nombre des facteurs de risque intégrés
dans une combinaison linéaire.
La façon avec laquelle diﬀérents niveaux d'information des agents inﬂuent sur les
marchés ﬁnanciers est bien soulignée dans l'article écrit par Kyle en 1985, [42]. En consid-
érant un marché stylisé avec une seule action, un seul market maker neutre au risque, un
agent initié neutre au risque et une population d'agents non stratégiques, l'auteur a le but
de trouver un équilibre représenté par un couple formé par la stratégie optimale de l'initié et
le prix (ﬁxé par le market maker) qui rend le marché eﬃcient. Kyle peut obtenir un équili-
bre avec stratégies linéaires soit dans un modèle uniperiodale, multiperiodale ainsi qu'en
temps continu. Le succès de ses résultats est dû à leurs simplicité, clarté et élégance; par
conséquent, une importante série d'articles est apparue dans les années suivantes ayant le
but de découvrir comment l'information se transmet aux prix des actions. Nous rappelons,
en particulier, la thèse doctorale de Wu en 1999, [58], où il étudie diﬀérent extensions du
modèle original (par exemple, le cas de deux initiés ou le cas où l'initié doit soutenir des
coûts pour obtenir des information privilégiées; pour une liste des références quasiment
exhaustive, nous renvoyons aussi à la bibliographie de [58]); l'article de Cho en 2003, [18],
où on considère un initié adverse au risque et enﬁn le travail de Campi et Çetin en 2007,
[16], où ils étudient un modèle de Kyle pour le prix des zéro coupons avec défaut.
Après le succès des diﬀérents paradigmes de choix comme la CPT, quelques chercheurs
ont formulé des modèles d'équilibre en intégrant ces nouveaux critères de quantiﬁcation
des préférences. Un résumé des ces tentatives se trouve dans la Section 3.1; brièvement,
les développements les plus importants sont l'extension du MEDAF à une économie pe-
uplée seulement par des investisseurs CPT homogènes, c'est-à-dire que tous ces agents
partagent les mêmes paramètres décrivant leurs fonctions valeur, leurs points de repère et
leurs distorsions de probabilité. De plus, nous pouvons trouver des résultats soit positifs
soit négatifs concernant ces modèles à cause du fait que les démonstrations de l'existence
11Le contenu du Chapitre 2 est fondamentalement une version étendue de l'article Weak Insider Trading
and Behavioral Finance écrite par moi et mon co-directeur du thèse Prof. L. Campi. Je m'excuse pour
les éventuelles répétitions des sujets contenus dans cette introduction.
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des équilibres sont extrêmement sensibles à la structure du marché et aux préférences des
agents; autrement dit, cette famille de modèles montre un manque de robustesse assez
important.
Aﬁn d'éviter ce problème, les modèles que nous allons proposer dans le Chapitre 3 sont
tout d'abord formulés dans un cadre qui exploite la théorie des jeux. En outre, la présence
d'un market maker complaisant ou de particulières liaisons imposés sur les paramètres des
problèmes permettent d'obtenir des équilibres stables par rapport à des petites variations
de ces paramètres. De plus, ce chapitre présente une analyse détaillée de sensibilité par
rapport aux paramètres du marché en utilisant l'analyse numérique et graphique12.
12Le Chapitre 3 est une version étendue du mon working paper Market equilibrium with heterogeneous
behavioral and classical investors' preferences. Je m'excuse encore une fois pour les possibles répétitions.
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Chapter 2
Insider trading and behavioral
ﬁnance
2.1 Introduction
We initially recover the setting of Jin and Zhou in [33] when studying a portfolio opti-
mization problem of a CPT agent in a fully speciﬁed market framework. In particular, the
authors assume a standard ﬁnancial market with one risk-free asset and a number of risky
assets and they explicitly deﬁne the price dynamics. After that, the optimization problem
for the CPT trader is framed in a full information setting, i.e. when the investor knows
both the historical measure P which underlies the market and the price dynamics.
Next, we analyze a similar model for an insider in the strong information case. We
present some technical tools connected with enlargement of ﬁltrations theory which are
necessary to solve the problem for an EU maximizer and we subsequently adapt them in
our CPT case.
Secondly, the partial information case is studied. Basic ﬁltering theory results are
presented; then, the model for such a CPT less informed agent is framed and we specify
the way a complete solution can be obtained.
The main topic of this chapter starts from a paper by Baudoin [8]. In his work, the
notions of weak information and weakly informed agent are introduced, where the latter
is an agent having an additional information about the law (under the objective proba-
bility measure) of a functional of the price process. In contrast to the well-known strong
information approach (initiated in [37]), we follow Baudoin's approach and assume that
there is an extra-informed investor acting in the market, who knows the law (under the
historical probability P) of a functional Y related to the asset prices. In this approach
the historical probability P is assumed to be unknown to every agent, whereas everyone
knows the so-called equivalent martingale measure, namely Q. Therefore, knowing the
P-law of Y translates to an informational advantage. For a wider treatment of the subject,
we abandon the market framework speciﬁed by Jin and Zhou in [33] and we admit more
general price processes. We also note that in this setting, the discounted prices of the assets
are assumed to be martingales under Q. The assumption that nobody in the market can
observe the prices under P is justiﬁed by the reasonable fact that the model for the prices
can be calibrated on observed data under Q, while every agent ignores the eﬀective drifts
in the price dynamics (see Remark 1 in [9]).
In [8], the author studies a portfolio optimization problem for an EU non informed
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agent and an EU insider respectively. He is then able to characterize the optimal terminal
wealth and the corresponding optimal value. Moreover, he ﬁnds an explicit formula for a
particular choice of the utility function. It is important to note that only EU maximizers
are considered in [8]. A natural question is: What happens if one considers diﬀerence
preference paradigms than EU's? More speciﬁcally, we think of an investor whose goal
is not necessarily to maximize the expected utility from terminal wealth. In the utility
maximization literature, the EU case developed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in
the early 30's is the most treated thanks to its relative simplicity and the possibility of
using a dual theory allowing to solve a wide range of problems. However, it is empirically
observed that real world people systematically violate the hypotheses standing behind EU
(this lead to a number of so-called paradoxes and puzzles). In this paper, we consider three
alternative models.
- Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT thereafter): this paradigm is fully described in
[57] and it is a further development of the original Prospect Theory by Kahneman
and Tversky (see [36]). Brieﬂy, according to CPT an economic agent evaluates her
payoﬀ with respect to a reference level B: if the payoﬀ is greater than B, then it is
considered as a gain. On the other side, a payoﬀ lower than B becomes a loss for a
CPT agent, and a loss hurts more than an equivalent gain (loss aversion). This type of
investor does not use a utility function. More precisely, she has two value functions,
a concave one for the gains and a convex one for the losses. Hence, the overall
form of her utility function is so-called S-shaped and she is risk-averse w.r.t. gains
while risk-lover w.r.t. losses. Finally, laboratory evidence shows that people tend
to overweight relatively large gains and losses of small probabilities. This feature is
captured via two reversed S-shaped functions (one for the gains and one for the losses)
describing probability distortions. Loosely speaking, the shape of such a weighting
function looks like a reversed S, i.e. it is monotone increasing, greater than the
identity for small probabilities and lower than the identity for probabilities near 1.
Once the two corresponding problems are solved, the delicate part is merging them
to ﬁnd the general solution. A general mathematical treatment in continuous time
for CPT can be found in [33], where it is necessary to use Choquet capacities instead
of classical expectations and to split the objective function into two parts, one for
the gains and one for losses.
- Goal Reaching Model: in this case, the objective function of the considered investor
consists in maximizing the probability of having a terminal payoﬀ greater than a
speciﬁed level. This model has been extensively treated by Browne [15] and it can
be viewed as the problem of a fund manager who wants to beat a given benchmark.
- Yaari's Dual Theory of Choice: in 1987, Yaari proposed in [59] a diﬀerent set of
axioms than Von Neumann and Morgenstern's. The result was a dual representation
of the expected utility criterion, where in the preference value functional the distortion
applies to decumulative probabilities instead of payoﬀs (recall that a utility function
u(·) can be viewed as a distortion on payoﬀs). A mathematical formulation of Yaari's
model in continuous time can be found in [27], where w(·) is used as a probability
distortion function. In [59] it has been shown that the risk-aversion is characterized by
a convex w(·), i.e. by an overweighting of relatively small payoﬀs and underweighting
of relatively large payoﬀs, whereas the opposite case of a risk-loving agent is described
by a concave w(·).
24
2.2. A particular market framework
For any of the previous paradigms, we will solve the optimization problem for a non-
informed investor and for an insider. We stress that, throughout this chapter, agents will
always be small traders, in the sense that their investment choices do not aﬀect the asset
prices. Our study is strongly motivated by the contributions in [28] and [33]. We will
use the same mathematical framework and keep their notation to get a more transparent
comparison with their results.
An important issue in this family of non-classical problem is well-posedness. Indeed,
it is shown in [33] and [27] that ill-posed problems, i.e. having inﬁnite optimal value, can
quite easily arise if one does not make the right assumptions on the value functions and/or
the probability distortions. We will give suﬃcient conditions for well-posedness during our
analysis.
At last, we recall that the existing literature lacks of explicit examples and explicit
computations of the optimal value for both CPT and Yaari's models. This is why we focus
on examples which, to the best of our knowledge, are new.
This chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we describe a particular ﬁnancial
market framework; next, in Section 2.3 the model for a fully informed CPT investor is
presented, together with its solution. After that, Section 2.4 and Section 2.5 introduce the
problems and the solutions for a CPT trader who is supposed to be strongly and partially
informed respectively. In Section 2.6 we recall the weak information setting as developed
in [8] and in Section 2.7 we consider the maximization problems for an EU agent, whose
results are already proved in [8]. Then, Section 2.8 deals with the problem in the CPT case
and Section 2.9 is devoted to comparison results between EU and CPT agents. Section
2.10 is about the goal reaching problem and Section 2.11 concerns a Yaari-type investor.
Finally, Section 2.12 concludes. Some proofs are presented in Section 2.13.
2.2 A particular market framework
Fix a probability space (Ω,F ,P,F), where F := {Ft}t≥0 is a completed and right contin-
uous ﬁltration with F0 being the trivial σ-algebra. Fix a terminal time T and consider a
market model with m+ 1 traded assets in a continuous time setting, where the ﬁrst asset
S0(t) is the risk-free asset, or bank account, and the other m assets (S1(t), . . . , Sm(t)) are
the risky ones, or stocks. We assume the dynamics
dS0(t) = S0(t)r(t)dt, t ∈ [0, T ]; S0(0) = s0 > 0, (2.2.1)
where the interest rate r(·) is an F-progressively measurable stochastic process satisfying∫ T
0 |r(t)|dt < +∞, P-a.s., and for i = 1, . . . ,m
dSi(t) = Si(t)[bi(t)dt+
m∑
j=1
σij(t)dW
j(t)], t ∈ [0, T ]; Si(0) = si > 0, (2.2.2)
where W (t) = (W 1(t), . . . ,Wm(t))′ is a (F,P) m-dimensional Brownian motion and the
drifts bi(·) and the volatilities σij(·) are F-progressively measurable stochastic processes
satisfying
∫ T
0 |bi(t)| dt < +∞, i = 1, . . . ,m, and
∫ T
0 |σij(t)|2 dt < +∞, i, j = 1, . . . m, P-
a.s..
If one deﬁnes the excess rate of return as Bi(t) := bi(t)− r(t) and the volatility matrix
σ(t) := (σij(t))i,j=1,...,m, then standard assumptions on the market coeﬃcients are
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Assumption 2.2.1 (Assumption 2.1, [33]).
(i) There exists c ∈ R such that ∫ T0 r(t) dt ≥ c P-a.s.;
(ii) Rank (σ(t)) = m, for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s.;
(iii) There exists an Rm-valued, uniformly bounded, F-progressively measurable process θ(·)
such that θ(t)σ(t) = B(t) for a.e. t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s..
Under these assumptions one can deﬁne the pricing kernel
ρ(t) ≡ dQ
dP
∣∣∣∣
Ft
:= exp
(
−
∫ t
0
r(s) +
|θ(s)|2
2
ds−
∫ t
0
θ(s)′ dW (s)
)
(2.2.3)
and we can easily show that ρ ≡ ρ(T ) deﬁnes the unique risk-neutral measure Q on FT
(also known as martingale measure). Note that Q is deﬁned in such a way in [33] and ρ
already incorporates the interest rate r(·), so Q is a discounting or spot martingale measure.
As the authors point out in [33], 0 < ρ < +∞ and 0 < EP[ρ] < +∞, where EP[·] denotes
the expectation w.r.t. P.
Assumption 2.2.2. ρ admits no atom w.r.t. to P, i.e. P{ρ = a} = 0 ∀ a ∈ R.
Moreover, we deﬁne
ρ ≡ esssupP ρ := sup{a ∈ R : P{ρ > a} > 0}, (2.2.4)
ρ ≡ essinfP ρ := inf{a ∈ R : P{ρ < a} > 0}. (2.2.5)
2.3 The CPT agent's model in the full information case
Following [33], let's assume the presence of a CPT fully informed agent (we will refer to her
as to N-agent because she is a non extra informed one), who has to select the best portfolio
among the class of admissible ones in order to maximize her prospect value, which arises
from gains and losses w.r.t. a reference wealth.
More precisely, let's assume that N-agent is a small trader in the sense that her invest-
ment choices do not aﬀect the stock dynamics (2.2.2), i.e. there is no price impact. Let
x0 ∈ R be her initial endowment1 and x(t) her total wealth at time t ≥ 0 in monetary
units. If trading is continuous and self-ﬁnancing, then the wealth dynamics are
dx(t) = [r(t)x(t) +B(t)′pi(t)]dt+ pi(t)′σ(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ]; x(0) = x0, (2.3.1)
where pi(·) ≡ (pi1(·), . . . , pim(·))′ is the portfolio of the investor and pii(t), i = 1, . . . ,m is the
total market value of the agent's wealth in the i-th asset at time t. For our N-agent, the
class of admissible portfolios is the set of Rm-valued F-progressively measurable processes
s.t.
∫ T
0 |B(t)′pi(t)| dt < +∞ and
∫ T
0 |σ(t)′pi(t)|2 dt < +∞ P-a.s..
An admissible portfolio pi(·) is said to be P-tame if the corresponding discounted wealth
process S0(t)−1x(t) is P-a.s. bounded from below, where the bound may depend on pi(·).
The next result will be useful in what follows.
Proposition 2.3.1 (Proposition 2.3, [33]). For any FT -measurable random variable ξ
such that ξ is P-a.s. bounded from below and EP[ρξ] = x0, there exists a P-tame admissible
portfolio pi(·) such that the corresponding wealth process x(·) satisﬁes x(T ) = ξ.
1See also Footnote 3, Remark 2.1 and Remark 2.2 in [33] for some economic interpretation of the initial
wealth x0.
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Starting from the empirical observations of Kahneman and Tversky [57], Jin and Zhou's
analysis leads to a behavioral framework where N-agent wishes to select the portfolio (not
necessarily unique) that will engender a ﬁnal wealth x(T ) such that will maximize her
prospect value. Such a prospect value will come up from the algebraic sum of the expected
distorted utilities of gains and losses w.r.t. to a reference wealth that we set once for all at
the value 0. Mathematically speaking, we will make the following assumptions.
Assumption 2.3.1 (Assumption 2.3, [33]). u+(·) and u−(·) : R+ 7→ R+, are strictly
increasing, concave, with u+(0) = u−(0) = 0. Moreover, u+(·) is strictly concave and twice
diﬀerentiable, satisfying the Inada conditions u′+(0+) = +∞ and u′+(+∞) = 0.
Assumption 2.3.2 (Assumption 2.4, [33]). T+(·) and T−(·) : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1], are diﬀeren-
tiable and strictly increasing, with T+(0) = T−(0) = 0 and T+(1) = T−(1) = 1.
For any random variable X representing a ﬁnal wealth at time T , our N-agent assigns
to it the value V (X), determined by
V (X) = V+(X
+)− V−(X−), (2.3.2)
where X+ and X− denote the positive and the negative part of X respectively and we
deﬁne
V+(Y ) :=
∫ +∞
0
T+(P{u+(Y ) > y}) dy, (2.3.3)
V−(Y ) :=
∫ +∞
0
T−(P{u−(Y ) > y}) dy, (2.3.4)
for any random variable Y ≥ 0 a.s..2 Using this setting, N-agent's problem is formulated
in a standard way as
Maximize V (x(T ))
subject to (x(·), pi(·)) satisﬁes (2.3.1), pi(·) is admissible and P-tame.
(2.3.5)
But thanks to Proposition 2.3.1 and referring to X as the terminal wealth, we can equiva-
lently frame the previous problem as
Maximize V (X)
subject to EP[ρX] = x0, X is FT -measurable and P-a.s. lower bounded.
(CPT-F)
We note that x0 is just the price (set by the market) that N-agent has to pay at time
t = 0 in order to acquire the terminal position X, and this is nothing but the initial wealth
of our trader. Moreover, the budget constraint EP[ρX] = x0 could also be written as
EQ[X] = x0 simply applying a change of measure. Finally, we observe that the domain of
Problem (2.3.5) is a set of admissible portfolio processes, whereas the domain of Problem
(CPT-F) is a set of random variables. As a consequence, the equivalence between these
two problems allows us to shift our attention to the research of the (not necessarily unique)
optimal terminal wealth X. In particular, once such a X is found our problem reduces to
ﬁnd its replicating portfolio. However, in what follows we only focus on ﬁnding an optimal
X, leaving aside the replication issue.
2See [33] for an extensive explanation of the meaning of T+(·) and T−(·).
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2.3.1 The solution for a CPT fully informed agent
In [33], the authors completely solve Problem (CPT-F), also providing some explicit for-
mulas. Now we brieﬂy recall their main assumptions and results.
Assumption 2.3.3 (Assumption 3.1, [33]). V+(X) < +∞ for any nonnegative, FT -
measurable random variable X satisfying EP[ρX] < +∞.
The previous hypothesis is necessary to avoid systematic ill-posedness of Problem
(CPT-F). Now, the technique employed is based on an appropriate decomposition of
(CPT-F) into two distinct sub-problems, a positive one and a negative one; once the de-
coupling is made and the two parts are separately solved, one only has to merge these two
components in order to ﬁnd the global solution.
• Positive Part Problem: given the pair (A, x+), with A ∈ FT and x+ ∈ [x+0 ,+∞),
Maximize V+(X) =
∫ +∞
0
T+(P{u+(X) > y}) dy
subject to EP[ρX] = x+, X ≥ 0 P-a.s., X = 0 P-a.s. on AC .
(2.3.6)
Note that Assumption 2.3.3 implies that V+(X) is a ﬁnite nonnegative number for
any feasible X. We now deﬁne v+(A, x+), the optimal value of problem (2.3.6), in
the following manner:
- if P(A) > 0, then the feasible region of (2.3.6) is non-empty (for example,
X = (x+IA)/(ρP(A)) is an admissible solution) and v+(A, x+) is deﬁned as the
supremum of (2.3.6);
- if P(A) = 0 and x+ = 0, then the only feasible solution for (2.3.6) isX = 0 P-a.s.,
so v+(A, x+) := 0;
- if P(A) = 0 and x+ > 0, then (2.3.6) has an empty feasible region, therefore
v+(A, x+) := −∞.
• Negative Part Problem: given the pair (A, x+), with A ∈ FT and x+ ∈ [x+0 ,+∞),
Minimize V−(X) =
∫ +∞
0
T−(P{u−(X) > y}) dy
subject to
{
EP[ρX] = x+ − x0, X ≥ 0 P-a.s., X = 0 P-a.s. on A,
X is upper bounded P-a.s..
(2.3.7)
We now similarly deﬁne v−(A, x+), the optimal value of problem (2.3.7), in the
following way:
- if P(A) < 1, then the feasible region of (2.3.7) is non-empty and v−(A, x+) is
deﬁned as the inﬁmum of (2.3.7);
- if P(A) = 1 and x+ = x0, then the only feasible solution for (2.3.7) is X = 0 P-
a.s., so v−(A, x+) := 0;
- if P(A) = 1 and x+ > x+0 , then (2.3.7) has an empty feasible region, therefore
v−(A, x+) := +∞.
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• Merged Problem: the objective now is to solve
Maximize v+(A, x+)− v−(A, x+)
subject to
{
A ∈ FT , x+ ≥ x+0 ,
x+ = 0 if P(A) = 0, x+ = x0 if P(A) = 1.
(2.3.8)
It is immediate to see that Problems (2.3.6), (2.3.7) and (2.3.8) are diﬃcult to solve, in the
sense that they depend on a parameter which is not conventional, the set A. In order to get a
solution, Jin and Zhou in [33] make a series of clever modiﬁcations to the previous problems
and ﬁnally show that (2.3.8) is deeply linked to a more standard problem depending on a
pair of real parameters (c, x+). More speciﬁcally, let F (·) be the cumulative distribution
function (c.d.f. hereafter) of ρ; we now formulate
Maximize v+(c, x+)− u−
(
x+ − x0
EP[ρIρ>c]
)
T− (1− F (c))
subject to
{
ρ ≤ c ≤ ρ, x+ ≥ x+0 ,
x+ = 0 if c = ρ, x+ = x0 if c = ρ,
(2.3.9)
where v+(c, x+) := v+({ω ∈ Ω : ρ(ω) ≤ c}, x+) and we use the convention
u−
(
x+ − x0
EP[ρIρ>c]
)
T−(1− F (c)) := 0 if c = ρ and x+ = x0. (2.3.10)
The main result in [33] is the following.
Theorem 2.3.1 (Theorem 4.1, [33]). Assume that u−(·) is strictly concave at 0. We have
the following conclusions:
(i) If X∗ is optimal for Problem (CPT-F), then c∗ := F−1(P{X∗ ≥ 0}), x∗+ :=
EP[ρ(X∗)+], where F (·) is the distribution function of ρ, are optimal for Problem
(2.3.9). Moreover, {ω : X∗ ≥ 0} and {ω : ρ ≤ c∗} are identical up to a P-null
probability set, and (X∗)− =
x∗+ − x0
EP[ρIρ>c∗ ]
Iρ>c∗ P-a.s..
(ii) If (c∗, x∗+) is optimal for Problem (2.3.9) and X∗+ is optimal for Problem (2.3.6)
with parameters ({ρ ≤ c∗}, x∗+), then X∗ := X∗+Iρ≤c∗ −
x∗+ − x0
EP[ρIρ>c∗ ]
Iρ>c∗ is optimal
for Problem (CPT-F).
This theorem provides the theoretical key to solve problem (CPT-F), and the hope to
ﬁnd an explicit solution, if any exists. In particular we can rely on the following algorithm:
Step 1 Solve Problem (2.3.6) with given parameters ({ρ ≤ c}, x+), where ρ ≤ c ≤ ρ and
x+ ≥ x+0 , in order to obtain v+(c, x+) and the optimal solution X∗+(c, x+).
Step 2 Solve Problem (2.3.9) to get (c∗, x∗+).
Step 3 If (c∗, x∗+) = (ρ, x0), then X∗+(ρ, x0) solves Problem (CPT-F), else
X∗+(c
∗, x∗+)Iρ≤c∗ −
x∗+ − x0
EP[ρIρ>c∗ ]
Iρ>c∗
solves Problem (CPT-F).
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The next step toward an explicit solution consists in imposing some technical assumptions
on the value functions u±(·), on the probability distortions T±(·) and on the equivalent
martingale measure ρ of the fully informed agent. In particular, in [33] the authors give
the following conditions.
Assumption 2.3.4 (Assumption 4.1, [33]).
(i)
F−1(z)
T ′+(z)
is non-decreasing in z ∈ (0, 1];
(ii) lim inf
x→+∞
−xu′′+(x)
u′+(x)
> 0;
(iii) EP
[
u+
(
(u′+)−1
(
ρ
T ′+(F (ρ))
))
T ′+(F (ρ))
]
< +∞.
We remark that condition (i) is related to the fact that the distortion on gains should
not be too extreme, i.e. for (i) to be fulﬁlled it is necessary that T+(·) satisﬁes some
inequalities which can be given a sensible economic interpretation3. On the other hand,
(ii) and (iii) are connected with some suﬃcient conditions which are used in [33] to solve
a quantile problem4.
With Assumption 2.3.4 in force, v+(c, x+) and the corresponding optimal solution X∗+ to
(2.3.6) can be expressed a little bit more explicitly, together with the optimal solution X∗
of (CPT-F):
v+(c, x+) = EP
[
u+
(
(u′+)
−1
(
λ(c, x+)ρ
T ′+(F (ρ))
))
T ′+(F (ρ))Iρ≤c
]
,
X∗+ = (u
′
+)
−1
(
λ(c, x+)ρ
T ′+(F (ρ))
)
Iρ≤c,
X∗ = (u′+)
−1
(
λ(c∗, x∗+)ρ
T ′+(F (ρ))
)
Iρ≤c∗ − x
∗
+ − x0
EP[ρIρ>c∗ ]
Iρ>c∗ ,
where λ(c, x+) is the Lagrange multiplier satisfying EP
[
(u′+)−1
(
λ(c, x+)ρ
T ′+(F (ρ))
)
ρIρ≤c
]
= x+.
2.3.2 The case with a two-piece CRRA value function
In this section we consider a special case of the previous problem, namely when N-agent has
power law value functions on gains and losses. Moreover, in order to make calculations more
explicit, we will consider the case of a constant coeﬃcient market, which amounts to choose
ρ log-normally distributed. Mathematically speaking we make the following assumptions:
• the law of ln ρ is Gaussian with mean µ ∈ R and variance σ2 > 0 (we will write
ln ρ ∼ N (µ, σ2)). In turn, this implies ρ = 0, ρ = +∞, F (x) = N
(
lnx−µ
σ
)
, where
N (·) is the distribution function of a standard Gaussian random variable;
• u+(x) = xα, u−(x) = k−xα, x ≥ 0, where k− > 0 is the so called loss-aversion
coeﬃcient and α ∈ (0, 1) identiﬁes the Relative Risk Aversion (RRA hereafter)
coeﬃcient; this obviously implies u′+(x) = αxα−1, (u′+)−1(x) = (x/α)1/(α−1),
u+
(
(u′+)−1(x)
)
= (x/α)α/(α−1);
3See Section 6.2 in [33].
4See Appendix C in [33].
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• we do not specify any particular form for the distortions T±(·), which are assumed
to satisfy Assumption 2.3.2 and Assumption 2.3.4.
We can now follow Step 1 to 3 previously described in order to get an explicit solution
for this problem. The results obtained by Jin and Zhou in [33] exploit the functions
ϕ(c) := EP
[(
T ′+(F (ρ))
ρ
)1/(1−α)
ρIρ≤c
]
> 0, 0 < c ≤ +∞,
k(c) :=
k−T−(1− F (c))
ϕ(c)1−α (EP [ρIρ>c])α
> 0, c > 0.
Note that the case c = 0 is trivial because for the Positive Part Problem (2.3.6) we need
x+ = 0 in order to have a feasible problem, with v+(c, x+) = 0.
Depending on the sign of the initial wealth x0, i.e. whether it represents a gain or a loss,
we have two distinct results.
Theorem 2.3.2 (Theorem 9.1, [33]). Assume that x0 ≥ 0 and Assumption 2.3.4 holds.
(i) If infc>0 k(c) ≥ 1, then the optimal portfolio for Problem (2.3.5) is the replicating
portfolio for the contingent claim
X∗ =
x0
ϕ(+∞)
(
T ′+(F (ρ))
ρ
)1/(1−α)
.
(ii) If infc>0 k(c) < 1, then Problem (2.3.5) is ill-posed.
In the well-posed case we obtain by straightforward calculations the optimal value
V (X∗) = ϕ(+∞)1−αxα0 ; note that a null initial wealth is accompanied by a null risky
investment and a null optimal value.
Theorem 2.3.3 (Theorem 9.2, [33]). Assume that x0 < 0 and Assumption 2.3.4 holds.
(i) If infc>0 k(c) > 1, then Problem (2.3.5) is well-posed. Moreover, (2.3.5) admits an
optimal portfolio if and only if
argminc≥0
[(
k−T−(1− F (c))
(EP [ρIρ>c])α
)1/(1−α)
− ϕ(c)
]
6= ∅, (2.3.11)
where ϕ(0) := 0.
Furthermore, if c∗ > 0 is one of the minimizers in (2.3.11), then the optimal portfolio is
the one to replicate
X∗ =
x∗+
ϕ(c∗)
(
T ′+(F (ρ))
ρ
)1/(1−α)
Iρ≤c∗ − x
∗
+ − x0
EP [ρIρ>c∗ ]
Iρ>c∗ ,
where x∗+ :=
−x0
k(c∗)1/(1−α) − 1 ; and if c
∗ = 0 is the unique minimizer in (2.3.11), then the
optimal portfolio is the one to replicate X∗ =
x0
EP[ρ]
.
(ii) If infc>0 k(c) = 1, then the supremum value of Problem (2.3.5) is 0, which is however
not achieved by any admissible portfolio.
(iii) If infc>0 k(c) < 1, then Problem (2.3.5) is ill-posed.
This time, taking x∗+ and c∗ as explained above in the well-posed case, we obtain as
optimal value V (X∗) = ϕ(c∗)1−α(x∗+)α −
k−T−(1− F (c∗))
(EP [ρIρ>c∗ ])α
(x∗+ − x0)α.
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2.4 The CPT agent's model in the strong information case
In this section, we will assume that in the market there is an insider trader (also known as
I-agent), who is still a small trader like N-agent, but who knows at the initial time t = 0
a functional G of the future prices of the risky assets, i.e. she knows ω by ω the value of
G (e.g. G may be the ﬁnal price of a stock Si(T ), or the terminal value of the Brownian
motion W (T ) and so on). Note that this framework is analogous to that of Karatzas and
Pikovsky in [37] with a complete market background.
The question now is to see how Problems (2.3.5) and (CPT-F) change, keeping in mind
that I-agent can (and will) exploit her favorable position. Our approach will be based on
enlargement of ﬁltration techniques, developed by the French school during the 80's [30]
and further powered during the following two decades (see [4], [2] and [3]). Following these
references, we assume that G is a random variable taking values in Rm 5; as a ﬁrst step we
deﬁne the enlarged ﬁltration G := (Gt)t∈[0,T ], where Gt = Ft ∨ σ(G) and σ(G) ⊆ F . This
new ﬁltration reﬂects the information of I-agent; it is well known that in general W will
no longer be a Brownian motion w.r.t. G, even if it was an (F,P)-Brownian motion.
Assumption 2.4.1 (Equivalence). The regular conditional distributions of G given Ft,
t ∈ [0, T ], are equivalent to the law of G P-a.s., i.e.
P[G ∈ ·|Ft](ω) ∼ P[G ∈ ·] ∀ t ∈ [0, T ], P-a.s..
The intuitive explanation of the previous assumption is that the knowledge owned by
the insider is not so good as it may seem; in fact it rules out the cases where G is a certain
information about the future prices, while there is room for a noisy signal concerning S(T ).
By a rather technical lemma of Jacod [30], it follows the existence of a measurable, strictly
positive function pxt (ω) which is càdlàg in t and such that
(i) for all x ∈ Rm, px is a (F,P)-martingale;
(ii) for all t ∈ [0, T ], the measure pxt P[G ∈ dx] on (Rm,B(Rm)) is a version of the
conditional distributions P[G ∈ dx|Ft].
At this point one can prove a slight variant of Theorem 3.1 by Amendinger [2]:
Theorem 2.4.1. If Assumption 2.4.1 [Equivalence] is satisﬁed and the risk free interest
rate is r(t) ≡ 0, then
1.
1
pGt
is a (G,P)-martingale on [0, T ];
2.
ρt
pGt
is a (G,P)-martingale on [0, T ];
3. the measure QG(A) deﬁned on the σ-algebra GT by
QG(A) :=
∫
A
ρ
pGT
dP, A ∈ GT , (2.4.1)
has the following properties:
5We could even assume that G takes values in any Polish space P, but for the sake of clarity it will be
suﬃcient to choose P = Rm, with m = 1 if not otherwise stated.
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(i) the σ-algebras FT and σ(G) are independent under QG;
(ii) QG = Q on FT and QG = P on σ(G).
Before proceeding further, some remarks and clariﬁcations are in order:
- The hypothesis r(t) ≡ 0 is only needed to simplify notations and calculus; in such a
case we have
ρ(t) =
dQ
dP
∣∣∣∣
Ft
= exp
(
−
∫ t
0
|θ(s)|2
2
ds−
∫ t
0
θ(s)′ dW (s)
)
≡ E
(
−
∫ t
0
θ(s)′ dW (s)
)
,
where E denotes the Dolèans-Dade exponential; note that the process (ρt)t is a (F,P)-
martingale on [0, T ] thanks to Assumption 2.2.1 and recall that ρ ≡ ρT ≡ dQdP
∣∣∣
FT
deﬁnes the martingale measure for N-agent, i.e. the price of any asset (or portfolio)
is a (F,Q)-martingale on [0, T ] .
- The measure QG is also known as the Martingale Preserving Probability Measure
under initial enlargement (MPPM for short); such a deﬁnition is easily understood
referring to the fact that the discounted price of any asset (or portfolio) is a (G,QG)-
martingale on [0, T ]. In other words, QG is the martingale measure for I-agent and
this fact will be useful later.
- More generally, with Assumption 2.4.1 [Equivalence], Corollary 2.6 in [3] shows that
for every measure Q ∼ P, a (F,Q)-martingale on [0, T ] is also a (F,QG)-martingale
on [0, T ], which in turn is a (G,QG)-martingale on [0, T ]; a similar result holds for
semi-martingales; however, the converse is not true. In particular we see that any
(F,Q)-Brownian motion is also a (G,QG)-Brownian motion.
Now one can try to ﬁnd a better representation for the process 1/pG and for the density
of the MPPM w.r.t. to P just aﬀording on some stronger assumptions. Speciﬁcally, let's
assume the following:
(i) the market is complete for N-agent (which amounts to have a martingale representa-
tion theorem on (Ω,F ,P,F));
(ii) the asset prices Si(t) are (F,P) continuous semi-martingales which can be written as
S = M+
∫
α d〈M〉, whereM is a continuous (F,P)-martingale and α is a predictable,
locally integrable process.
At this point one can show the existence of a measurable function µxt (ω) such that
M˜ := M − ∫ µG d〈M〉 is a continuous (G,P)-martingale. If moreover µx is predictable
and locally integrable for all x ∈ Rm, then for t ∈ [0, T ] the following formulas hold:
1
pGt
= E
(
−
∫ t
0
(
µGs
)′
dM˜s
)
, (2.4.2)
dQG
dP
∣∣∣∣
Gt
≡ ρt
pGt
= E
(
−
∫ t
0
(
αs + µ
G
s
)′
dM˜s
)
. (2.4.3)
Note that if the prices of the risky assets are Itô processes as in this framework, all the
previous assumptions are fulﬁlled in many cases.
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We have just seen that for the insider too it exists a risk-neutral measure, which im-
plies the absence of arbitrage for I-agent. The last ingredient we need is a martingale
representation theorem for the insider: if she would like to get a ﬁnal wealth X(T ), then
she must be able to replicate that particular contingent claim starting from her initial
wealth x0 and using a portfolio which belongs to a suitable admissible class. Everything
we need is to ﬁnd out whether the completeness of the market for N-agent is translated in
a completeness condition for I-agent; the answer is positive as can be seen from Theorem
3.2 in [3]. In fact, the uniqueness of the martingale measure Q for N-agent implies the
uniqueness (modulo G0) of the MPPM QG. Let's remark that the σ-algebra F0 is assumed
to be trivial, while in general G0 = σ(G) is not; therefore any (F,Q)-martingale on [0, T ]
can be represented as a sum of a suitable constant and a stochastic integral w.r.t. to a
(F,Q)-Brownian motion, while a (G,QG)-martingale on [0, T ] can be represented as a sum
of a suitable G0-measurable random variable and a stochastic integral w.r.t. to a (G,QG)-
Brownian motion.
Now we are able to state I-agent's problem analogously to Problem (CPT-F).
Maximize V (X) =
∫ +∞
0
T+(P{u+(X+) > y}) dy −
∫ +∞
0
T−(P{u−(X−) > y}) dy
subject to EP
[
ρ
pGT
X
]
= x0, X is GT -measurable and P-a.s. lower bounded.
(2.4.4)
To convince yourself that this formulation may be the right one, let's choose the class of
admissible portfolios for the insider as the set of m-dimensional processes pi G-progressively
measurable, QG-tame (i.e. the wealth X(t) is QG-a.s. bounded from below) and such
that
∫ T
0 |b(t)′pi(t)|dt < +∞ and
∫ T
0 |σ(t)′pi(t)|2 dt < +∞ QG-a.s.. We remark that the
SDE (2.3.1) which describes the wealth dynamic in no longer well-deﬁned in this new
setting. However it can be properly deﬁned on the new probability space (Ω,F ,P,G) by
substituting the dW (t) term with a suitable (G,P)-Brownian motion counterpart, see e.g.
[37] or more generally [2].
Thanks to the previous arguments, we can frame an analog of Proposition 2.3.1 and
show that for every GT -measurable random variable ξ which is QG-a.s. bounded from below
and such that EP
[
ρ
pGT
ξ
]
= EQG [ξ] = x0, we can ﬁnd a portfolio of the above class which
perfectly replicates ξ, i.e. ξ = X(T ). Moreover P-tameness is the same as QG-tameness
and the integrability conditions w.r.t. QG can be taken w.r.t. to P just like the a.s. lower
boundedness of the ﬁnal wealth X(T ) ≡ X, thanks to Assumption 2.4.1[Equivalence].
Finally note that the objective function for I-agent is the same as the one for N-agent,
because they both evaluate their gain and loss probabilities w.r.t. the historical measure
P.
Remark 2.4.1. Alternative formulations like
V+(X
+) :=
∫ +∞
0
T+(P{E[u+(X+)|σ(G)] > y}dy,
V+(X
+) :=
∫ +∞
0
T+(P{u+(EP[X+|σ(G)]) > y} dy,
and similarly for V−(X−) don't seem to be correct in that they don't reﬂect the overall
information which is at disposal of the insider.
Before proceeding further we observe that Problem (2.4.4) for I-agent is nothing but a
generalization of Problem (CPT-F); in fact we have:
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- if the additional information G is independent of the σ-algebra F (e.g. when G is pure
noise) then 1/pGT ≡ 1. Hence, we recover N-agent's problem; economically speaking,
the observation of G is completely useless for I-agent;
- if we set no probability distortion, i.e. T±(·) = id(·), then we obtain V+(X+) =
EP[u+(X+)] and similarly for V−(X−); however this does not mean that Problems
(CPT-F) and (2.4.4) are equivalent because the constraints for the non informed
agent identify a smaller set of feasible solutions w.r.t. the insider's one, as already
noted;6
- since the initial σ-algebra G0 need not to be trivial, one can also formulate a prob-
lem where the initial condition of the SDE (2.3.1) representing the wealth X(t)
is no more a constant but a G0-measurable random variable; however we have
x0 = EQ
G
[X] = EQG
[
EQG [X|G0]
]
, hence we can always choose a deterministic initial
wealth for the insider. As Amendinger points out in [2], a non-constant X(0) for I-
agent may represent a situation of initial uncertainty for the insider, due for example
to a stochastic amount of funds that can be raised;
- as is standard in insider trading models (see e.g. [37]), a fundamental issue consists in
proving that an insider always gets more that a non informed trader and the diﬀer-
ence between the optimal values of these two investors is usually called insider's gain.
Now, if we choose as ﬁnal wealth a contingent claim X which is a FT -measurable
random variable, P-a.s. lower bounded and such that EP[ρX] = x0, then we can
see that X is feasible both for N-agent and I-agent. In fact it obviously satisﬁes
the constraints of Problem (CPT-F) but it also satisﬁes those of Problem (2.4.4), as
FT ⊆ GT and
x0 = EP[ρX] = EQ[X] = EQ
G
[X] = EP
[
ρ
pGT
X
]
,
thanks to property (ii) of Theorem 2.4.1. This in turn implies that the feasible
solutions for N-agent form a subset of those of I-agent; moreover, by the fact that
the objective functions are the same, it follows that the optimal value for the insider
is always greater or equal than the optimal value for the non informed agent, as one
should expect. This observation is nothing but the proof of the following result.
Proposition 2.4.1. Under Assumption 2.4.1 [Equivalence], in the strong information set-
ting the insider's gain for a CPT investor is always non negative.
2.4.1 The solution for a CPT strongly informed insider
The similarities between Problems (CPT-F) and (2.4.4) allow us to apply all the techniques
presented in Section 2.3.1 with some slight modiﬁcations; the only diﬀerences between these
two problems are:
(i) the new σ-algebra GT instead of FT ;
(ii) the new density γ :=
ρ
pGT
which appears in the constraint.
6This situation appears also in classical portfolio selection models, see e.g. [37].
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With regard to the ﬁrst point, we can see that it causes no technical problems because our
hypotheses imply that the ﬁltration G is right-continuous and completed, as showed by
Proposition 3.3, [2]. Relying on that result, we can now work with GT just like we did with
FT . What remains to do is to check that all the assumptions imposed in Section 2.2 on ρ
are now fulﬁlled by the new random variable γ; after that we can re-state all the previous
results obtained by Jin and Zhou in [33] replacing γ and GT in every explicit expression.
As a ﬁrst step, we have to check that γ has no atoms w.r.t. P, that is to say P {γ = a} =
0 ∀ a ∈ (0,+∞) 7. But it is easily seen that we have
P {γ = a} = EP [I{γ=a}] = 1aQG {γ = a} ,
which in general will be equal to 0 for suitable choices of G; otherwise we could impose
that γ has no atoms as an additional (and innocuous) assumption.
The other conditions on γ are straightforward to check, as we have γ ∈ (0,+∞) P-a.s. and
EP[γ] = 1, thanks to the fact that pGT > 0 P-a.s. and the results of Theorem 2.4.1.
In what follows we will need a new set of variables for I-agent; they will be accompanied
with a I , in contrast to the variables for N-agent which will be recovered by Section 2.3.1
and do not have any upper symbol. Moreover, let F γ(·) be the distribution function of γ
and deﬁne
γ ≡ esssupP γ := sup{a ∈ R : P{γ > a} > 0},
γ ≡ essinfP γ := inf{a ∈ R : P{γ < a} > 0}.
Well-posedness is again an important issue as it happened for the non informed agent; with
some slight adjustments to Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 in [33] we can formulate:
Proposition 2.4.2. Problem (2.4.4) is ill-posed if there exists a nonnegative GT -measurable
random variable X such that EP[γX] < +∞ and V+(X) = +∞.
Proposition 2.4.3. If u+(+∞) = +∞, γ = +∞, and T−(·) = id(·), then Problem (2.4.4)
is ill-posed.
In particular, we already know that ill-posedness for N-agent implies ill-posedness for
I-agent thanks to Proposition 2.4.1. As in Section 2.3.1, we will make the following
Assumption 2.4.2. V+(X) < +∞ for any nonnegative, GT -measurable random variable
X satisfying EP[γX] < +∞.
For the sake of clarity we brieﬂy report the decomposition of Problem (2.4.4), making
the necessary modiﬁcations.
• Positive Part Problem: given the pair (A, x+), with A ∈ GT and x+ ∈ [x+0 ,+∞),
Maximize V+(X) =
∫ +∞
0
T+(P{u+(X) > y}) dy
subject to EP[γX] = x+, X ≥ 0 P-a.s., X = 0 P-a.s. on AC .
(2.4.5)
Note that again Assumption 2.4.2 implies that V+(X) is a ﬁnite nonnegative number
for any feasible X. We now deﬁne vI+(A, x+), the optimal value of problem (2.4.5),
analogously to v+(A, x+):
7As noted in [33], this assumption is not necessary but it is imposed to avoid undue technicalities.
Moreover, we restrict our attention to a ∈ (0,+∞) because γ can be represented as a stochastic exponential;
see equation (2.4.3).
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- if P(A) > 0, then the feasible region of (2.4.5) is non-empty and vI+(A, x+) is
deﬁned as the supremum of (2.4.5);
- if P(A) = 0 and x+ = 0, then the only feasible solution for (2.4.5) isX = 0 P-a.s.,
so vI+(A, x+) := 0;
- if P(A) = 0 and x+ > 0, then (2.4.5) has an empty feasible region, therefore
vI+(A, x+) := −∞.
• Negative Part Problem: given the pair (A, x+), with A ∈ GT and x+ ∈ [x+0 ,+∞),
Minimize V−(X) =
∫ +∞
0
T−(P{u−(X) > y}) dy
subject to
{
EP[γX] = x+ − x0, X ≥ 0 P-a.s., X = 0 P-a.s. on A,
X is upper bounded P-a.s..
(2.4.6)
We now similarly deﬁne vI−(A, x+), the optimal value of problem (2.4.6), in the
following way:
- if P(A) < 1, then the feasible region of (2.4.6) is non-empty and vI−(A, x+) is
deﬁned as the inﬁmum of (2.4.6);
- if P(A) = 1 and x+ = x0, then the only feasible solution for (2.4.6) is X = 0 P-
a.s., so vI−(A, x+) := 0;
- if P(A) = 1 and x+ > x+0 , then (2.4.6) has an empty feasible region, therefore
vI−(A, x+) := +∞.
• Merged Problem: the objective now is to solve
Maximize vI+(A, x+)− vI−(A, x+)
subject to
{
A ∈ GT , x+ ≥ x+0 ,
x+ = 0 if P(A) = 0, x+ = x0 if P(A) = 1.
(2.4.7)
But now we see that (2.4.7) can be connected with the "simpler" problem
Maximize vI+(c, x+)− u−
(
x+ − x0
EP[γIγ>c]
)
T−(1− F γ(c))
subject to
{
γ ≤ c ≤ γ, x+ ≥ x+0 ,
x+ = 0 if c = γ, x+ = x0 if c = γ,
(2.4.8)
where vI+(c, x+) := v
I
+({ω ∈ Ω : γ(ω) ≤ c}, x+) and we use the convention
u−
(
x+ − x0
EP[γIγ>c]
)
T−(1− F γ(c)) := 0 if c = γ and x+ = x0. (2.4.9)
We are ready to state the solution results for I-agent.
Proposition 2.4.4. Assume that u−(·) is strictly concave at 0. We have the following
conclusions:
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(i) if XI∗ is optimal for Problem (2.4.4), then cI∗ := (F γ)−1(P{XI∗ ≥ 0}), xI∗+ :=
EP[γ(XI∗)+] are optimal for Problem (2.4.8). Moreover, {ω : XI∗ ≥ 0} and {ω : γ ≤
cI∗} are identical up to a P-null probability set, and (XI∗)− = x
I∗
+ − x0
EP[γIγ>cI∗ ]
Iγ>cI∗ P
a.s..
(ii) If (cI∗, xI∗+ ) is optimal for Problem (2.4.8) and XI∗+ is optimal for Problem (2.4.5) with
parameters ({γ ≤ cI∗}, xI∗+ ), then XI∗ := XI∗+ Iγ≤cI∗ −
xI∗+ − x0
EP[γIγ>cI∗ ]
Iγ>cI∗ is optimal
for Problem (2.4.4).
Therefore, in order to solve Problem (2.4.4) we can exploit the following algorithm.
Step 1 Solve Problem (2.4.5) with given parameters ({γ ≤ c}, x+), where γ ≤ c ≤ γ and
x+ ≥ x+0 , in order to obtain vI+(c, x+) and the optimal solution XI∗+ (c, x+).
Step 2 Solve Problem (2.4.8) to get (cI∗, xI∗+ ).
Step 3 If (cI∗, xI∗+ ) = (γ, x0), then XI∗+ (γ, x0) solves Problem (2.4.4); else
XI∗+ (c
I∗, xI∗+ )Iγ≤cI∗ −
xI∗+ − x0
EP[γIγ>cI∗ ]
Iγ>cI∗ (2.4.10)
solves Problem (2.4.4).
To get an explicit solution we again have to impose conditions similar to Assumption 2.3.4.
In particular, we set
Assumption 2.4.3.
(i')
(F γ)−1(z)
T ′+(z)
is non-decreasing in z ∈ (0, 1];
(ii) lim inf
x→+∞
−xu′′+(x)
u′+(x)
> 0;
(iii') EP
[
u+
(
(u′+)−1
(
γ
T ′+(F γ(γ))
))
T ′+(F γ(γ))
]
< +∞.
Condition (i') is still related to the fact that the distortion on gains should not be
too extreme; note that the hypothesis (ii) on the RRA coeﬃcient on gains is the same
as for N-agent; in fact value functions like probability distortions are supposed to be the
same for the two types of agent. Now, with Assumption 2.4.3 in force, vI+(c, x+) and the
corresponding optimal solution XI∗+ to Problem (2.4.5) can be expressed more explicitly,
together with the optimal solution XI∗ of (2.4.4):
vI+(c, x+) = EP
[
u+
(
(u′+)
−1
(
λI(c, x+)γ
T ′+(F γ(γ))
))
T ′+(F
γ(γ))Iγ≤c
]
,
XI∗+ = (u
′
+)
−1
(
λI(c, x+)γ
T ′+(F γ(γ))
)
Iγ≤c,
XI∗ = (u′+)
−1
(
λI(cI∗, xI∗+ )γ
T ′+(F γ(γ))
)
Iγ≤cI∗ −
xI∗+ − x0
EP[γIγ>cI∗ ]
Iγ>cI∗ ,
where λI(c, x+) satisﬁes EP
[
(u′+)
−1
(
λI(c, x+)γ
T ′+(F γ(γ))
)
γIγ≤c
]
= x+.
To conclude this section on the strong information case, we observe that analogous results
for the CRRA case could be stated; however, we do not report them for reasons of space.
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2.5 The CPT agent's model in the partial information case
Analogously to the EU investor's problem, we can frame and solve a portfolio selection
problem for a partial informed CPT agent. We will follow the approach of Björk, Davis and
Landen [12], modeling a complete ﬁnancial market in continuous time where our partially
informed agent cannot observe the drift underlying the evolution of the stock prices.8
Actually, she can only observe the prices realized in the past and the present price.
In what follows we partially recover the setting of Section 2.2, with a ﬁltered probability
space (Ω,F ,P,F) where F = {Ft}t≥0 is a completed ﬁltration and F0 needs not to be the
trivial σ-algebra. Furthermore, we assume that the risk-free asset has a null return, i.e.
r(t) ≡ 0 and the market consists of a single risky asset whose price dynamics are
dS(t) = S(t)b(t)dt+ S(t)σ(t)dW (t), t ∈ [0, T ]; S(0) = s0 > 0. (2.5.1)
We recall that the process {Wt}t≥0 is an (F,P)-Brownian motion and that the ﬁltration F
needs not to be the one generated by W , namely FW . Moreover, our market is complete
under the historical measure P and there exists a unique risk-neutral measure Q on FT
implicitly deﬁned by the density ρ (see equation (2.2.3)). We will make the following
hypothesis.
Assumption 2.5.1.
(i) The process b is F-adapted whereas σ is FW -adapted;
(ii) The process σ is bounded away from zero, i.e. there exists a constant c > 0 such that
σ(t) > c ∀ t ≥ 0.
We note that the adaptedness condition on the process σ is without loss of generality,
thanks to the quadratic variation properties of the Brownian motion.
Economically speaking, the partially informed agent is only able to take her investment
decisions on the basis of the observed past prices as she is not aware of the drift b. This
amounts to say that her information set is represented by the ﬁltration FS :=
{
FSt
}
t≥0,
where FSt = σ {S(u), u ≤ t}. At this point, all we have to do is to formulate the behavioral
agent's problem in this partial information framework; we will use standard ﬁltering tech-
niques in order to recover a full information setting, together with new SDEs for the stock
price and the wealth of the investor. This approach allows to obtain a solution which is
qualitatively similar to the strongly informed insider trader, as we will only need to change
the state price density and the ﬁltration under which we are working.
Remark 2.5.1. About the notation: we use ·ˆ to denote the ﬁlter estimates, whereas ·˜
represents variables in the partially observed model. For example: bˆ will be the ﬁlter
estimate of the process b and W˜ will be a Brownian motion w.r.t. FS .
Precisely, we can deﬁne the ﬁlter estimate of the F-adapted drift coeﬃcient b as its
projection on the strictly smaller ﬁltration FS , i.e.
bˆ(t) := EP
[
b(t)
∣∣FSt ] . (2.5.2)
Now, as usual in ﬁltering theory, we look for the so called innovation process; elementary
results (see e.g. [44]) give us the following
8The naming partial information was introduced by Lakner in [43].
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Lemma 2.5.1. The innovation process W˜ =
{
W˜t
}
t∈[0,T ]
deﬁned by
dW˜ (t) = dW (t) +
b(t)− bˆ(t)
σ(t)
dt (2.5.3)
is a standard (FS ,P)-Brownian motion over [0, T ].
Remark 2.5.2. We note that a basic result of ﬁltering theory asserts that a standard (FS ,P)-
Brownian motion can be obtained with dynamics
dW˜ (t) = dW (t) +
[
b(t)
σ(t)
−
(̂
b(t)
σ(t)
)]
dt.
However, thanks to the adaptedness of the process σ to the ﬁltration FS , it is straightfor-
ward to obtain (2.5.3).
At this point we can write a SDE for the stock price evolution w.r.t. its internal ﬁltration
FS , simply replacing the dW (t) in (2.5.1) with the one previously obtained. Rearranging
terms, we have
dS(t) = S(t)bˆ(t)dt+ S(t)σ(t)dW˜ (t), t ∈ [0, T ]; S(0) = s0 > 0. (2.5.4)
Analogously to the full information setting, we can compute the pricing kernel for a partially
informed agent as
ρ˜(t) ≡ dQ˜
dP
∣∣∣∣∣
FSt
:= exp
(
−1
2
∫ t
0
bˆ(s)2
σ(s)2
ds−
∫ t
0
bˆ(s)
σ(s)
dW˜ (s)
)
, (2.5.5)
where ρ˜ ≡ ρ˜(T ) deﬁnes the unique risk-neutral measure Q˜ on FST .
Applying the same argument as for the stock prices, we can now derive a SDE for the
wealth process x w.r.t. the ﬁltration FS starting from equation (2.3.1); rearranging terms
we have
dx(t) = bˆ(t)pi(t)dt+ σ(t)pi(t)dW˜ (t), t ∈ [0, T ]; x(0) = x0, (2.5.6)
where the portfolio pi(t) is the market value at time t of the agent's wealth invested in the
risky asset. Obviously, equation (2.5.6) is well-deﬁned if we allow pi to be chosen among a
suitable class of admissible portfolios. In this particular case, we have to select pi such that
it is an FS-progressively measurable process satisfying the integrability conditions∫ T
0
|bˆ(t)pi(t)|dt < +∞,
∫ T
0
σ(t)2pi(t)2dt < +∞, P-a.s..
Moreover, such an admissible portfolio pi is said to be tame if the corresponding wealth
process x(t) is P-a.s. bounded from below. We ﬁnally remark that thanks to the uniqueness
of the equivalent martingale measure Q˜, we also have a completeness result analogous to
Proposition 2.3.1 at our disposal, concerning FST -measurable random variables ξ which are
P-a.s. bounded from below and such that EP[ρ˜ξ] = EQ˜[ξ] = x0.
We are now ready to formulate the optimization problem for a partially informed behav-
ioral agent; denoting as usual the terminal wealth x(T ) ≡ X and recalling the deﬁnition
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of the objective function V (·) from equation (2.3.2), we have to solve
Maximize V (X) =
∫ +∞
0
T+(P{u+(X+) > y}) dy −
∫ +∞
0
T−(P{u−(X−) > y}) dy
subject to EP[ρ˜X] = x0, X is an a.s. lower bounded, FST -random variable.
(2.5.7)
We note that in the deﬁnition of the objective function V (·) we still use the historical
measure P, as well as in the budget constraint. However, for Probelem (2.5.7) we have
the new density ρ˜ instead of ρ and we have to select an FST -measurable terminal wealth.
Therefore, the solution to problem (2.5.7) exactly replicates the original one by Jin and
Zhou, simply replacing ρ˜ instead of ρ in the explicit expressions obtained in Section 2.3.
Obviously, we should check the validity of all necessary hypotheses; furthermore, we have to
avoid ill-posedness of the problem by imposing analogous assumptions to those of Section
2.3.
For reasons of space, we do not write down the whole procedure to get the solution.
Moreover, it is straightforward to see that in the CRRA case with positive initial endowment
x0 and no probability distortion on gains, i.e. T+(·) = id(·), if the problem is well-posed
we exactly recover the results obtained in [12]. Finally, in the particular case b(t) ≡ σλ,
σ(t) ≡ σ > 0 with λ ∼ N (λ0, v0) independent of the (F,P)-Brownian motionW , we recover
the results of Danilova, Monoyios and Ng, [21].
2.6 The weak information approach
As we already said in the introduction, we abandon the market framework speciﬁed in
Section 2.2 in order to obtain a more general model. In particular, let (Ω,F ,F,Q) be
an atomless probability space, where F := {Ft}0≤t≤T is a completed and right-continuous
ﬁltration with F0 being the trivial σ-algebra and T > 0 a constant time horizon.
We consider a continuous-time market model with one riskless asset whose price is
S0 ≡ 1 and m traded risky assets, whose evolution is described by the process S(t) =
(S1(t), . . . , Sm(t)). The main assumption we make is the following.
Assumption 2.6.1. The price process (S1(t), . . . , Sm(t)) is a continuous and adapted
square integrable martingale on (Ω,F,Q). Moreover, Q is the unique probability measure
under which S(t) is a local martingale, i.e. the market is complete.
We consider two types of agents acting in this market, a non informed agent (or N-agent)
and an informed agent (I-agent). An N-agent relies on Q as well as on the observable past
and present prices when taking her investment decisions. On the other hand, an I-agent has
also some privileged information concerning the law of a functional Y of the stock prices.
Speciﬁcally, I-agent knows the distribution of Y under the so-called historical measure P
governing market prices.
From now on, we assume that Y is a scalar random variable (everything shown below can
be easily generalized to a vector valued random variable or to more complicated functionals
Y taking values in a Polish space P). We will denote with QY the law of Y under Q and
with ν the eﬀective law of Y known by I-agent. Therefore we have
QY (B) = Q{Y ∈ B}, ∀B ∈ B(R).
Assumption 2.6.2. ν is equivalent to QY , the (real) density is ξ := dνdQY and ξ(Y ) is
Q-a.s. bounded.
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Note that Assumption 2.6.2 rules out some interesting cases of information owned by
the insider. Now, the privileged information (Y, ν) can be naturally associated with a new
measure called by Baudoin the minimal probability.
Deﬁnition 2.6.1. The probability measure Qν deﬁned on (Ω,FT ) by:
Qν(A) :=
∫
R
Q(A|Y = y) ν( dy), A ∈ FT (2.6.1)
is called the minimal probability associated with the weak information (Y, ν).
The meaning of the word minimal used by Baudoin is explained by the following propo-
sition, which shows that Qν fulﬁlls a minimum criterion. Speciﬁcally, let Eν be the set of
probability measures on F which are equivalent to Q and such that the law of Y under
those measures is ν. Then we have
Theorem 2.6.1 (Proposition 6, [8]). For every convex function ϕ : R+ → R,
min
µ∈Eν
E
[
ϕ
(
dµ
dQ
)]
= E
[
ϕ
(
dQν
dQ
)]
.
If dQ
ν
dQ is bounded, then the two quantities above are ﬁnite.
Moreover, observe that Qν does not depend on the choice of the utility function in a
standard portfolio selection model, thus in a behavioral setting this amounts to say that
the minimal probability is unaﬀected by the probability distortions and the value functions
(see Remark 2.8.3 later).
To better understand the notion of miminal probability, note that the expression
Q(A|Y = y) which appears in (2.6.1) is nothing but the conditional probability measure
given Y , which can also be written as EQ [IA|Y = y] = g(y) for some measurable function
g(·). Otherwise, we could deﬁne Q(A|Y = y) to be the measurable function such that
Q {A, {Y ∈ B}} =
∫
B
Q (A|Y = y)QY ( dy), A ∈ FT , B ∈ B(R). (2.6.2)
For particular cases of the side information Y we can obtain explicit expressions for Qν :
- if Y is a discrete random variable taking values in {y0, y1, . . .} with positive Q prob-
ability, then
Qν{u+(X) > t} =
+∞∑
k=0
Q{u+(X) > t, Y = yk}
Q{Y = yk} ν{Y = yk};
- if Y is a real continuous random variable then
Qν{u+(X) > t} =
∫
R
∫ +∞
u−1+ (t)
n(y, dx) ν( dy),
where (n(y, dx))y∈R is the conditional law of X given Y . Moreover, if Y has a density
fY (y) and (X,Y ) have a joint density fXY (x, y) w.r.t. Q, then
Qν{u+(X) > t} =
∫
R
∫ +∞
u−1+ (t)
fXY (x, y)
fY (y)
dx ν( dy).
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Now, it is not diﬃcult to show the following useful properties.
1. If X : Ω→ R is a bounded random variable, then Eν [X|Y ] = EQ[X|Y ] Q-a.s., where
Eν denotes the expectation w.r.t. the measure Qν .
2. The law of Y under Qν is ν, i.e. ν(B) = Qν{Y ∈ B}, ∀ B ∈ B(R).
3. Qν = Q ⇐⇒ ν = QY .
4. We have the following equivalence relationship:
dQν =
dν
dQY
(Y ) dQ. (2.6.3)
To avoid ambiguity, this means that ∀A ∈ FT we have Eν [IA] = E
[
dν
dQY (Y ) IA
]
.
5. If A ∈ FT is Q-independent of Y , then it is also Qν-independent of Y .
In particular, (2.6.3), Property 3 and 5 follow immediately by Deﬁnition 2.6.1; these in turn
imply Property 1 thanks to the Bayes' rule for conditional expectations; ﬁnally Property 2
can be easily checked for every Borel set (−∞, b], b ∈ R.
2.7 The EU agents' models and their solutions
In a classical portfolio selection model, i.e. when N-agent's objective is to maximize her
expected utility from terminal wealth, all the results have already been derived in [8].
For reader's convenience, we recall here the solution of this problem assuming that the
considered investor is endowed with a positive initial wealth x0 and with a utility function
satisfying the following standard assumption.
Assumption 2.7.1. The utility function U : (0,+∞) → R is strictly increasing, strictly
concave and twice continuously diﬀerentiable and satisﬁes the Inada conditions U ′(+∞) =
0, U ′(0+) = +∞.
In [8] it is used the convention U(x) = −∞ for x ≤ 0. This is because the initial wealth
x0 is assumed to be positive; however, in the case of a power utility function one could
conventionally assume U(0) = 0.
Before formulating the optimization problems, we need to deﬁne a suitable class of
admissible portfolios or strategies. We are going to use a slight modiﬁcation of the deﬁnition
of tame portfolios given in [33], which is well adapted to solve the optimal investment
problems of both EU and CPT agents, in the informed as well as in the non-informed case.
Let's denote with Πi(t) the number of shares of the i-th risky asset held by our trader at
time t.
Deﬁnition 2.7.1. An admissible portfolio is a couple (x0,Π(·)), where x0 is an initial
wealth and Π(·) is a F-predictable process, (S(t))-integrable and such that the corresponding
wealth process
x(t) := x0 +
∫ t
0
Π(u) dS(u), 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (2.7.1)
is a (F,Q)-martingale. Moreover, we say that an admissible portfolio Π(·) is Q-tame if the
corresponding wealth x(·) is Q-a.s. bounded from below, where the bound may depend on
Π(·).
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Under the previous assumption, the value of any portfolio is a Q-martingale whose
Q-dynamics is
dx(t) = Π(t)′dS(t), t ∈ [0, T ]; x(0) = x0 > 0. (2.7.2)
Furthermore, for every admissible portfolio Π(·) we will ﬁnd as terminal wealth x(T ) ≡ X
a FT -measurable random variable, Q-a.s. bounded from below and such that EQ[X] = x0.
Conversely, thanks to Assumption 2.6.1 a standard completeness argument can be applied,
so that any bounded from below contingent claim X with EQ[X] = x0 can be replicated
by a Q-tame portfolio Π(·) with the initial wealth x0.9 Hence, in the formulation of the
optimization problems of both EU and CPT agents, we will translate the constraints on
strategies Π(·) into constraints on contingent claims X. This is usual in the martingale
approach.
2.7.1 The non informed agent's problem
For a N-agent, the most natural way to evaluate her own utility from terminal wealth X
is to choose the martingale measure Q when computing the expectation (in fact she does
not know the historical measure P, so she can not use it!). Therefore, the EU non informed
agent's problem is
Maximize EQ[U(X)]
subject to EQ[X] = x0, X is FT -measurable and Q-a.s. bounded from below.
(EU-N)
The solution to Problem (EU-N) is trivial thanks to Jensen's inequality and the concavity
assumption on U(·). In fact, for every feasible solution X we have
EQ[U(X)] ≤ U
(
EQ[X]
)
= U(x0),
so the best choice for N-agent is X∗ ≡ x0, with optimal value U(x0). In other words,
Π ≡ 0 will be the selected portfolio, which implies null risky investment. The explanation
of this behavior is obvious if one thinks to the risk neutrality which stands behind the
Black-Scholes model and which is perfectly reﬂected by the measure Q. In the CPT case
things will be diﬀerent even for non-informed risk-neutral agents, i.e. agents evaluating
their gains/losses under the risk-neutral measure Q.
2.7.2 The insider's problem
Let us look at the results obtained by Baudoin and Nguyen-Ngoc in [8, 9] in a classical
portfolio optimization problem for an informed agent who has the weak information (Y, ν)
and a utility function U(·) satisfying Assumption 2.7.1. In the following deﬁnition, X will
denote any terminal payoﬀ which can be attained using admissible strategies.
Deﬁnition 2.7.2 ([9], Deﬁnition 4). The ﬁnancial value of the weak information (Y, ν) for
an insider with initial endowment x0 > 0 is
u(x0, ν) := inf
µ∈Eν
sup
Π admissible
Eµ[U(X)]. (2.7.3)
9See for example [38], Deﬁnition 6.1 and Theorem 6.6 or [33], Proposition 2.1. We also remark that in
[33], absolute value portfolio strategies were used instead of our number of shares strategies.
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Thanks to convex duality and the martingale dual approach in complete markets, one
has the following result adapted from [9].
Theorem 2.7.1 ([9], Theorem 1). Assume that the expectations below are ﬁnite. Then for
each initial endowment x0 > 0,
u(x0, ν) = sup
Π admissible
Eν [U(X)] = Eν
[
U
((
U ′
)−1 (Λ(x0)
ξ(Y )
))]
, (2.7.4)
where Λ(x0) is deﬁned by
Eν
[
1
ξ(Y )
(
U ′
)−1 (Λ(x0)
ξ(Y )
)]
= x0.
Moreover, under Qν the optimal terminal wealth is given by
X∗ =
(
U ′
)−1 (Λ(x0)
ξ(Y )
)
. (2.7.5)
We observe that it would be more natural to perform a shift over u(x0, ν) and deﬁne
the value of the privileged information (or insider's gain) as u(x0, ν) − U(x0), i.e. the
diﬀerence between the ﬁnal utility of the insider and the optimal value of a non informed
investor. Note that if the insider has no additional information, i.e. ν = QY , then we
have ξ(Y ) = 1 Q-a.s.. Therefore, we deduce u(x0, ν) = U(x0) and X = x0 Q-a.s., which
is nothing but the N-agent's solution. Finally, as a corollary one can even show that
u(x0, ν) ≥ U(x0) where the equality holds for ν = QY .
Turning back to the portfolio optimization problem of a weakly informed classical in-
sider, we see that it can be equivalently deﬁned as
Maximize Eν [U(X)]
subject to Eν
[
1
ξ(Y )X
]
= x0 > 0, X is FT -measurable and Qν-a.s. lower bounded,
(EU-I)
thanks to the ﬁrst equality in equation (2.7.4). We also remark that the constraint in
Problem (EU-I) is a direct consequence of the relation (2.6.3). Indeed, we can write 1ξ
as a density of QY w.r.t. ν and 1ξ(Y ) is Q-a.s. bounded. Now it immediately follows
x0 = EQ[X] = Eν
[
1
ξ(Y )X
]
, as it appears in (EU-I).
Example 2.7.1. If α ∈ (0, 1) and U(x) = xα then by straightforward calculations
u(x0, ν) = x
α
0
(
EQ
[
ξ(Y )
1
1−α
])1−α
,
X∗ = x0
ξ(Y )
1
1−α
EQ
[
ξ(Y )
1
1−α
] .
Example 2.7.2 (Proposition 67, [8]). Let WQ be a (Ω,F,Q)-Brownian motion and con-
sider a market with only one risky asset whose price dynamics is
dS(t) = σS(t)dWQ(t), t ∈ [0, T ], S(0) = s0 > 0,
for some constant σ > 0, or equivalently
S(t) = s0 exp
(
σWQt −
σ2
2
t
)
.
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Hence, by a change of variable, a weak information on the ﬁnal price S(T ) is equivalent
to a weak information on the Gaussian random variable WQT . Suppose I-agent has the
privileged information (WQT , ν), where
ν(dx) =
1√
2pis
exp
(
−(x−m)
2
2s2
)
dx
is Gaussian with mean m ∈ R and variance s2 ≤ T , with 0 < s ≤ √T , i.e. ν ∼ N (m, s2).
Note that Assumption 2.6.2 is fulﬁlled and we can also explicitly compute
ξ(Y ) = ξ(WQT ) =
√
T
s
exp
(
−(W
Q
T −m)2
2s2
+
(WQT )
2
2T
)
(2.7.6)
Therefore, if we set δ = s
2−T
T , then for a power utility function U(x) = x
α, α ∈ (0, 1), one
can compute
u(x0, ν) = x
α
0
1√
1 + δ
(
1− α
1
1+δ − α
) 1−α
2
exp
(
αm2
2[T (1− α)− αδT ]
)
.
Speciﬁcally, ifm = 0 and s2 = T (i.e. δ = 0), then we recover theminimal information case,
as ν = QY . If m 6= 0 and s2 = T , then I-agent has some additional information regarding
the drift but not the variance of the Brownian motion; in this case we have u(x0, ν) =
xα0 exp
(
αm2
2[T (1−α)]
)
and the bigger m, the more valuable the information. Viceversa, if
m = 0 and s2 < T , then we obtain u(x0, ν) = xα0
1√
1+δ
(
1−α
1
1+δ
−α
) 1−α
2
, which tends to
inﬁnity as δ ↓ −1, or equivalently as s ↓ 0. Thus a more precise knowledge on the ﬁnal
price leads to a higher value of the weak information, as naturally expected. This example
will be studied in full details in the CPT case as well.
2.8 The CPT agents' models and their solutions
In this section we will give the solution of portfolio selection problems of CPT non-informed
and informed agents. We will keep as much as possible the setting and the notation used by
Jin and Zhou [33] to describe the preferences and the objective function of a CPT investor.
We point out that our results are linked to those in [33]. However, they need a complete
proof as we are working in a slight diﬀerent setting. Loosely speaking, in [33], the investor
knows the historical probability P and she performs a standard change of measure based
on the pricing kernel (or state price density) ρ, thus obtaining martingale processes for
the prices under an equivalent probability. After that, a complete solution based on ρ is
derived under some technical assumptions.
In the present framework we start from the very beginning with martingale prices.
Therefore, no change of measure is needed as ρ ≡ 1 a.s., i.e. it is totally concentrated.
As a consequence, we will see that the structure of the solution for a N-agent will be
law dependent, in the sense that only the distribution of a random variable will aﬀect her
optimal value.
Regarding the preference parameters, we retain Assumptions 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. Concern-
ing the market, we maintain Deﬁnition 2.7.1 over the class of admissible portfolios; hence
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our non informed CPT agent will search a terminal wealth X, FT -measurable and a.s.
lower bounded w.r.t. her reference probability. However, her initial endowment can be any
amount x0 ∈ R and not necessarily non-negative.
2.8.1 The non informed agent's problem
We now consider a non-informed agent who evaluates her total utility distinguishing gains
from losses w.r.t. to the reference level 0. For the moment, probability distortion are not
allowed, i.e. T±(·) = id(·). Such an investor represents an intermediate case between a
classical agent and a behavioral agent à la Kahneman and Tversky.
Within this framework, it seems reasonable to deﬁne the problem of a non informed agent
as
Maximize V (X) = EQ[u+(X+)]− EQ[u−(X−)]
subject to EQ[X] = x0, X is FT -measurable and Q-a.s. bounded from below.
(2.8.1)
Unfortunately there are bad news about Problem (2.8.1) because under Assumptions 2.3.1
and 2.3.2 it can easily be ill-posed. Before giving a more precise statement (and its proof),
we note that an investor with the previous objective function would better choose a ﬁxed
reward x+ whenever X is positive, thanks to Jensen's inequality and the concavity of u+(·).
Otherwise, conditioned to X ≤ 0, she will try to minimize the expected loss. The following
ill-posedness result depends substantially on a comparison between the magnitude of the
utility from large gains and that of disutility from large losses.
Proposition 2.8.1. Assume limx→+∞ u+(x) = +∞ and limx→+∞ u+(x)u−(x) ∈ (1,+∞], where
the previous limit exists. Then Problem (2.8.1) is ill-posed.
Proof. Consider the sequence of admissible terminal wealths (Xn)n, where
Xn =
{
n(x+0 + 1) with Q-probability 1/2,
2x0 − n(x+0 + 1) with Q-probability 1/2,
for n suﬃciently large. Then we have
V (Xn) =
1
2
[
u+
(
n(x+0 + 1)
)− u− (n(x+0 + 1)− 2x0)]→ +∞,
as n → +∞, thanks to our assumptions limx→+∞ u+(x) = +∞ and limx→+∞ u+(x)u−(x) ∈
(1,+∞].
There are diﬀerent ways out of this drawback. Obviously, we could choose suitable value
functions u±(·), e.g. imposing limx→+∞ u+(x) < +∞. We could alternatively introduce
probability distortions, especially on the loss part as explained in [33]. Finally, we could
impose a loss control, i.e. a lower bound L on the maximal loss which can be suﬀered by
the investor (for more details on the subject, see [32]). One could also use a combination
of the previous modiﬁcations.
Let us consider the case where the probability distortions satisfy Assumption 2.3.2.
Thus, the problem for a CPT N-agent will be
Maximize V (X) = V+(X+)− V−(X−)
subject to EQ[X] = x0, X is FT -measurable and Q-a.s. bounded from below,
(CPT-N)
47
2.8. The CPT agents' models and their solutions
where we set
V+(X
+) :=
∫ +∞
0
T+(Q{u+(X+) > y}) dy, V−(X−) :=
∫ +∞
0
T−(Q{u−(X−) > y}) dy.
The main diﬀerence between our Problem (CPT-N) and the optimization problem in [33]
concerns the constraint on the expected value of the terminal wealth X. More speciﬁcally,
in Problem (CPT-F), the budget constraint was EP[ρX] = x0, where the law of the state
price density ρ was assumed to be atom-less w.r.t. P. Now, we do not have that atom-less
density as we are already working under the martingale measure Q. We also recall that
the assumption on ρ being atom-less w.r.t. P was imposed in [33] just to avoid technical
diﬃculties. In our case, the absence of a weighting random variable (this was actually the
role played by ρ) will change the structure of the solution to Problem (CPT-N) as well as
its economical interpretation.
For reader's convenience, we will report below only the main results, while the proofs are
postponed in Section 2.13.
For any ﬁxed random variable Z uniformly distributed over (0, 1) w.r.t. Q (i.e. Z ∼
U(0, 1), for short) and given a pair (p, x+) with p ∈ [0, 1] and x+ ≥ x+0 , deﬁne v+(p, x+)
as the optimal value of the following problem:
Maximize V+(X) =
∫ +∞
0
T+(Q{u+(X) > y}) dy
subject to EQ[X] = x+, X ≥ 0 on {Z ≤ p}, X = 0 on {Z > p}.
(2.8.2)
Next, we set up the optimization problem
Maximize v+(p, x+)− u−
(
x+ − x0
1− p
)
T−(1− p)
subject to
{
p ∈ [0, 1], x+ ≥ x+0 ,
x+ = 0 if p = 1, x+ = x0 if p = 0,
(2.8.3)
where we conventionally deﬁne u−
(
x+ − x0
1− p
)
T−(1−p) := 0 if p = 1 and x+ = x0. Finally,
we denote with X∗ the optimal solution to Problem (CPT-N) and we make the following
hypothesis.
Assumption 2.8.1.
(i) T ′+(z) is non-increasing for z ∈ (0, 1];
(ii) lim inf
x→+∞ −
xu′′+(x)
u′+(x)
> 0;
(iii) for any Z ∼ U(0, 1) w.r.t. Q we have EQ
[
u+
(
(u′+)−1(
1
T ′(Z))
)
T ′(Z)
]
< +∞.
Under Assumption 2.8.1, for any Z ∼ U(0, 1) w.r.t. Q we have
X∗ = (u′+)
−1
(
λ
T ′+(Z)
)
IZ≤p∗ −
x∗+ − x0
1− p∗ IZ>p∗ , (2.8.4)
V (X∗) = EQ
[
u+
(
(u′+)
−1
(
λ
T ′+(Z)
))
T ′+(Z)IZ≤p∗
]
− u−
(
x∗+ − x0
1− p∗
)
T−(1− p∗),
(2.8.5)
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where the pair (p∗, x∗+) is optimal for Problem (2.8.3) and the Lagrange multiplier λ satisﬁes
EQ
[
(u′+)
−1
(
λ
T ′+(Z)
)
IZ≤p∗
]
= x∗+. (2.8.6)
Remark 2.8.1. Firstly, our result shows that a CPT non-informed investor is interested in
probabilities (and not in events). This is a by-product of the law-invariance property of
the CPT preferences and the fact that she observes the evolution of the price process under
the martingale measure Q. These facts are eventually reﬂected by the indiﬀerence in the
choice of Z. For instance, in a Brownian motion driven market as in Example 2.7.2, the
agent can choose Z = FW (W
Q
T ), where FW (·) is the c.d.f. of WQT . In this way she will
obtain a gain when the price of the risky stock is lower than a certain threshold. However,
she could also choose Z = 1− FW (WQT ), representing the opposite situation.
Secondly, we highlight that the explicit solution given by (2.8.4) is available only when
T ′+(·) is non-increasing over (0, 1]. Combining this observation with Assumption 2.3.2, a
necessary condition to get (2.8.4) is T+(·) to be concave. Notice that a reversed S-shaped
T+(·) does not fulﬁll this condition.
Before going further, we consider the case of power utilities. We now adapt the argu-
ments of Section 2.3.2 and we choose the special distortion on gains T+(p) = pγ , γ ∈ (0, 1],
as suggested by the previous Remark 2.8.1. Intuitively, this concave function should re-
ﬂect an overweighting of relatively large gains w.r.t. smaller payoﬀs. With straightforward
computations, for α < γ we ﬁnd
ϕN (p) := EQ
[
T ′+(Z)
1/(1−α)IZ≤p
]
= γ1/(1−α)
(
1− α
γ − α
)
p
γ−α
1−α , p ∈ [0, 1], (2.8.7)
kN (p) :=
k−T−(1− p)
(1− p)αϕN (p)1−α =
k−
γ
(
γ − α
1− α
)1−α T−(1− p)
(1− p)αpγ−α , p ∈ (0, 1], (2.8.8)
and following the same lines as in Theorem 2.3.2, we have
Proposition 2.8.2. In the CRRA case with x0 ≥ 0 and T+(p) = pγ, γ ∈ (0, 1]:
(i) if 0 < α < γ ≤ 1 and infp∈(0,1] kN (p) ≥ 1, then Problem (CPT-N) is well-posed and
X∗ = x0
(
γ − α
1− α
)
Z
γ−1
1−α , Z ∼ U(0, 1); (2.8.9)
V (X∗) = xα0 γ
(
1− α
γ − α
)1−α
. (2.8.10)
(ii) if α ≥ γ or infp∈(0,1] kN (p) < 1, then Problem (CPT-N) is ill-posed.
It is clear by the parameters' condition in (i) that the curvature of the value function
on gains must be greater than that of the distortion T+(·) if we hope to ﬁnd a ﬁnancially
meaningful solution. Moreover, the well-posedness of this model strongly depends on the
shape of T−(·). We also note that the optimal value V (X∗) is decreasing in γ, whereas
it does not exhibit a clear dependence in α. As a particular case, we have the following
corollary.
Corollary 2.8.1. With the same assumptions of Proposition 2.8.2 and T−(p) = pδ, δ ∈
(0, 1):
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(i) if 0 < δ ≤ α < γ < 1 and k− ≥ f(α, γ, δ), where
f(α, γ, δ) := γ
(1− α)1−α
(γ − α)1−γ
(α− δ)α−δ
(γ − δ)γ−δ , (2.8.11)
then Problem (CPT-N) is well-posed;
(ii) if 0 < δ ≤ α < γ = 1, then Problem (CPT-N) is well-posed;
(iii) if δ > α then Problem (CPT-N) is ill-posed.
Proof. Using (2.8.8) and the special form of T−(·), it is immediate to compute the inﬁmum
of kN (p) over (0, 1] via ﬁrst order conditions. Now, case (iii) follows if we let p tend to 1.
In the other cases, we have that the inﬁmum is reached for pˆ = γ−αγ−δ ≤ 1. Hence, we ﬁnd
kN (pˆ) = f(α, γ, δ) with the subsequent well-posedness condition k− ≥ f(α, γ, δ). If γ = 1,
equation (2.8.11) reduces to
f(α, 1, δ) =
(1− α)1−α(α− δ)α−δ
(1− δ)1−δ ≤ 1.
To see this, note that we have 1− δ, 1− α, α− δ ∈ (0, 1); moreover, the function g(x) :=
xx ≡ ex lnx is well deﬁned for x ∈ (0, 1). To prove the previous relation, we only have to
show that for every 0 < y < x < 1 we have
y ln y + (x− y) ln(x− y)− x lnx ≤ 0.
But this is true because
sup
0<y<x<1
y ln y + (x− y) ln(x− y)− x lnx = 0,
as it is easily seen using standard minimization techniques.
Remark 2.8.2. We stress that the ad hoc choice of concave T±(·) corresponds to an investor
who underweights relatively small gains and losses and overweights relatively large gains
and losses.10 Lengthy but not diﬃcult computations show that f(·, ·, ·) is decreasing in γ
and increasing in δ, conﬁrming the economic intuition. In fact, the lower the overestimation
of gains is, the higher the loss aversion coeﬃcient has to be in order to compensate its
eﬀect and for the problem to reach well-posedness. However, the dependence on α is not
monotonic.
For a better understanding of the previous corollary, in Figure 2.1 we provide a plot
representing a 3D surface of the well-posedness threshold f(·, ·, ·) in case (i), where we
arbitrarily ﬁx γ = 0.9 and we take α ∈ [0.7, 0.9) and δ ∈ (0, 0.7]. An horizontal plane at the
level f = 1 is drawn to facilitate the distinction between a surely well-posed case, i.e. when
the surface stands below the plane, or a probable ill-posed case, i.e. when the loss-aversion
coeﬃcient has to be suﬃciently high to ensure condition (2.8.11). More generally, we can
also note that for the reversed S-shaped T−(·) used in [57], namely T−(p) = pδ(pδ+(1−p)δ)1/δ
with δ ∈ (0.28, 1), we have
kN (p) = const× (1− p)
δ−αpα−γ
[(1− p)δ + pδ]1/δ .
In this case, if δ ≥ α or δ < α < γ we have a systematic ill-posedness because
limp→1− kN (p) = 0.
10This is no longer true if we assume T+(·) = id(·), as our trader will not weight gains while she would
exhibit some distortion on the loss side.
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Figure 2.1: A comparison between the well-posedness threshold and the level of the loss
aversion coeﬃcient k− in the CRRA value functions case with concave probability distor-
tions.
2.8.2 The insider's problem
In this section we will solve the portfolio optimization problem for an informed agent with
CPT preferences. We keep Assumption 2.3.1 on the value functions u±(·) and Assumption
2.3.2 on the probability distortions T±(·). Furthermore, thanks to the equivalence between
Q and Qν stated in Assumption 2.6.2, the CPT I-agent can still rely on the admissible
portfolios described in Deﬁnition 2.7.1. We remark that the dynamics of the wealth process
x(·) under Q remain the same as in equation (2.7.2), whereas it drastically changes under
Qν .11
We now deﬁne the value of the weak information for the I-agent analogously to (EU-I).
The optimization problem for a CPT insider with the weak information (Y, ν) and the
initial endowment x0 ∈ R is
Maximize V ν(X) := V ν+(X
+)− V ν−(X−)
subject to Eν
[
1
ξ(Y )X
]
= x0, X is FT -measurable and Qν a.s. bounded from below,
(CPT-I)
where
V ν+(X
+) :=
∫ +∞
0
T+(Qν
{
u+(X
+) > y
}
) dy,
V ν−(X−) :=
∫ +∞
0
T−(Qν
{
u−(X−) > y
}
) dy.
(2.8.12)
Here X represents the terminal payoﬀ obtained via the initial wealth x0 and the dynamics
(2.7.2). The optimal value of problem (CPT-I) will be denoted V (x0, ν).
Remark 2.8.3. Notice that the maximization problem (CPT-I) is formulated under the
minimal probability Qν . To see why this makes sense, we recall that the historical proba-
bility P is unknown to I-agent and thus can not be used. Moreover, using the martingale
measure Q (as in N-agent's optimization problem) doesn't make sense since it does not
exploit the information advantage of I-agent, hence it must be replaced by a diﬀerent mea-
sure reﬂecting the extra knowledge. Thus, the insider chooses a probability belonging to
11For more details, see [8] where the theory of Conditioned Stochastic Diﬀerential Equations (CSDEs) is
developed.
51
2.8. The CPT agents' models and their solutions
the set Eν and it seems natural for her to select a measure which is not inﬂuenced by u±(·)
and T±(·). As a matter of fact, a CPT trader is able to correctly assess probabilities of
events. Therefore, those functions shouldn't aﬀect probabilities because they are used in
the CPT paradigm only to describe risk attitudes.
Another reason behind the choice of Qν relies on the fact that it reﬂects a Bayesian up-
dating, in the sense that it involves the conditional probabilities Q(·|Y = y). Moreover, the
properties of the minimal probability listed in Section 2.6, especially the characterization
in property 3. and the independence in property 5., make it desirable to use Qν in Problem
(CPT-I)12. Furthermore, dropping the distinction between losses and gains and probability
distortions as well, we recover Problem (EU-I). On the other hand, in the extreme case of
no additional information, i.e. ν = QY , we have V ν±(X) = V±(X) thanks to the properties
of the minimal probability, so we turn back to Problem (CPT-N).
To conclude this remark, we observe that we could deﬁne the ﬁnancial value of the weak
information (Y, ν) analogously to Baudoin [8] as
inf
µ∈Eν
sup
Π admissible
V µ+ (X
+)− V µ− (X−),
where V µ± (·) are deﬁned similarly as in equation (2.8.12). Unfortunately, due to the com-
plexity of the preferences of the CPT I-agent, it is not clear whether the previous problem
is equivalent to Problem (CPT-I).
It is important to note that Problem (CPT-I) is nothing but a special case of Problem
(CPT-F) where
1. the measure P is replaced by Qν in both the objective function and the constraints;
2. the random variable ρ is replaced by the new random variable 1ξ(Y ) .
Therefore, we have to check that all the assumptions imposed in [33] on ρ are now fulﬁlled
by 1ξ(Y ) and then we will be able to use all the results found in [33] with the obvious
modiﬁcations, i.e. substitute for 1ξ(Y ) and Q
ν in every explicit expression. First of all, to
avoid undue technicalities, the assumption of ρ having no atoms w.r.t. P ([33], Assumption
2.2) is now translated to the following
Assumption 2.8.2. The random variable 1ξ(Y ) has no atoms w.r.t. Q
ν , i.e.
Qν
{
1
ξ(Y ) = a
}
= 0 ∀ a ≥ 0.
Other technical conditions on ξ(Y ) are straightforward to check; in fact we have 1ξ(Y ) ∈
(0,+∞) Qν-a.s. thanks to our Assumption 2.6.2. Moreover, Eν [ 1ξ(Y ) ] = 1 follows directly
from the deﬁnition of ξ.
Remark 2.8.4. But it is easily seen that
Qν
{
1
ξ(Y ) = a
}
= EQ
[
ξ(Y )I{ 1
ξ(Y )
=a
}] = 1aQ{ξ(Y ) = 1a} ;
so that the Qν-law of 1/ξ(Y ) is atomless if and only if the Q-law of ξ(Y ) is. The latter
condition is satisﬁed in most common situations (see our examples in the rest of this
chapter).
12In [9], the authors conﬁrm that Qν has been built with the purpose of keeping the independence
property. Then, it seems reasonable for us to keep such a feature in the evaluation function of a CPT
agent.
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We now adapt the analysis made in [33] with the necessary modiﬁcations for a CPT
informed investor. In what follows, we will need a new set of variables for I-agent, that
will be equipped with the superscript ν , to distinguish them from the same variables for
N-agents. We deﬁne
1
ξ(Y ) ≡ esssupQν 1ξ(Y ) := sup{a ∈ R : Qν{ 1ξ(Y ) > a} > 0},
1
ξ(Y ) ≡ essinfQν 1ξ(Y ) := inf{a ∈ R : Qν{ 1ξ(Y ) < a} > 0}.
Once again well-posedness is an important issue as in the case of N-agent's problem. With
some slight adjustments to Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 in [33] we have:
Proposition 2.8.3. Problem (CPT-I) is ill-posed if there exists a nonnegative FT -mea-
surable random variable X such that Eν
[
1
ξ(Y )X
]
< +∞ and V ν+(X) = +∞.
Proposition 2.8.4. If u+(+∞) = +∞, 1ξ(Y ) = +∞, and T−(·) = id(·), then Problem
(CPT-I) is ill-posed.
Thus, to avoid systematic ill-posedness, we will impose:
Assumption 2.8.3 (see Assumption 3.1, [33]). V ν+(X) < +∞ for any nonnegative, FT -
measurable random variable X satisfying Eν
[
1
ξ(Y )X
]
< +∞.
Remark 2.8.5. Note that we do not have yet a comparison result between the optimal value
for a CPT I-agent, V (x0, ν), and the optimal value for a CPT N-agent's problem, so for
the moment we can not conclude that an insider always gets more than a non informed
agent in this behavioral context, neither we can say that ill-posedness for N-agent implies
ill-posedness for I-agent.
We recall the main steps to get the solution to Problem (CPT-I). First, for a given pair
(A, x+), with A ∈ FT and x+ ≥ x+0 , deﬁne the problem
Maximize V ν+(X) =
∫ +∞
0
T+(Qν{u+(X) > y}) dy
subject to Eν
[
1
ξ(Y )X
]
= x+, X ≥ 0 Qν-a.s., X = 0 Qν-a.s. on AC .
(2.8.13)
Note that Assumption 2.8.3 implies that V ν+(X) is a ﬁnite nonnegative number for any
feasible X. We now deﬁne vν+(A, x+), the optimal value of problem (2.8.13), in this way:
- if Qν(A) > 0, then the feasible region of (2.8.13) is non-empty and vν+(A, x+) is
deﬁned as the supremum of (2.8.13);
- if Qν(A) = 0 and x+ = 0, then the only feasible solution for (2.8.13) is X = 0 Qν-a.s.,
so vν+(A, x+) := 0;
- if Qν(A) = 0 and x+ > 0, then (2.8.13) has an empty feasible region, therefore
vν+(A, x+) := −∞.
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For any c ≥ 0, set vν+(c, x+) := vν+({ω ∈ Ω : 1ξ(Y (ω)) ≤ c}, x+); moreover, deﬁne F ν(·)
and FQ(·) the distribution functions of 1ξ(Y ) w.r.t. Qν and Q respectively. Following the
guidelines of [33], equation (4.4), we set up the simpler" problem
Maximize vν+(c, x+)− u−
(
x+ − x0
1− FQ(c)
)
T−(1− F ν(c))
subject to

1
ξ(Y ) ≤ c ≤ 1ξ(Y ) , x+ ≥ x+0 ,
x+ = 0 if c = 1ξ(Y ) , x+ = x0 if c =
1
ξ(Y ) ,
(2.8.14)
where we use the convention
u−
(
x+ − x0
1− FQ(c)
)
T−(1− F ν(c)) := 0 if c = 1ξ(Y ) and x+ = x0. (2.8.15)
We are now ready to state the results for a CPT agent who has the weak information (Y, ν):
Proposition 2.8.5. Assume that u−(·) is strictly concave at 0. We have the following
conclusions:
(i) If Xν∗ is optimal for Problem (CPT-I), then
cν∗ := (F ν)−1 (Qν{Xν∗ ≥ 0}) , xν∗+ := Eν
[
1
ξ(Y )
(Xν∗)+
]
are optimal for Problem (2.8.14). Moreover, {ω : Xν∗ ≥ 0} and
{
ω : 1ξ(Y ) ≤ cν∗
}
are
identical up to a Qν-null probability set, and
(Xν∗)− =
xν∗+ − x0
1− FQ(cν∗)I 1ξ(Y )>cν∗ Q
ν-a.s..
(ii) If (cν∗, xν∗+ ) is optimal for Problem (2.8.14) and Xν∗+ is optimal for Problem (2.8.13)
with parameters ({ 1ξ(Y ) ≤ cν∗}, xν∗+ ), then
Xν∗ := Xν∗+ I 1
ξ(Y )
≤cν∗ −
xν∗+ − x0
1− FQ(cν∗)I 1ξ(Y )>cν∗
is optimal for Problem (CPT-I).
Therefore, in order to solve Problem (CPT-I) we can exploit the following algorithm:
Step 1 Solve Problem (2.8.13) with given parameters ({ 1ξ(Y ) ≤ c}, x+), where 1ξ(Y ) ≤ c ≤
1
ξ(Y ) and x+ ≥ x+0 , in order to obtain vν+(c, x+) and the optimal solution Xν∗+ (c, x+).
Step 2 Solve Problem (2.8.14) to get (cν∗, xν∗+ ).
Step 3 If (cν∗, xν∗+ ) = (
1
ξ(Y ) , x0), then X
ν∗
+ (
1
ξ(Y ) , x0) solves Problem (CPT-I), else
Xν∗+ (c
ν∗, xν∗+ )I 1
ξ(Y )
≤cν∗ −
xν∗+ − x0
1− FQ(cν∗)I 1ξ(Y )>cν∗
solves Problem (CPT-I).
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To get an explicit solution we now have to impose conditions similar to that in As-
sumption 2.8.1. In particular, we set
Assumption 2.8.4.
(i)
(F ν)−1(z)
T ′+(z)
is non-decreasing in z ∈ (0, 1];
(ii) lim inf
x→+∞
−xu′′+(x)
u′+(x)
> 0;
(iii) Eν
[
u+
(
(u′+)−1
(
1
ξ(Y )T ′+(F ν(
1
ξ(Y )
))
))
T ′+(F ν(
1
ξ(Y )))
]
< +∞.
Brieﬂy, condition (i) is related to the fact that the distortion on gains should not be
too extreme13. Then, hypothesis (ii) on the RRA coeﬃcient on gains is the same as for
N-agent (recall that the value functions, as well as the probability distortions, are assumed
to be the same for the two types of agent in order to facilitate a comparative analysis).
Under Assumption 2.8.4, both vν+(c, x+) and the corresponding optimal solution X
ν∗
+ to
Problem (2.8.13) can be expressed more explicitly, together with the optimal solution Xν∗
of (CPT-I):
vν+(c, x+) = Eν
[
u+
(
(u′+)
−1
(
λν(c, x+)
ξ(Y )T ′+(F ν(
1
ξ(Y )))
))
T ′+(F
ν( 1ξ(Y )))I 1ξ(Y )≤c
]
, (2.8.16)
Xν∗+ = (u
′
+)
−1
(
λν(c, x+)
ξ(Y )T ′+(F ν(
1
ξ(Y )))
)
I 1
ξ(Y )
≤c, (2.8.17)
Xν∗ = (u′+)
−1
(
λν(cν∗, xν∗+ )
ξ(Y )T ′+(F ν(
1
ξ(Y )))
)
I 1
ξ(Y )
≤cν∗ −
xν∗+ − x0
1− FQ(cν∗)I 1ξ(Y )>cν∗ , (2.8.18)
where λν(c, x+) satisﬁes Eν
[
(u′+)−1
(
λν(c,x+)
ξ(Y )T ′+(F ν(
1
ξ(Y )
))
)
1
ξ(Y )I 1ξ(Y )≤c
]
= x+.
Remark 2.8.6. Before going further, let us explore in details what are the implications of
the optimal policy adopted by a weakly informed CPT investor. As Jin and Zhou noticed
in [33], Footnote 7, a non-informed agent selects a ﬁnal payoﬀ which looks like a gamble
on a good state of the world14. In fact, in their framework a trader obtains a ﬁnal wealth
greater than her wealth reference point if and only if the event {ρ ≤ c∗} happens. In a
market with one risky asset, constant coeﬃcients and null interest rate, this amounts to
say that the ﬁnal price of the stock, namely S(T ), must be greater than a certain threshold
depending on c∗. This can be easily shown by noting that
S(T ) = s0 exp
((
b− σ22
)
T + σW PT
)
,
13We observe that our Assumption 2.8.4 is nothing but Assumption 2.3.4. However, in the full information
context condition (i) concerns the distribution function of the state prices ρ, thus it involves the market
parameters. On the contrary, in our case (i) imposes a link between the distortion T+(·) and F ν(·), therefore
it is a condition on I-agent's weak information. A similar remark holds for (iii).
14Remember that in the original framework the agent knows the historical measure P but this is by no
means helpful, i.e. it does not give any advantage because P is common knowledge.
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where W P is a (F,P)-Brownian motion over [0, T ]. This in turn implies
{ρ ≤ c∗} =
{
exp
(
− b2
2σ2
T − bσW PT
)
≤ c∗
}
=
{
S(T ) ≥ s0 exp
(
b−σ2
2 T − σ
2
b ln c
∗
)}
.
Obviously one can see that the greater c∗, the higher is the P-probability to reach a ﬁnal
gain. Can we ﬁnd a similar explanation for a weak informed CPT investor? A good state
of the world for I-agent is the event{
1
ξ(Y ) ≤ cν∗
}
=
{
ξ(Y ) ≥ 1
cν∗
}
.
Again it is clear that the greater cν∗, the higher is the Qν-probability of a terminal gain.
Moreover, note that the optimal threshold cν∗ varies with the weak information (Y, ν)!
(Recall that cν∗ is obtained in Step 2 of the previous algorithm, where one has to solve
Problem (2.8.14)). It would be interesting to analyze how much cν∗ or the probability
of a terminal (positive) gain Qν{ξ(Y ) ≥ 1/cν∗} vary depending on ξ(Y ), and this is in
general not an easy task. However we are able to provide an interesting example where
this dependence can be estimated (see Example 2.8.1 below).
Analogously to the non-informed agent case, let's now assume that the I-agent has
CRRA value functions. We follow again the argument described in Section 2.3.2, but now
using the following functions
ϕν(c) := Eν
[(
ξ(Y )T ′+(F
ν( 1ξ(Y )))
)1/(1−α)
1
ξ(Y )I 1ξ(Y )≤c
]
> 0, 1ξ(Y ) < c ≤ 1ξ(Y ) , (2.8.19)
kν(c) :=
k−T−(1− F ν(c))
ϕν(c)1−α (1− FQ(c))α > 0,
1
ξ(Y ) < c ≤ 1ξ(Y ) . (2.8.20)
Note that the case c = 1ξ(Y ) is trivial and that once again the sign of the initial wealth x0
is crucial.
Proposition 2.8.6. Assume that x0 ≥ 0 and Assumption 2.8.4 holds.
(i) If infc> 1
ξ(Y )
kν(c) ≥ 1, then Problem (CPT-I) is well-posed and
Xν∗ =
x0
ϕν( 1ξ(Y ))
(
ξ(Y )T ′+(F
ν( 1ξ(Y )))
)1/(1−α)
, (2.8.21)
V ν(x0, ν) = x
α
0ϕ
ν( 1ξ(Y ))
1−α. (2.8.22)
(ii) If infc> 1
ξ(Y )
kν(c) < 1, then Problem (CPT-I) is ill-posed.
Note that a null initial wealth corresponds to a null risky investment and a null ﬁnancial
value. Finally, if x0 < 0 it is suﬃcient to adapt the results of Theorem 2.3.3, to the present
case.
Example 2.8.1 (Evaluation of V (x0, ν) with T+(·) convex ). We are going to provide a
concrete example where the optimal value for a CPT insider can be explicitly computed.
We assume CRRA value functions with x0 ≥ 0 for the informed agent and a single risky
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asset market analogous to that of Example 2.7.2, with weak information given by Y = WQT
and ν ∼ N (0, s2) with 0 < s ≤ √T . Hence, it is easy to compute
1
ξ(Y )
=
s√
T
exp
{
T − s2
2Ts2
(WQT )
2
}
, (2.8.23)
which immediately gives 1ξ(Y ) =
s√
T
and 1ξ(Y ) = +∞. Next, Assumption 2.8.2 is clearly
satisﬁed, i.e. 1ξ(Y ) has no atoms w.r.t. Q
ν , as 1ξ(Y ) does not have atoms under Q and the
two measures are equivalent. Moreover 1ξ(Y ) ∈ (0,+∞) Qν-a.s. and its Qν-expected value
is 1. Thus every technical condition is fulﬁlled.
The next step consists in verifying the three conditions in Assumption 2.8.4. (ii) follows
immediately by the CRRA hypothesis and (iii) will be checked a posteriori once we have
performed the necessary computations. For condition (i), we observe that the law of Y
under Qν is exactly ν. Hence, with some tedious but elementary computations one can
check that the distribution function of 1ξ(Y ) under Q
ν is given by
F ν(c) = Qν
{
1
ξ(Y )
≤ c
}
=

0 if c ≤ s√
T
,
2N
(√
2T
T − s2 ln
(
c
√
T
s
))
− 1 if c > s√
T
,
(2.8.24)
where N (·) is the distribution function of a standard Gaussian random variable. The left
inverse of F ν(·) is given by
(F ν)−1(z) =
s√
T
exp
(
T − s2
2T
[
N−1
(
z + 1
2
)]2)
, z ∈ [0, 1). (2.8.25)
Now, condition (i) requires the ratio (F
ν)−1
T ′+
(z) to be non decreasing over (0, 1]. If the
distortion T+(·) is assumed to be twice continuously diﬀerentiable, we see that this is
indeed the case whenever the derivative of that ratio is non-negative. Note that a suﬃcient
condition for this to happen is T ′′+(·) ≤ 0 over [0, 1], as it ensures
d
dz
(F ν)−1
T ′+
(z) =
[
(F ν)−1
]′
T ′+ − (F ν)−1T ′′+
(T ′+)2
(z) ≥ 0, z ∈ (0, 1], (2.8.26)
thanks to the fact that
[
(F ν)−1
]′
(·), T ′+(·) and (F ν)−1(·) are non-negative functions. By
the way, T ′′+(·) ≤ 0 is only a suﬃcient condition and not necessary. Therefore, we can try
to use a non concave T+(·) and check the validity of (i).
It turns out that a class of weighting functions that fulﬁlls both Assumption 2.3.2 and the
previous condition (i) is given by15
T+(p) = 2N
(√
1− 2a N−1
(
p+ 1
2
))
− 1, a ∈ (0, 12) . (2.8.27)
It is not diﬃcult to check that such distortions are globally convex over (0, 1), thus implying
a prudential criterion when evaluating gains. The lack of concavity restricts our attention to
15To deﬁne T+(1) we use the convention N (+∞) = 1.
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Problem (CPT-I), as Assumption 2.8.1 for Problem (CPT-N) is not fulﬁlled. A closer look
at equation (2.8.27) shows that those weighting functions are nothing but the primitives of
T ′+(p) =
√
1− 2a exp
(
a
[
N−1
(
p+ 1
2
)]2)
, a ∈ (0, 12) . (2.8.28)
By using (2.8.25) and (2.8.28), rather long calculations show that condition (i) is indeed
fulﬁlled if and only if a ≤ T−s22T < 12 (however, we will choose a < T−s
2
2T as the equal-
ity leads to integrability problems, so that condition (iii) in Assumption 2.8.4 might not
hold). Forgetting for a while the ill-posedness issue, we now apply Proposition 2.8.6. After
cumbersome (but not diﬃcult) computations, we ﬁnd
Xν∗ = x0
√
T − s2 − 2aT
s
√
1− α exp
(
−T − s
2 − 2aT
2Ts2(1− α) (W
Q
T )
2
)
,
V (x0, ν) = x
α
0
√
T (1− 2a)
s
(
s
√
1− α√
T − s2 − 2aT
)1−α
.
Performing ﬁrst order derivatives, it is immediate to see that V (x0, ν) is increasing in T ,
whereas it is decreasing in a and in s. This is perfectly coherent with intuition, as the more
accurate the information, the greater should be its value. It is interesting to note that the
magnitude of the parameter a determines the degree of convexity of T+(·) and as a→ 0,
T+(·) tends to the identity function. As expected, we obtain lima→0+ V (x0, ν) = u(x0, ν)
as in Example 2.7.2, because CPT and EU preferences coincide.
According to the last observation in Remark 2.8.6, we can provide in this example some
information on how the threshold cν∗ varies with the information (Y, ν). A closer look at the
shape of the distribution function F ν(·) in (2.8.24) shows that if s→ 0 (which corresponds
to a more and more accurate information), then the random variable 1ξ(Y ) tends to be more
and more concentrated around 0, i.e. (2.8.24) tends to Ic>0. In the other extreme case, as
s→ √T (which corresponds to no additional information case) 1ξ(Y ) tends to be more and
more concentrated around 1, i.e. (2.8.24) tends to Ic>1.
We now come back to the ill-posedness issue. In order to ensure well-posedness,
one has to compute ϕν(c) and specify a particular form for T−(·) and check whether
infc> 1
ξ(Y )
kν(c) ≥ 1 as we did in Corollary 2.8.1. Nonetheless, we observe that we can
also ﬁnd an estimate about the value V (x0, ν) in the well-posed case. If infc>0 kν(c) ≥ 1,
then we know that V (x0, ν) = xα0ϕ
ν(+∞)1−α and we can compute
ϕν(+∞) = EQ
[
ξ(Y )
1
1−αT ′+
(
F ν
(
1
ξ(Y )
)) 1
1−α
]
≥ inf
p∈[0,1]
T ′+(p) EQ
[
ξ(Y )
1
1−α
]
−→ +∞
(2.8.29)
as s ↓ 0 whenever the inﬁmum appearing in (2.8.29) above is strictly positive. On one
hand, this fact suggests that well-posedness can only be assessed for weak information
that are not too accurate, i.e. when s2 is close to T . On the other hand, the condi-
tion on infp∈[0,1] T ′+(p) > 0 is fulﬁlled by our particular choice in (2.8.28). Moreover,
this intuition is implicit in the empirical estimation in [57] where the suggested distortion
T+(p) =
pδ
(pδ+(1−p)δ)1/δ automatically satisﬁes infp∈[0,1] T
′
+(p) > 0 for suﬃciently high δ
(approximatively δ > 0.28, whereas in [57] it was estimated δ = 0.69).
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Example 2.8.2 (Reversed S-shaped probability distortion T+(·)). We are aware of the fact
that empirical observations suggest probability weighting not to be globally convex neither
globally concave. While in the previous example an ad hoc construction has been performed
in order to obtain explicit (and sensible!) expressions, we now suggest a particular reversed
S-shaped T+(·) which may look like an observable one. Following the same lines as in [33],
Example 6.1, and using the framework in Example 2.8.1, it is not diﬃcult to exhibit such
a distortion. Setting δ = s
2−T
T , for a given set of parameters a < 0, 0 < b < −1δ , c0 > s√T
we obtained
T+(p) =

4k
(
s√
T
)a
δa
[
N
(
N−1
(
p+1
2
)
δa
)
− 12
]
p ∈ [0, p0),
4k
(
s√
T
)a
δa
[
N
(
N−1
(
p0+1
2
)
δa
)
− 12
]
+ 4k˜
(
s√
T
)b
δb
[
N
(
N−1
(
p+1
2
)
δb
)
−N
(
N−1
(
p0+1
2
)
δb
)]
p ∈ (p0, 1),
(2.8.30)
where δa :=
√
1
δ
(
a+ 1δ
)
, δb :=
√
1
δ
(
b+ 1δ
)
, k˜ := kca−b0 , p0 := F
ν(c0) and the real number
k is uniquely determined by the terminal condition T+(1) = 1. Note that such a T+(·) is a
non decreasing function over [0, 1] and T ′+(p)→ +∞ as p→ 0 or p→ 1, which is consistent
with the empirical estimates. However, it is important to note that the overall construction
depends on the weak information (Y, ν), thus it seems to be completely unrealistic. This
ﬂaw was still present in Example 6.1 of [33], where the ad hoc distortion depends on the
market parameters! To conclude, we note that the condition infp∈[0,1] T ′+(p) > 0 which
ensured (2.8.29) is satisﬁed for the T+(·) that we exhibit in (2.8.30). In fact we have
T ′+(p) = T
′
+(F
ν(x)) =
{
kxa if 0 < x ≤ c0,
k˜xb if x > c0,
which is always greater than or equal to kca0 > 0.
2.9 Comparison results between EU and CPT agents
Our analysis distinguished four types of investors, depending on their information (N-
agents versus I-agents) and on their valuation criteria or preferences paradigms (classical
EU maximizers versus CPT investors à la Kahneman and Tversky).
In [9], the authors already compared an EU N-agent with an EU I-agent; the main
result is the fact that the insider always gets more than a non informed agent (see also
the estimates in Examples 2.7.1 and 2.7.2). Furthermore, the diﬀerences between an EU
N-agent and a CPT N-agent are easy to analyze: on one hand, we have seen in Section
2.7.1 that the optimal policy for a classical N-agent is to choose a constant wealth, i.e.
X∗ = x0 Q-a.s., leading to the optimal value U(x0), whereas the CPT N-agent's strategy
is characterized by her substantial indiﬀerence between events of the same probability.
This phenomenon produces structurally diﬀerent optimal ﬁnal wealths, as the behavioral
agent can even exploit a leverage eﬀect by choosing a negative ﬁnal wealth with positive
probability. Moreover, this kind of investor can obviously select (p∗, x∗+) = (1, x0), thus
obtaining V (X∗) = u+(x0). However this strategy is not necessarily the best one, as she
has to face Problem (2.8.3).
In the next subsections, we will focus on two non-trivial comparisons: EU agent versus
CPT agent (with same information) and CPT N-agent versus CPT I-agent.
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2.9.1 EU versus CPT insiders
To make things sensible, we assume that the two types of investors share the same initial
wealth x0 > 0 and the same utility function on gains u+(·), whereas the CPT agent is also
endowed with a value function on losses u−(·) and probability distortions T±(·).
A comparison can be made among the ﬁnal optimal wealths X∗ and Xν∗, given by (2.7.5)
and (2.8.18) respectively. Unfortunately, nothing can be said in full generality. However
we see that if cν∗ < 1ξ(Y ) then the CPT I-agent selects a negative payoﬀ with positive prob-
ability, thus the two policies are substantially diﬀerent. On the other hand, if cν∗ = 1ξ(Y ) ,
then xν∗+ = x0 so that we can say something more in this case, as now we are comparing
two positive random variables16. In the CRRA case we can compare the expression ap-
pearing in Example 2.7.1 with (2.8.21). After some straightforward computations we see
that Xν∗ R X∗ if and only if
T ′+
(
F ν
(
1
ξ(Y )
))1/(1−α)
R
EQ
[
ξ(Y )1/(1−α)T ′+
(
F ν
(
1
ξ(Y )
))1/(1−α)]
EQ
[
ξ(Y )1/(1−α)
] . (2.9.1)
We observe that the previous expression is easily reduced to{
Xν∗ R X∗
}⇔ {T ′+ (F ν ( 1ξ(Y ))) R c1}
for a suitable constant c1. Assuming a reversed S-shaped distortion T+(·) with inﬁnite
positive derivative at the endpoints and recalling that F ν
(
1
ξ(Y )
)
is uniformly distributed
over (0, 1) w.r.t. Qν , we can see that a CPT I-agent selects a greater ﬁnal wealth when
F ν(·) takes values near 0 or 1, i.e. when the random variable ξ(Y ) takes values close to its
esssup and essinf. In the case of Example 2.7.2, this situation corresponds to extremely
(positive or negative) high values of
∣∣∣WQT ∣∣∣ (thus, the ﬁnal price should be extremely high
or close to its initial value s0) or to
∣∣∣WQT ∣∣∣ to be quasi-null (hence, the terminal price should
be close to s0 exp
{
−σ22 T
}
).
Remark 2.9.1 (Finite vs inﬁnite values of the same weak information). An interesting
result is obtained if we compare the optimal values for the two agents. Obviously, their
magnitudes are not important as we are comparing two diﬀerent preference paradigms. We
can have u(x0, ν) < +∞ and V (x0, ν) = +∞ even if the two insiders share a common
extra information (Y, ν). To see this, assume the same market setting as in Example 2.8.1.
Now, for any ﬁxed initial endowment x0 > 0, Example 2.7.2 shows that for every s > 0 we
have u(x0, ν) < +∞, whereas it tends to inﬁnity only when s ↓ 0. However, if we assume
T−(·) = id(·), then for every s > 0 Proposition 2.8.4 implies ill-posedness for I-agent, i.e.
V (x0, ν) = +∞. In conclusion, a CPT trader reaches Nirvana since she fears losses less
than a EU investor fears small payoﬀs.
2.9.2 CPT non informed agents versus CPT insiders
At last we compare the solutions and the optimal values of the problems faced by a CPT
N-agent and a weakly informed CPT I-agent. We assume that they share the same initial
16The comparison is however still diﬃcult as the expression for the CPT I-agent depends on the distortion
T+(·). Obviously, if there is no distortion on gains then the two expressions are equal.
60
2.9. Comparison results between EU and CPT agents
endowment x0 ∈ R, the same utility functions u±(·) and the same probability weightings
T±(·). We suppose that Assumption 2.8.1 and 2.8.4 are in force and I-agent has a weak
information given by (Y, ν).
In insider trading models (see e.g. [37]), a fundamental issue consists in proving that
an insider always gets more than a non-informed trader and the diﬀerence between the
optimal values of these two investors is usually called insider's gain. Now, we are going
to prove that this fact sill holds in such a behavioral setting. In other words, we show the
inequality V (x0, ν) ≥ V (X∗), whose intuitive meaning is that any additional information
is an advantage for the investor, even if she is a behavioral one.
Before stating the main result, we need the following preliminary lemma which compares
F ν(·) and FQ(·), the distribution functions of the random variable 1ξ(Y ) w.r.t. Qν and Q
respectively.
Lemma 2.9.1. The following inequality holds:
F ν(c) ≥ FQ(c), ∀ c ∈
[
1
ξ(Y ) ,
1
ξ(Y )
]
. (2.9.2)
Moreover, if c ∈
(
1
ξ(Y ) ,
1
ξ(Y )
)
and ξ 6≡ 1 then (2.9.2) holds strictly.
Proof. If c ≥ 1, then it is suﬃcient to use the estimation
F ν(c) = 1− EQ
[
ξ(Y )I 1
ξ(Y )
>c
]
= FQ(c) + EQ
[
(1− ξ(Y ))I 1
ξ(Y )
>c
]
≥ FQ(c) + (1− 1c) (1− FQ(c))
≥ FQ(c).
Otherwise, if c < 1 we observe that the function f(c) := EQ
[
(1− ξ(Y )) I 1
ξ(Y )
>c
]
is increas-
ing in
(
1
ξ(Y ) , 1
)
and limc↓ 1
ξ(Y )
f(c) = 0. Finally, the strict inequality is a consequence of
Assumption 2.6.2, i.e. the equivalence of ν and QY .
We are now ready to prove the existence of the insider's gain. Note that it suﬃces
to ﬁnd a particular feasible solution to Problem (CPT-I) whose prospect value for the
informed trader is greater or equal than V (X∗). A quick look at Problems (CPT-N) and
(CPT-I) shows that they share the same feasible set. Hence, we could even choose X∗ as
the insider's terminal wealth. This random variable will not be the optimal solution to
Problem (CPT-I). However, we will be able to prove that V ν(X∗) ≥ V (X∗) and this will
in turn imply V (x0, ν) ≥ V (X∗).
Theorem 2.9.1. Let Assumption 2.6.2 hold. Then
V (x0, ν) ≥ V (X∗).
Moreover, if ξ 6≡ 1, V (X∗) < +∞ and the optimal solution (p∗, x∗+) to Problem (2.8.3) is
such that p∗ ∈ (0, 1), then the inequality is strict.
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Proof. First of all, we recall that a behavioral N-agent endowed with a concave T−(·) is
indiﬀerent to choosing (2.8.4) as optimal solution for any given Z ∼ U(0, 1) w.r.t. Q. Now
we distinguish between two cases, namely when the optimal value for N-agent is ﬁnite or
not. In the ﬁrst case, the non informed trader can select Z˜ = FQ
(
1
ξ(Y )
)
. Using (2.8.4),
(2.8.5) and setting c∗ := (FQ)−1(p∗), we ﬁnd
X∗ = (u′+)
−1
(
λ(c∗, x∗+)
T ′+(Z)
)
I 1
ξ(Y )
≤c∗ −
x∗+ − x0
1− FQ(c∗)I 1ξ(Y )<c∗ , (2.9.3)
V (X∗) = V+(X∗+)− u−
(
x∗+ − x0
1− FQ(c∗)
)
T−(1− FQ(c∗)), (2.9.4)
where (p∗, x∗+) are optimal for Problem (2.8.3) and λ(c∗, x∗+) is determined by the budget
constraint. On the other hand, if the informed investor chooses X∗ as her terminal wealth,
then she obtains the prospect value
V ν(X∗) = V ν(X∗+)− u−
(
x∗+ − x0
1− FQ(c∗)
)
T−(1− F ν(c∗)). (2.9.5)
Now, using Lemma 2.9.1, it is immediate to see that the negative part of the prospect value
for N-agent is greater (in absolute value) than that of I-agent. Moreover, using the fact
that u+
(
(u′+)−1
)
(·) is strictly decreasing, we can explicitly write
V+(X
∗+) =
∫ +∞
0
T+
(
Q
({
T ′+
(
FQ( 1ξ(Y ))
)
>
λ(c∗, x∗+)
u′+
(
u−1+ (y)
)} ∩ { 1ξ(Y ) ≤ c∗}
))
dy.
(2.9.6)
Now it suﬃces to note that T ′+(·) is monotone decreasing, whereas FQ(·) is monotone
increasing; furthermore, V ν+(X
∗+) can be written analogously to V+(X∗+) just by replacing
Q with Qν . Therefore, applying again Lemma 2.9.1 we have V ν+(X∗+) ≥ V+(X∗+), which
in turn implies the desired inequality. In the ill-posed case for N-agent, note that we
can ﬁnd a sequence of feasible solutions to Problem (2.8.3), namely {(pn, xn+)}n∈N, where
pn = (FQ)−1(cn) for some cn ∈
[
1
ξ(Y ) ,
1
ξ(Y )
]
, for every n ∈ N. This sequence will in
turn induce a sequence of feasible terminal wealths {Xν,n}n∈N. Now, using the previous
argument, it is easily seen that if I-agent chooses that sequence of terminal wealths, then
her optimal value will diverge to +∞ too. Finally, the strict version is a consequence of
(2.9.2) holding strictly.
We remark that in general the optimal pair (c∗, x∗+) for N-agent will be diﬀerent than
(cν∗, xν∗+ ). Moreover, we have seen that ill-posedness for (CPT-N) implies ill-posedness for
(CPT-I). A natural question arising from this observation is whether it is possible to ﬁnd
an example where (CPT-N) is well-posed and (CPT-I) is ill-posed. The answer is positive
and we are going to exploit some results previously obtained in a single risky asset market
driven by an (Ω,F,Q)-Brownian motion (see Example 2.8.1 for the notation).
Proposition 2.9.1. Assume CRRA preferences with x0 ≥ 0, T+(p) = p and T−(p) = pδ,
0 < δ < α < 1. If the weak information of CPT I-agent is given by Y = WQT and
ν ∼ N (0, s2) with 0 < s ≤ √T , then for suﬃciently small s Problem (CPT-I) is ill-posed.
Proof. To start, recall that with these assumptions on the agents' preferences, Corol-
lary 2.8.1 ensures well-posedness for Problem (CPT-N). Then, ill-posedness for Problem
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(CPT-I) follows from Proposition 2.8.6 if we are able to show that
inf
c> 1
ξ(Y )
kν(c) ≡ inf
c> 1
ξ(Y )
k−(1− F ν(c))δ
(1− FQ(c))α
(
EQ
[
ξ(Y )
1
1−α I 1
ξ(Y )
≤c
])1−α < 1. (2.9.7)
Now, we apply Jensen's inequality to the convex function f(x) = x
1
1−α , α ∈ (0, 1), and we
estimate the inﬁmum choosing cˆ = (FQ)−1
(
1−α
1−δ
)
. Hence we obtain
inf
c> 1
ξ(Y )
kν(c) ≤ inf
c> 1
ξ(Y )
k−(1− F ν(c))δ
(1− FQ(c))αF ν(c) = k−
(
1− δ
α− δ
)α (1− F ν(cˆ))δ
F ν(cˆ)
,
where it is important to note that cˆ depends both on the preference parameters and on the
weak information. At this point it is not diﬃcult to compute
FQ(c) ≡ Q
{
1
ξ(Y )
≤ c
}
=

0 if c ≤ s√
T
,
2N
(√
2s2
T−s2 ln
(
c
√
T
s
))
− 1 if c > s√
T
,
(2.9.8)
where as usual N (·) is the standard Gaussian distribution function. Next, we ﬁnd
(FQ)−1(z) =
s√
T
exp
(
T − s2
2s2
[
N−1
(
z + 1
2
)]2)
, z ∈ [0, 1). (2.9.9)
Using the explicit expression of F ν(·) in equation (2.8.24), we can compute
F ν(cˆ) = 2N
(√
T
s
N−1
(
2− α− δ
2(1− δ)
))
− 1.
Now we see that for every choice of k− ≥ 1 and 0 < δ < α < 1, there exists a s˜ > 0 such
that for every s < s˜ the inequality in (2.9.7) is fulﬁlled.
Economically speaking, the meaning of the previous proposition is that there can always
exists a particular weak information which ensures well-posedness for N-agent's problems
and ill-posedness for the informed investor. Obviously, this extra information must be
suﬃciently accurate (in our case s < s˜) in order to provide an inﬁnite optimal value for I-
agent. We recognize that our estimation for (2.9.7) is eﬀectively rough. For a more detailed
analysis, we note that an explicit expression for kν(c) can be provided, even if it is quite
cumbersome. However, it is not diﬃcult to perform a graphical analysis whose results are
shown in Figure 2.2. Fixing α = 0.88, δ = 0.7 and T = 1, kν reduces to a function of k−, s
and c; isolating the loss aversion coeﬃcient k−, we can now see whether k− ≤ supc>s k(c, s)
which in turn implies ill-posedness for the CPT insider's problem. In the left-side plot, the
3D surface of k(c, s) shows that even for a quite elevated k− we still have ill-posedness. On
the contrary, if s is suﬃciently close to 1, then every k− ≥ 1 leads to well-posedness, as
the surface lies below the horizontal plane at level k ≡ 1 and k(·, s) becomes monotonically
decreasing. Finally, for particular values of s, i.e. for speciﬁc types of weak information,
we have drawn in the right-side plot the corresponding curves k(c) which conﬁrm what
previously stated.
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Figure 2.2: A graphical analysis for the ill-posedness of the problem of a CPT weakly
informed investor in the CRRA value functions case with no probability distortion on
gains an concave distortion on losses.
Remark 2.9.2. It is worth noting that with the same hypothesis as in Proposition 2.9.1,
the analogous problem for a classical informed trader has a completely diﬀerent solution.
Indeed, Problem (EU-I) is well-posed for every s > 0 and its optimal value tends to
diverge only if s ↓ 0. On the other hand, if we assume T−(·) = id, then Problem (CPT-I)
too becomes ill-posed for every s > 0, thus showing a substantial lack of robustness.
To conclude this section, we now provide an example where the insider's gain can be
explicitly computed and whose results have a clear and intuitive economic explanation.
Example 2.9.1 (Explicit evaluation of the insider's gain). We use exactly the same setting
of Example 2.8.1 changing only the probability distortion on gains of the informed investors.
Precisely, this time we assume
T+(p) = 2N
(√
1 + 2b N−1
(
p+ 1
2
))
− 1, b > 0. (2.9.10)
These weighting functions are globally concave over (0, 1) 17 and are the primitives of
T ′+(p) =
√
1 + 2b exp
(
−b
[
N−1
(
p+ 1
2
)]2)
, b > 0. (2.9.11)
As we did in Example 2.8.1, we check condition (i) of Assumption 2.8.1, as (ii) is clearly
true and (iii) will be controlled ex post. Using equation (2.8.25) and performing the ﬁrst
order derivative, it is immediate to see that (F
ν)−1
T ′+
(·) is non decreasing over (0, 1] for
every b > 0. Hence, we can make our computations assuming well-posedness for Problem
(CPT-I), which implies that of Problem (CPT-N) as well (thanks to Theorem 2.9.1). For
the non informed investor, we exploit the results of Proposition 2.8.2, which give us
X∗ = x0
√
1− α+ 2b
(1− α)(1 + 2b)1/(1−α)T
′
+(Z)
1/(1−α), (2.9.12)
V (X∗) = xα0
√
1 + 2b
(√
1− α
1− α+ 2b
)1−α
. (2.9.13)
17Thus, we observe an overestimation of relatively large gains and an underestimation of small gains.
64
2.10. The goal reaching models and their solutions
On the other hand, for the CPT insider we apply Proposition 2.8.6 which yields
Xν∗ = x0
T − s2α+ 2bT
s2(1− α) exp
{
−T − s
2 + 2bT
2Ts2(1− α) (W
Q
T )
2
}
, (2.9.14)
V (x0, ν) = x
α
0
√
T (1 + 2b)
s2
(√
s2(1− α)
T − s2α+ 2bT
)1−α
. (2.9.15)
The insider's gain is thus given by V (x0, ν)−V (X∗). For our purposes, it is more convenient
to compute the ratio
V (x0, ν)
V (X∗)
=
√
T
s
(√
s2(1− α)
T − s2α+ 2bT
)1−α
≥ 1, (2.9.16)
which is increasing in both b, T and decreasing in s, whereas the dependence on α is not
monotone. Note that this makes perfectly sense since a greater T (or a lower s) improves the
accuracy of insider's information. Moreover, if s ↑ √T , the ratio (2.9.16) tends decreasingly
to 1. On the other hand, as b ↓ 0 we see that T+(·) converges uniformly to the identity
function and, in case of well-posedness, we recover the same results of Example 2.7.2, where
the agent was a classical insider. Finally, if α ↑ 1, then (2.9.16) tends to √T/s; this is
equivalent to say that if the trader becomes risk neutral, then the ratio between the optimal
values is nothing but an index of the goodness of the extra information.
The comparison between the optimal terminal wealths X∗ and Xν∗ exhibits the already
know ﬂaw of being dependent on the choice of Z; in particular, if Z = FQ
(
1
ξ(Y )
)
then
straightforward computations show that Xν∗ ≥ X∗ if and only if the terminal price of the
stock lies in a certain range, whereas if Z = 1 − FQ
(
1
ξ(Y )
)
then we obtain the opposite
result.
2.10 The goal reaching models and their solutions
A completely diﬀerent perspective about the target of a ﬁnancial investor is given by the so-
called goal reaching model. Brieﬂy, the trader we consider has the objective of maximizing
the probability of her terminal wealth being greater than a speciﬁc threshold. For a detailed
treatment of this model, we refer the reader to [15], where the author solved the problem
for a deterministic investment opportunity set using stochastic control theory and HJB
equations. However, we will follow the approach developed in [27], which generalizes the
solution scheme to a stochastic investment opportunity set. As our agents are assumed to
observe prices under the martingale measure Q instead of the historical probability P, we
will see that some simpliﬁcations are in order.
2.10.1 The non informed agent's problem
We straightforwardly adapt the goal reaching model to the case when the state price density
is unknown. For simplicity, we ﬁx a constant threshold b > 0 and we assume x0 ≥ 0 to be
the initial endowment of our agent. Denoting by X the terminal wealth, the problem is
Maximize VGR(X) := Q {X ≥ b}
subject to EQ[X] = x0, X ≥ 0, X is FT -measurable.
(GR-N)
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Now, let X∗GR the optimal solution to Problem (GR-N); it is clear that we should also
assume x0 < b to avoid a trivial problem. Moreover, for our N-agent it is not convenient
to choose with positive Q-probability {X > b} or {0 < X < b}, as this will consume her
initial budget without increasing the objective function. Furthermore, using Chebyshev's
inequality, we see that Q {X ≥ b} ≤ x0/b. Hence, the optimal solution will be of the form
X∗GR = bIA, for a suitable set A ∈ FT satisfying the budget constraint. We have just
proved the following result.
Proposition 2.10.1. For Problem (GR-N), we have:
- if x0 = 0, then X
∗
GR = 0 Q-a.s. and VGR(X∗GR) = 0;
- if 0 < x0 < b, then X
∗
GR = bIA for every A ∈ FT such that Q(A) = x0/b and
VGR(X
∗
GR) = x0/b;
- if x0 ≥ b, then X∗GR = x0 Q-a.s. and VGR(X∗GR) = 1.
2.10.2 The insider's problem
Passing to the analogous model for an insider, all we have to do is to modify the problem
using the privileged weak information (Y, ν) and the updated probability measure Qν .
Thus, we have
Maximize V νGR(X) := Qν {X ≥ b}
subject to Eν
[
1
ξ(Y )X
]
= x0, X ≥ 0, X is FT -measurable,
(GR-I)
with optimal solution Xν∗GR and corresponding optimal value VGR(x0, ν). We immediately
see that Problem (GR-I) is nothing but Problem (9) in [27], where P is replaced by Qν
and the state price density ρ is replaced by 1ξ(Y ) . We observe the law-invariant nature of
the objective function as it happened for the CPT agents' problems. Now, it remains to
adapt the main result for the goal reaching problem in [27], namely Theorem 1, to get the
solution.
Proposition 2.10.2. For Problem (GR-I), we have:
- if x0 = 0, then X
ν∗
GR = 0 Qν-a.s. and VGR(x0, ν) = 0;
- if 0 < x0 < b, then X
ν∗
GR = b
νI 1
ξ(Y )≤cν
, where cν = (FQ)−1
(
x0
b
)
> 0 and VGR(x0, ν) =
F ν(cν).
- if x0 ≥ b, then Xν∗GR = x0 Qν-a.s. and VGR(x0, ν) = 1.
Comparison results between a non informed investor and an insider are quite clear.
Firstly, the presence of the insider's gain in non trivial cases can be assessed simply using
Lemma 2.9.1, which gives
VGR(x0, ν) = F
ν(cν) ≥ FQ(cν) = x0b = VGR(X∗).
Finally, we can easily compare the optimal terminal wealths if N-agent chooses A ={
1
ξ(Y ) ≤ cν
}
. In such a case, we see that X∗GR = X
ν∗
GR but they lead to diﬀerent opti-
mal values as the evaluation criteria for the two investors are diﬀerent.
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2.11 The Yaari's models and their solution
The last model we are going to analyze is the one proposed by Yaari in [59]. That model
is somewhat linked to CPT model since a probability distortion w(·) is applied as well.
However, in that model gains are not distinct from losses, so what is important for the
trader is the level of terminal wealth X. Moreover, the value function is simply the identity,
hence distortion on payments are not allowed. We will solve the problems relative to a non
informed investor and an insider respectively, following the approach developed in [28]. At
last, we will provide an example where the insider's gain is explicitly computed. From now
on, the following assumptions on the distortion w(·) will be in force.
Assumption 2.11.1 (see Assumption 3.3, [28]). w(·) : [0, 1] → [0, 1] is continuous and
strictly increasing with w(0) = 0, w(1) = 1. Furthermore, w(·) is continuously diﬀerentiable
on (0, 1).
2.11.1 The non informed agent's problem
For our N-agent, we adapt the solution scheme proposed in [28], Section 3.2. Assuming an
initial endowment x0 > 0, a standard formulation of this model would be
Maximize VY (X) :=
∫ +∞
0
w (Q {X > x}) dx
subject to EQ[X] = x0, X ≥ 0, X is FT -measurable.
(YA-N)
Once again, we note that the objective function is law-invariant, in the sense that if X is
a feasible solution to (YA-N) with distribution function FX(·), then for every Z ∼ U(0, 1)
w.r.t. Q we have VY (X) = VY
(
(FX)
−1(Z)
)
(see e.g. Lemma 2.13.1). Moreover, the
structure of the objective function may be a source of ill-posedness, similarly to what
happened for the CPT model. A straightforward adaptation of the proof in [28], Theorem
3.4, shows the next result.
Proposition 2.11.1. Under Assumption 2.11.1, if lim infz↓0w′(z) = +∞ then Problem
(YA-N) is ill-posed whereas it is well-posed if lim supz↓0w′(z) < +∞.
In particular, w(z) = zγ leads to well-posedness if γ > 1, whereas γ < 1 implies ill-
posedness. We also recall that in Yaari's model, a convex distortion is equivalent to risk
aversion. Moreover, using Jensen's inequality we see that if w(·) is convex, then Problem
(YA-N) has the trivial solution X∗Y = x0 Q-a.s. with VY (X∗Y ) = x0 (we will use this fact
in Example 2.11.1). Therefore, it remains some other interesting shapes of w(·) to analyze.
Following [28], we impose this technical condition.
Assumption 2.11.2 (see Assumption 3.5, [28]). M(z) := w′(1 − z) is continuous on
(0, 1), and there exists z0 ∈ (0, 1) such that M(·) is strictly increasing on (0, z0) and strictly
decreasing on (z0, 1).
In other words, the previous assumption describes an S-shaped distortion function which
is useful for the subsequent mathematical analysis whereas it is not properly suitable in an
economic sense from a descriptive or a normative point of view. In fact, such an S-shaped
w(·) implies underweighting of both relatively large and small payoﬀs. Using exactly the
same argument as in the proofs of Proposition 3.6 and Theorem 3.7 in [28], we state the
main result of this section.
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Proposition 2.11.2. Suppose Assumption 2.11.2 holds. Deﬁne
z(λ) := inf {z ∈ (0, z0] : M(z) = λ} , (2.11.1)
h(λ) := w (1− z(λ))− λ (1− z(λ)) , (2.11.2)
and let λ∗ be the unique positive root of h(·). Then, for every Z ∼ U(0, 1) w.r.t. Q, we have
X∗Y = b
∗Iz(λ∗)<Z≤1, where b∗ = x01−z(λ∗) is determined by the budget constraint. Moreover,
VY (X
∗
Y ) = b
∗w (1− z(λ∗)).
2.11.2 The insider's problem
For a weakly informed trader who follows the tenets of Yaari's dual theory of choice, the
optimization problem can be naturally set as follows
Maximize V νY (X) :=
∫ +∞
0
w (Qν {X > x}) dx
subject to Eν
[
1
ξ(Y )X
]
= x0, X ≥ 0, X is FT -measurable.
(YA-I)
We will call Xν∗Y its optimal solution, with optimal value VY (x0, ν). Once again, we recover
the same structure as in [28], Problem (2.11), and we replace ρ with 1ξ(Y ) and P with Q
ν .
Before giving the solution, we impose the technical hypothesis
Assumption 2.11.3 (see Assumption 5.2, [28]). Mν(z) := w
′(1−z)
(F ν)−1(1−z) is continuous on
(0, 1), and there exists z0 ∈ (0, 1) such that M(·) is strictly increasing on (0, z0) and strictly
decreasing on (z0, 1).
The solution to Problem (YA-I) is completely described in the next proposition.
Proposition 2.11.3. Suppose Assumption 2.11.3 holds. Deﬁne
zν(λν) := inf {z ∈ (0, z0] : Mν(z) = λν} , (2.11.3)
hν(λ) :=
∫ 1
zν(λ)
[
w′(1− z)− λ(F ν)−1(1− z)] dz. (2.11.4)
Let λν∗ be the unique positive root of hν(·). Then, Xν∗Y = bνI 1
ξ(Y )≤cν
, where bν is implicitly
deﬁned by the budget constraint Eν
[
1
ξ(Y )X
ν∗
Y
]
= x0 and c
ν is the unique root of
ϕν(c) := xw (F ν(x))− w′ (F ν(x))
∫ x
0
s dF ν(s) (2.11.5)
over
(
(F ν)−1(1− z0), 1ξ(Y )
)
. Moreover, VY (x0, ν) = λ
ν∗x0.
Proof. Use the same arguments as in [28], Proposition 3.6 and Theorem 3.7.
Before giving an explicit example, we show that I-agent always gets a higher optimal
value than an N-agent. In fact, Problems (YA-N) and (YA-I) share the same feasible set;
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therefore, the non-informed agent can choose Z = FQ( 1ξ(Y )) and the insider can select the
corresponding X∗Y as her terminal wealth. Hence, using Lemma 2.9.1, we can compute
V νY (X
∗
Y ) =
∫ +∞
0
w
(
Qν
{
b∗I
z(λ∗)<FQ( 1ξ(Y ) )
> x
})
dx
=
∫ b∗
0
w
(
F ν
(
(FQ)−1(1− z(λ∗))
))
dx
≥
∫ b∗
0
w (1− z(λ∗)) dx
= VY (X
∗
Y ),
which obviously implies VY (x0, ν) ≥ VY (X∗). This time too the comparison between the
optimal terminal wealths is not very sensible, as it strongly depends on the choice of Z.
Example 2.11.1 (Evaluation of the insider's gain in Yaari's model). Consider the single
risky asset setting as in Example 2.7.2. We assume that the weak information of I-agent
is given by Y = FW (W
Q
T ) and ν(dx) = [(2− 2a)x+ a] dx, a ∈ (0, 1), where FW (·) is the
c.d.f. of the random variable WQT .
Note that Y ∼ U(0, 1) w.r.t. Q and the economic intuition behind this example is that the
insider has a weak knowledge about the terminal price, as the distortion applied by FW (·)
is irrelevant due to its strict monotonicity. Furthermore, the parameter a is an index of the
goodness of the extra information: (Y, ν) becomes in particular more and more valuable as
a → 0+, whereas if a → 1− we recover the no additional information case. At this point,
we can immediately compute
1
ξ(Y )
=
1
(2− 2a)FW (WQT ) + a
,
1
ξ(Y )
=
1
2− a,
1
ξ(Y )
=
1
a
. (2.11.6)
Now, we assume a risk averse investor endowed with probability distortion w(z) = zγ ,
γ > 1. As noticed in Section 2.11.1, for such a convex w(·) we already know that X∗Y =
x0 Q-a.s. and VY (X∗Y ) = x0. Next, we check the validity of Assumption 2.11.3. Using
equation (2.11.6) together with the uniform distribution of Y , we ﬁnd
M(z) = γ(1− z)γ−1
√
4z(a− 1) + (a− 2)2, z0 = a
2(1− γ) + 2(1− a)
2(1− a)(2γ − 1) ∈ (0, 1).
(2.11.7)
Then, we look for a root of ϕν(·) as deﬁned in Proposition 2.11.3. It turns out that an
admissible cν ∈
(
(F ν)−1(1− z0), 1ξ(Y )
)
is obtained only under an additional condition over
the parameters γ and a. More precisely, we have
cν =
2γ − 1
2− a if γ <
1
a
. (2.11.8)
Observe that whenever γ < 1/a, the quantity z0 in (2.11.7) belongs to (0, 1). The ﬁnal
step is to ﬁnd the optimal solution Xν∗Y together with its optimal value. Using the budget
constraint we have
Xν∗Y = b
ν∗I
WQT≥(FW )−1
(
aγ−1
(a−1)(2γ−1)
), (2.11.9)
VY (x0, ν) = x0
γγ(γ − 1)γ−1(2− a)2γ−1
(1− a)γ−1(2γ − 1)2γ−1 , (2.11.10)
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where bν∗ = x0
(1−a)(2γ−1)
(2−a)(γ−1) . We remark that our insider will obtain b
ν∗ if the terminal
prices are higher than a certain threshold which is decreasing in both a and γ as economic
intuition suggests. Furthermore, bν∗ is decreasing in both parameters and the Q-probability
of obtaining bν∗ is nothing but (γ−1)(2−a)(2γ−1)(1−a) , which is increasing in both γ and a. Finally,
we note that VY (x0, ν) ≥ x0 obviously holds. However, there is no clear dependence of
VY (x0, ν) in the parameters.
2.12 Conclusions
In this chapter, we considered portfolio optimization problems for investor following dif-
ferent preference paradigms. Classical expected utility, CPT, goal reaching and Yaari's
dual theory maximizers have been studied. We considered diﬀerent information levels for
each type of trader; in particular, we started by studying the full information case and we
extended the optimization problem in the strong, partial and weak information framework.
We have seen that for a partial informed agent or for any type of insider, all we had to do
was to correctly write down her problem and then exploit already known results ([33] in
the CPT case, [27] in the goal reaching and Yaari-type cases). On the contrary, for the non
informed investor those results cannot be directly applied. Nonetheless, the corresponding
optimization problems can be solved using similar techniques, leading to a family of opti-
mal solutions, for which uniqueness in distribution of the solution replaces the uniqueness
almost surely. In particular, a CPT trader obtains an optimal terminal payoﬀ which looks
like a gamble on the ﬁnal price, where this payoﬀ can even be negative. We proved the
intuitive fact that the optimal value of an informed agent is always bigger than that of
a non-informed agent. In other terms, the value of the extra information is always posi-
tive. Moreover, in CPT I-agent case, ill-posedness is an even more delicate issue than in
the non-informed case. In some involved examples, we performed some graphical analysis
which helped us to understand well-posedness as a function of model's parameters.
Other contributions are explicit computations of the optimal terminal wealths of a
CPT and a Yaari-type insider. In particular, we proposed two new classes of probability
distortions, a convex and a concave one and a new example of weak information which
turns out to be economically meaningful (see Examples 2.8.1, 2.9.1 and 2.11.1).
2.13 Proofs of the results for a CPT non informed agent
2.13.1 A Choquet maximization problem
Our aim is to solve a general utility maximization problem which includes a Choquet
capacity:
Maximize V1(X) =
∫ +∞
0
T (P{u(X) > y}) dy
subject to EP[X] = a, X ≥ 0,
(2.13.1)
where a ≥ 0, T : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is a strictly increasing, diﬀerentiable function with T (0) = 0,
T (1) = 1, and u(·) is a strictly concave, strictly increasing, twice diﬀerentiable function
with u(0) = 0, u′(0) = +∞, u′(+∞) = 0. Note that the only diﬀerence with the Choquet
maximization problem solved in [33], Appendix C, is that their weighting function ξ in the
constraint is not atomless, being here a Dirac mass. This makes impossible to use directly
their results.
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We will denote by X∗ the optimal solution to Problem (2.13.1). The case a = 0 is trivial,
as it implies X∗ = 0 with optimal value V1(X∗) = 0; therefore assume a > 0. First of all
we have the following result, which states the law-invariance property of the problem.
Lemma 2.13.1. Suppose Problem (2.13.1) admits a feasible solution X whose distribution
function is G(·); then for every random variable Z ∼ U(0, 1) w.r.t. P we have V1(X) =
V1
(
G−1(Z)
)
.
Proof. One can easily guess from the structure of Problem (2.13.1) that the only relevant
feature of the optimal solution is its distribution. Formally, for any such Z we can compute
EP[G−1(Z)] =
∫ +∞
0
P{G−1(Z) > y} dy =
∫ +∞
0
P{X > y} dy = EP[X] = a,
thus the random variable G−1(Z) is feasible and we have
V1(X) =
∫ +∞
0
T (P{u(X) > y}) dy =
∫ +∞
0
T (P{X > u−1(y)}) dy
=
∫ +∞
0
T (1− P{X ≤ u−1(y)}) dy =
∫ +∞
0
T (1−G(u−1(y))) dy
=
∫ +∞
0
T (P{Z > G(u−1(y))}) dy =
∫ +∞
0
T (P{u(G−1(Z)) > y)}) dy
= V1(G
−1(Z))
as claimed.
We notice at once the diﬀerence between our Lemma 2.13.1 and Lemma C.1 in [33]: we
do not have an almost sure result. However we proved that for any such Z the previous
equivalence holds, thus it is clearly true even for an optimal X∗. Thus we are free to
choose any Z uniformly distributed. This is a general feature of our results, i.e. replacing
the almost sureness with a weaker condition on the distribution functions which gives us
an additional degree of freedom. From now on, we follow [33] just adding some slight
modiﬁcations. Let's introduce the problem
Maximize v1(G) :=
∫ +∞
0
T (P{u(G−1(Z)) > y}) dy
subject to
{
EP[G−1(Z)] = a,
G is the distribution function of a non negative random variable,
(2.13.2)
which changes the domain of our problem from a set of random variables to a set of
functions. The function G(·) appearing in the constraints must be non-decreasing, càdlàg
and satisfy G(0−) = 0, G(+∞) = 1. From Lemma 2.13.1 we deduce the equivalence
between the two previous Problems (2.13.1) and (2.13.2).
Proposition 2.13.1. If G∗ is optimal for Problem (2.13.2), then for any Z ∼ U(0, 1) w.r.t.
P the random variable X∗ := (G∗)−1(Z) is optimal for Problem (2.13.1). Conversely, if
X∗ is optimal for (2.13.1), then its distribution function G∗ is optimal for (2.13.2).
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Performing the same calculations as in [33] and setting
Γ :=
{
g : [0, 1)→ R+, g is non-decreasing, left continuous, with g(0) = 0} ,
we can rewrite Problem (2.13.2) as
Maximize v1(g) := E[u(g(Z))T ′(1− Z)]
subject to EP[g(Z)] = a, g ∈ Γ.
(2.13.3)
Thanks to the assumptions on T (·) and u(·) we now have a concave optimization problem
in g(·) and we can use Lagrange method. Thus, for a given λ ∈ R, we can solve
Maximize vλ1(g) := E[u(g(Z))T ′(1− Z)− λg(Z)]
subject to g ∈ Γ,
(2.13.4)
and then determine λ via the original constraint. As noticed in [33], if we ignore the
constraint and apply standard maximization techniques we ﬁnd g(z) = (u′)−1(λ/T ′(1−z)).
Moreover, if T ′(z) is non-increasing in z ∈ (0, 1], then g(z) is non-decreasing in z ∈ [0, 1)
and therefore it solves Problem (2.13.4). However, if T ′(z) is not non-increasing then we
are not able to ﬁnd an explicit solution18. We remark that if T (z) is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable, then T ′(z) non-increasing amounts to require a concave T (·). In particular
T (·) = id satisﬁes this condition.
Denote Ru(x) := −xu
′′(x)
u′(x) , x > 0, the index of Relative Risk Aversion (RRA for short)
of the function u(·). We have
Proposition 2.13.2. Assume T ′(z) non-increasing in z ∈ (0, 1] and lim inf
x→+∞ Ru(x) > 0.
Then for any Z ∼ U(0, 1) w.r.t. P, the following claims are equivalent:
(i) Problem (2.13.3) is well-posed for any a > 0.
(ii) Problem (2.13.3) admits a unique optimal solution for any a > 0.
(iii) EP
[
u
(
(u′)−1( 1T ′(1−Z))
)
T ′(1− Z)
]
< +∞.
(vi) EP
[
u
(
(u′)−1( λT ′(1−Z))
)
T ′(1− Z)
]
< +∞ ∀ λ > 0.
Furthermore, when one of the above (i)-(iv) holds, the optimal solution to Problem (2.13.3)
is
g∗(x) ≡ (G∗)−1(x) = (u′)−1
(
λ
T ′(1− x)
)
, x ∈ [0, 1),
where λ > 0 is the one satisfying EP[(G∗)−1(1− Z)] = a.
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition C.2 in [33], we can deﬁne a new probability measure
P˜ such that dP˜ = T ′(1−Z) dP and a random variable ζ := 1T ′(1−Z) which is positive P-a.s..
We can now rewrite Problem (2.13.3) as follows.
Maximize v1(g) := EP˜[u(g(Z))]
subject to EP˜[ζg(Z)] = a, g ∈ Γ.
By [31], Theorem 5.4, we get the result.
18If one restricts the domain over the step functions g ∈ Γ, then solving (2.13.4) is equivalent to solve a
non-linear programming problem in Rn, which once again does not have an easy explicit solution.
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We remark that the claim (ii) (as it appears in Proposition C.2 of [33]) still holds
true because the optimal solution g∗(·) to Problem (2.13.3) determines the inverse of a
distribution function whereas the optimal solution X∗ to Problem (2.13.1) is not unique
P-a.s. as it depends on the choice of Z. However, X∗ is unique in law. Moreover we could
also replace 1− Z with Z in every explicit expression containing an expected value, since
Z ∼ U(0, 1) too. Now we can state the main result of this section.
Theorem 2.13.1. Assume T ′(z) non-increasing in z ∈ (0, 1] and lim inf
x→+∞ Ru(x) > 0; for
any ﬁxed Z ∼ U(0, 1) w.r.t. P deﬁne X(λ) := (u′)−1
(
λ
T ′(1−Z)
)
for λ > 0. If V1(X(1)) <
+∞, then X(λ) is an optimal solution of Problem (2.13.1), where λ is the one satisfying
EP[X(λ)] = a. If V1(X(1)) = +∞, then Problem (2.13.1) is ill-posed.
Wit the obvious changes in the proofs, we can also state a necessary condition for
optimality as in [33].
Lemma 2.13.2. If g(·) is optimal for Problem (2.13.4), then either g ≡ 0 or g(x) >
0 ∀ x > 0.
Theorem 2.13.2. If X∗ is an optimal solution for Problem (2.13.1) with some a > 0, then
P{X∗ = 0} = 0.
Note that these last results do not depend on the choice of Z. They will be useful in
order to state monotonicity properties of the value function of a CPT non-informed agent.
2.13.2 A Choquet minimization problem
In this section we solve a general utility minimization problem including a Choquet capac-
ity:
Minimize V2(X) :=
∫ +∞
0
T (P{u(X) > y}) dy
subject to EP[X] = a, X ≥ 0,
(2.13.5)
where a, T (·) satisfy the same hypothesis of those employed in Problem (2.13.1) and u(·) is
strictly increasing, concave and u(0) = 0. Once again the only diﬀerence with the Choquet
minimization problem solved in [33], Appendix D, is the absence of the atom-less weighting
function ξ.
We will denote as usual with X∗ the optimal solution to Problem (2.13.5). Note that there
is always a feasible solution, namely X = a P-a.s.; hence the optimal value of Problem
(2.13.5) is a ﬁnite non-negative number. Proceeding as in Appendix 2.13.1 we can show
the following law-invariance lemma.
Lemma 2.13.3. Suppose Problem (2.13.5) admits a feasible solution X whose distribution
function is G(·); then for every random variable Z ∼ U(0, 1) w.r.t. P we have V1(X) =
V1
(
G−1(Z)
)
.
Thus, we can look for a solution to the following problem.
Minimize v2(g) := E[u(g(Z))T ′(1− Z)]
subject to EP[g(Z)] = a, g ∈ Γ,
(2.13.6)
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where g(·) represents the inverse of a distribution function G(·), i.e. g(·) = G−1(·). As
already pointed out in [33], Problem (2.13.6) is a diﬃcult one in that we have to minimize
a concave objective function in a function space. Again we can seek among corner point
solutions and by straightforward modiﬁcations of the proof of Proposition D.2 in [33], we
can prove the next result.
Proposition 2.13.3. Assume that u(·) is strictly concave at 0. Then the optimal solution
for Problem (2.13.6), if it exists, must be in the form g(t) =
a
1− bI(b,1)(t), t ∈ [0, 1).
Obviously by left continuity of g(·) we can extend the optimal g(·) over [0, 1] by setting
g(1) := a1−b . Moreover, g(·) is uniformly bounded in t ∈ [0, 1], so it follows by the previous
lemma that an X∗ optimal for Problem (2.13.5) is uniformly bounded from above. Thanks
to the previous proposition, we can reduce our problem to ﬁnd an optimal real number
b ∈ [0, 1). Therefore we introduce the following minimization problem:
Minimize v2(b) := E[u(g(Z))T ′(1− Z)]
subject to g(·) = a1−bI(b,1](·), 0 ≤ b < 1.
(2.13.7)
Adapting the proofs of Proposition D.3 and Theorem D.1 in [33], we can obtain the following
result.
Proposition 2.13.4. Problems (2.13.6) and (2.13.7) have the same inﬁmum values.
Theorem 2.13.3. Problems (2.13.5) and (2.13.7) have the same inﬁmum values. If, in
addition, u(·) is strictly concave at 0, then Problem (2.13.5) admits an optimal solution if
and only if the following problem
min
0≤b<1
u
(
a
1− b
)
T (1− b)
admits an optimal solution b∗, in which case the optimal solution to Problem (2.13.5) is of
the form X∗ =
a
1− b∗ I(b∗,1](Z) for any choice of Z ∼ U(0, 1) w.r.t. P.
2.13.3 The solution of a CPT non informed agent's problem
We will now proceed to solve Problem (CPT-N). The scheme of the solution is nothing but
the one already showed in [33]. Some results will be just restated without proofs as they
need only slight and straightforward adaptations. As already noted, the main changes are
due to the constraint EQ[X] = x0. Recall Problem (CPT-N):
Maximize V (X) = V+(X+)− V−(X−)
subject to EQ[X] = x0, X is FT -measurable and Q a.s. lower bounded,
where
V+(X
+) :=
∫ +∞
0
T+(Q{u+(X+) > y}) dy, V−(X−) :=
∫ +∞
0
T−(Q{u−(X−) > y}) dy.
As noticed in [33], Proposition 3.1, to avoid systematic ill-posedness we will impose
Assumption 2.13.1. V+(X) < +∞ for any nonnegative, FT -measurable random variable
X satisfying EQ[X] < +∞.
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We now split Problem (CPT-N) into its positive and negative part, also deﬁning their
respective optimal values v+(A, x+) and v−(A, x+) as usual; after that we merge them
back:
• Positive Part Problem: given the pair (A, x+), with A ∈ FT and x+ ≥ x+0 ,
Maximize V+(X) =
∫ +∞
0
T+(Q{u+(X) > y}) dy
subject to EQ[X] = x+, X ≥ 0 Q-a.s., X = 0 Q-a.s. on AC .
(2.13.8)
• Negative Part Problem: given the pair (A, x+), with A ∈ FT and x+ ≥ x+0 ,
Minimize V−(X) =
∫ +∞
0
T−(Q{u−(X) > y}) dy
subject to
{
EQ[X] = x+ − x0, X ≥ 0 Q-a.s., X = 0 Q-a.s. on A,
X is upper bounded Q-a.s..
(2.13.9)
• Merged Problem:
Maximize v+(A, x+)− v−(A, x+)
subject to
{
A ∈ FT , x+ ≥ x+0 ,
x+ = 0 if Q(A) = 0, x+ = x0 if Q(A) = 1.
(2.13.10)
With only a few and simple adaptations, we can prove the following two results.
Proposition 2.13.5 ([33], Proposition 5.1). Problem (CPT-N) is ill-posed if and only if
Problem (2.13.10) is ill-posed.
Proposition 2.13.6 ([33], Proposition 5.2). Given X∗, deﬁne A∗ := {ω : X∗ ≥ 0} and
x∗+ := EQ[(X∗)+]. Then X∗ is optimal for Problem (CPT-N) if and only if (A∗, x∗+) are
optimal for Problem (2.13.10) and (X∗)+ and (X∗)− are respectively optimal for Problems
(2.13.8) and (2.13.9) with parameters (A∗, x∗+).
Therefore, the original Problem (CPT-N) for N-agent is equivalent once more to the set
of Problems (2.13.8)-(2.13.10). The next step is the crucial one, as it completely changes
the structure of the solution of our problem. We will not be able to obtain the almost sure
characterization results obtained in [33]. On the other hand, we can avoid the technical
details related to the comonotonicity and anti-comonotonicity of the random variables
employed in the solution (see [33], Appendix B, where a series of so-called quantile problems
is solved).
The fact is that the density ρ permitted a huge simpliﬁcation of the overall procedure,
since it made possible to look for a solution where the set A was of the form {ρ ≤ c} for
some real number c ∈ [ρ, ρ]. Now we can ﬁnd a quite similar result adapting the proof of
Theorem 5.1 in [33]; this will substantially reduce the complexity of Problem (2.13.10).
Theorem 2.13.4. For any feasible (A, x+) of Problem (2.13.10) such that Q(A) = p and
for every (Ω,F ) random variable Z ∼ U(0, 1) w.r.t. Q, we have
v+(A, x+)− v−(A, x+) ≥ v+(A, x+)− v−(A, x+), (2.13.11)
where A := {Z ≤ p}.
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Proof. Fix a random variable Z ∼ U(0, 1). The cases x+ = x+0 and p = 0 or p = 1 are
trivial, so we assume that x+ > x
+
0 and p ∈ (0, 1). Deﬁne B := AC and A := {Z ≤ p} and
set
A1 = A ∩ {Z ≤ p}, A2 = A ∩ {Z > p},
B1 = B ∩ {Z ≤ p}, B2 = B ∩ {Z > p}.
Note that Q(A1 ∪ A2) = Q(A1 ∪ B1) = p, so that Q(A2) = Q(B1). If Q(A2) = 0 then the
result is trivial, so suppose Q(A2) > 0. Choose a feasible solution X1 for Problem (2.13.8)
with parameters (A, x+); we will prove that V+(X1) ≤ v+(A, x+) (the proof for a feasible
solution X2 for Problem (2.13.9) is analogous). To this end, deﬁne f1(t) := Q{X1 ≤ t|A2},
g1(t) := Q{Z ≤ t|B1}, t ∈ [0, 1], Z1 := g1(Z) and Y1 := f−11 (Z1). Note that Z has no atom
w.r.t. Q, which in turn implies that it has no atom w.r.t. Q(·|B1). Moreover one can show
that Z1 ∼ U(0, 1) w.r.t. Q(·|B1), implying Q{Y1 ≤ t|B1} = Q{Z1 ≤ f1(t)|B1} = f1(t). To
see this note that
g1(t) =
Q{AC ∩ (Z ≤ t) ∩ (Z ≤ p)}
Q{AC ∩ (Z ≤ p)} =
Q{AC ∩ (Z ≤ t ∧ p)}
Q{AC ∩ (Z ≤ p)} ,
so we can compute
Q{Z1 ≤ t|B1} = Q{A
C ∩ (Z1 ≤ t) ∩ (Z ≤ p)}
Q{AC ∩ (Z ≤ p)} =
Q{AC ∩ (Z ≤ g−11 (t) ∧ p)}
Q{AC ∩ (Z ≤ p)} = t.
Consequently, EQ[X1IA2 ] = Q(A2)EQ[X1|A2] = EQ[Y1IB1 ]. Now set X1 := X1IA1 +Y1IB1 .
Then EQ[X1] = EQ[X1], so X1 is feasible for Problem (2.13.8) with parameters (A, x+).
Finally it is obviously seen that Q{X1 > t} = Q{X1 > t}, therefore by the deﬁnition of
V+(·) it follows that V+(X1) ≥ V+(X1). Combining this with the similar result for the
Negative Part Problem we get the desired inequality (2.13.11).
The meaning of Theorem 2.13.4 is that a non informed agent cares only about the
probability of events, no matter what structure they have or what economic phenomenon
they represent. In what follows, it will be clear that for such an agent investing in a risky
asset is not so diﬀerent with respect to tossing a coin or betting on horses!19
We can now proceed similarly to Jin and Zhou [33], using v+(p, x+) and v−(p, x+) to
denote v+({ω : Z ≤ p}, x+) and v−({ω : Z ≤ p}, x+) respectively. Note that we can
freely choose Z, and the previous deﬁnition is in some sense independent of Z thanks to
the previous Theorem 2.13.4. Accordingly, we replace Problem (2.13.10) by the easier
constrained optimization problem in R2:
Maximize v+(p, x+)− v−(p, x+)
subject to
{
p ∈ [0, 1], x+ ≥ x+0 ,
x+ = 0 if p = 1, x+ = x0 if p = 0.
(2.13.12)
Using Theorem 2.13.4 we obtain the general structure of the solution to Problem (CPT-N),
which is indeed similar to the one found in [33]. However, it must reﬂect on one hand the
19Recall that also in the original framework in [33], the optimal policy for an investor was to behave like
a gambler, but she would choose a terminal gain accompanied with a high price of the underlying stock,
opposite to a ﬁnal loss if the terminal price would have fallen below a certain threshold.
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freedom to choose Z and on the other hand the fact that once a particular Z is chosen,
then the optimal solution of Problem (CPT-N) is allowed to depend only on Z, in order
to avoid possible correlation eﬀects. In what follows we will consider such a Z ﬁxed and
denote with X∗ the optimal solution depending on Z.
Theorem 2.13.5. Given X∗ and Z, deﬁne p∗ := Q{X∗ ≥ 0}, x∗+ := EQ[(X∗)+]. Then X∗
is optimal for Problem (CPT-N) if and only if (p∗, x∗+) is optimal for Problem (2.13.12) and
(X∗)+IZ≤p∗ and (X∗)−IZ>p∗ are respectively optimal for Problems (2.13.8) and (2.13.9)
with parameters ({ω : Z ≤ p∗}, x∗+).
The next step consists in solving the positive and the negative part Problems (2.13.8)
and (2.13.9) using the results obtained in Appendix 2.13.1 and 2.13.2 respectively. In order
to obtain a more explicit result, we impose the following conditions.
Assumption 2.13.2. T ′+(z) is non-increasing for z ∈ (0, 1], lim infx→+∞−xu
′′
+(x)
u′+(x)
> 0 and
for any Z ∼ U(0, 1) w.r.t. Q we have EQ
[
u+
(
(u′+)−1(
1
T ′(Z))
)
T ′(Z)
]
< +∞.
At this point we can perform the same procedure used in [33], Section 6.1, to obtain
Theorem 2.13.6. Let Assumption 2.13.2 hold. For any Z ∼ U(0, 1) w.r.t. Q and for a
given p ∈ [0, 1], set A := {ω : Z ≤ p}; let x+ ≥ x+0 be given. Then:
(i) if x+ = 0, then the optimal solution of Problem (2.13.8) is X∗ = 0 and v+(p, x+) = 0;
(ii) if x+ > 0, p = 0 then there is no feasible solution to Problem (2.13.8) and v+(p, x+) =
−∞;
(iii) if x+ > 0, p ∈ (0, 1] then the optimal solution to (2.13.8) is
X∗(λ) = (u′+)
−1
(
λ
T ′+(Z)
)
IZ≤p,
with the optimal value v+(p, x+) = EQ
[
u+
(
(u′+)−1
(
λ
T ′+(Z)
))
T ′+(Z)IZ≤p
]
, where
λ > 0 is the unique real number satisfying EQ[X∗(λ)] = x+.
Proof. Cases (i) and (ii) are trivial; to prove (iii) we follow an argument similar to that
in the proof of Theorem 6.1 in [33]. Deﬁne TA(x) :=
T+(xQ(A))
T+(Q(A)) =
T+(xp)
T+(p)
, x ∈ [0, 1] and
the conditional probability measure QA := Q(·|A). Now consider Problem (2.13.8) in the
conditional probability space (Ω ∩A,F ∩A,QA), i.e.
Maximize V+(Y ) = T+(p)
∫ +∞
0
TA(QA{u+(Y ) > y}) dy
subject to EQA [Y ] = x+p , Y ≥ 0.
(2.13.13)
We can apply Theorem 2.13.1 to Problem (2.13.13) choosing any random variable Z˜ ∼
U(0, 1) w.r.t. QA; note that every required assumption for Theorem 2.13.1 is still fulﬁlled.
At this point, in order to simplify calculations as much as possible, we see that once Z is
chosen there is a canonical choice of Z˜: Z˜ = 1− g(Z), where g(z) := Q{Z ≤ t|A}. In fact
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we can show that if Z ∼ U(0, 1) w.r.t. Q, then Z˜ has the same distribution w.r.t. QA. To
see this, note that
QA{Z˜ ≤ t} = Q{Z˜ ≤ t, A}
p
=
Q{1− g(Z) ≤ t, Z ≤ p}
p
= t, t ∈ (0, 1),
where we used
g(t) =
Q{Z ≤ t ∧ p}
p
=
t ∧ p
p
.
Using such a choice of Z˜ we can ﬁnd that an optimal solution to Problem (2.13.8) is
X∗ = (u′+)−1
(
λT+(p)
pT ′+(pg(Z))
)
IZ≤p, where λ is uniquely determined by the constraint. We
now observe that on the set {Z ≤ p} we have g(Z) = Z/p; ﬁnally we set λ := λT+(p)p to
ﬁnd our results.
Comparing this result to the analogous in [33], we see that the link between the two
solutions is substantially made by the replacement of the set {ρ ≤ c} with {Z ≤ p}. In
particular c = ρ corresponds to p = 0 and c = ρ corresponds to p = 1. Thanks to the free
choice of Z, we see once more that a non-informed agent is interested only in probabilities,
not in events.
With a simple modiﬁcation in the proof of [33], Proposition 6.2, we can also state the
strict monotonicity of the optimal value v+(·, x+) w.r.t. p.
Proposition 2.13.7. If x+ > 0 and Z ∼ U(0, 1) w.r.t. Q, then Problem (2.13.8) admits
an optimal solution with parameters ({Z ≤ p}, x+) only if v+(p, x+) > v+(p, x+) for any
p > p.
We now proceed to solve the negative part Problem (2.13.9). We follow again the
arguments applied in [33], Section 7, combining them with our results in Appendix 2.13.2.
Theorem 2.13.7. Assume that u−(·) is strictly concave at 0. For any Z ∼ U(0, 1) w.r.t.
Q and for a given p ∈ [0, 1] set A := {ω : Z ≤ p}. Let x+ ≥ x+0 be given. Then:
(i) if p = 1, x+ = x0 then the optimal solution of Problem (2.13.9) is X∗ = 0 and
v−(p, x+) = 0;
(ii) if p = 1, x+ 6= x0 then there is no feasible solution to Problem (2.13.9), therefore
v−(p, x+) = +∞;
(iii) if p ∈ [0, 1) then v−(p, x+) = inf0≤b<1 u−
(
x+−x0
(1−p)(1−b)
)
T− ((1− p)(1− b)) . Moreover,
Problem (2.13.9) with parameters (A, x+) admits an optimal solution X∗ if and only
if the minimization problem
min
0≤b<1
u−
(
x+ − x0
(1− p)(1− b)
)
T− ((1− p)(1− b)) (2.13.14)
admits an optimal solution b∗, in which case X∗ =
x+ − x0
(1− p)(1− b∗)IZ>(1−p)b∗+p .
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Proof. Cases (i) and (ii) are trivial; to prove (iii) we deﬁne TAC (x) :=
T−(xQ(AC)
T−(Q(AC))
=
T−(x(1−p))
T−(1−p) , x ∈ [0, 1] and the conditional probability measure QAC := Q(·|AC). Let's
consider Problem (2.13.9) in the conditional probability space (Ω ∩AC ,F ∩AC ,QAC ):
Minimize V−(Y ) = T−(1− p)
∫ +∞
0
TAC (QAC{u−(Y ) > y}) dy
subject to EQAC [Y ] =
x+ − x0
1− p , Y ≥ 0, Y QAC -a.s. bounded.
(2.13.15)
Now we apply Theorem 2.13.3 to Problem (2.13.15), choosing any random variable Z˜ ∼
U(0, 1) w.r.t. QAC . Once again, when Z is chosen there is a canonical choice of Z˜:
Z˜ = g(Z), where g(z) := Q{Z ≤ t|AC}. Indeed, if Z ∼ U(0, 1) w.r.t. Q then Z˜ has the
same distribution w.r.t. QAC . To see this, observe that
QAC{Z˜ ≤ t} =
Q{Z˜ ≤ t, AC}
1− p =
Q{g(Z) ≤ t, Z > p}
1− p =
Q{Z ≤ g−1(t), Z > p}
1− p ,
but we can compute
g(t) =
Q{Z ≤ t, Z > p}
1− p =
t− p
1− p ∧ 0,
therefore we obtain QAC{Z˜ ≤ t} = t, t ∈ (0, 1). Using such a choice of Z˜ and recalling
that an optimal solution to Problem (2.13.15) is automatically bounded (if it exists), we
can ﬁnd that an optimal solution to Problem (2.13.9) is
X∗ = x+−x0(1−p)(1−b∗)IZ>pIg(Z)∈(b∗,1] =
x+−x0
(1−p)(1−b∗)IZ>g−1(b∗) =
x+−x0
(1−p)(1−b∗)IZ>(1−p)b∗+p,
thanks to the fact that on the set {Z > p} we have g(Z) > 0 and g−1(t) = [(1− p)t+ p]∨
1.
At last we have to merge these results to obtain the overall solution to Problem
(CPT-N). As in [33] we take an intermediate step using the following problem
Maximize v+(p, x+)− u−
(
x+−x0
1−p
)
T−(1− p)
subject to
{
p ∈ [0, 1], x+ ≥ x+0 ,
x+ = 0 if p = 1, x+ = x0 if p = 0,
(2.13.16)
where we set u−
(
x+−x0
1−p
)
T−(1 − p) := 0 if p = 1 and x+ = x0. By simply adapting the
proofs in [33], Lemma 8.1 and Proposition 8.1, we claim:
Lemma 2.13.4. For any feasible pair (p, x+) for Problem (2.13.12), u−
(
x+−x0
1−p
)
T−(1 −
p) ≥ v−(p, x+).
Proposition 2.13.8. Problems (2.13.12) and (2.13.16) have the same supremum values.
Finally we state the main result of this section:
Theorem 2.13.8. Assume that u−(·) is strictly concave at 0. We have the following results:
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(i) if X∗ is optimal for Problem (CPT-N), then p∗ := Q{X∗ ≥ 0}, x∗+ := EQ[(X∗)+] are
optimal for Problem (2.13.16);
(ii) if (p∗, x∗+) is optimal for Problem (2.13.16) and X∗+ is optimal for Problem (2.13.8)
with parameters ({Z ≤ p∗}, x∗+), where Z ∼ U(0, 1) w.r.t. Q, then
X∗ := (X∗)+IZ≤p∗ −
x∗+ − x0
1− p∗ IZ>p∗
is optimal for Problem (CPT-N).
To conclude, if Assumption 2.13.2 is in force, then for any Z ∼ U(0, 1) w.r.t. Q we
have
X∗ = (u′+)
−1
(
λ
T ′+(Z)
)
IZ≤p∗ −
x∗+ − x0
1− p∗ IZ>p∗ ,
V (X∗) = EQ
[
u+
(
(u′+)
−1
(
λ
T ′+(Z)
))
T ′+(Z)IZ≤p∗
]
− u−
(
x∗+ − x0
1− p∗
)
T−(1− p∗),
where (p∗, x∗+) are optimal for Problem (2.13.16) and the Lagrange multiplier λ satisﬁes
EQ
[
(u′+)−1
(
λ
T ′+(Z)
)
IZ≤p∗
]
= x∗+. We ﬁnally notice that this construction can be consid-
ered as an adaptation of the model set up in [33] if we had started with prices following a
geometric or an arithmetic Brownian motion, as it is often supposed in the ﬁnance litera-
ture.
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Chapter 3
Equilibrium models
3.1 Introduction
After the Nobel Prize winning work by Daniel Kahneman, a lot of research has been done
over the CPT ﬁeld. While the ﬁrst steps primarily concerned laboratory experiments and
empirical estimates with the aim of assessing the existence of loss-averse economic agents,
in the past few years theoretical results became predominant, as undoubtedly real world
economy is made up of behavioral agents too. On one hand, the early works of Markowitz,
[47], on portfolio choice theory and Sharpe, [55], about CAPM represent two corner-stones
in one-period mathematical ﬁnance models, as long as we take for granted that EU investors
are the only ones who act in a ﬁnancial market. On the other hand, if we restrict our
attention solely to CPT agents, then the recent work of He and Zhou [27] provides a deep
theoretical insight over portfolio choice theory. Obviously, that is not the ﬁrst paper on
the subject (for example, see the work by Barberis and Huang, [6]); however, it seems to
us that it is the most complete and it retains the less restrictive set of assumptions. This
is why we decided to take [27] as a starting point.
Nonetheless, if the CPT agent is endowed with power value functions, optimization
results can sometimes be controversial. In particular, it easily happens that a so called
loss-averse investor violates her own loss aversion, in a sense to be made precise later.
Moreover, He and Zhou where primarily interested in a general formulation of a portfolio
selection problem, partially leaving aside a sensitivity analysis over the model's parameters.
Besides this, while in the existent literature the link between stochastic dominance criteria
and CPT is quite well understood on a theoretical basis, few works have been done from a
numerical point of view; more speciﬁcally, the work by Bernard and Ghossoub [11] is the
only relevant one which came to our attention. One of our aims is therefore to analyze the
robustness of portfolio choice theory using numerical computations and graphical tools.
Turning back to general equilibrium models, theoretical results are few and a full gen-
erality is far from being obtained. De Giorgi, Hens and Rieger [23] shed light over the
existence of market equilibria with heterogeneous CPT traders. Their results are partially
negative in the sense that CPT preferences are compatible with the absence of equilibria.
However, they were able to show the existence of an equilibrium with non-negative con-
straints on ﬁnal wealth and a continuum of agents in the market. We point out that in [23]
the market can only have a ﬁnite number of states. Another positive result comes from
the work of Barberis and Huang, [6], where the authors analytically prove under quite re-
strictive hypotheses that the well-known linear CAPM relations must hold in equilibrium.
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In particular, their assumptions concern homogeneous investors' preferences with power
value functions and jointly normally distributed stock returns. The interesting fact is that
they do not have to rely on numerical analysis and the equilibrium is derived very similarly
w.r.t. the classical case, where only EU maximizers can invest. A diﬀerent framework for
equilibrium analysis is given in [17] by Carlier and Dana, where the authors analyze a two
agents economy and prove the existence of an equilibrium based on eﬃcient risk-sharing
rules. Next, we mention the working paper by De Giorgi, Hens and Levy, [22], where it
is proved that in a multi-asset market with jointly normally distributed returns and het-
erogeneous CPT preferences a CAPM equilibrium exists. Finally, Azevedo and Gottlieb,
[5], assess non-existence of equilibria in a number of diﬀerent market contexts, e.g. in
a risk neutral monopoly, in an imperfect information monopoly and in a pure Bertrand
competition setting.
The question we address now is: are there equilibria in an economy where both EU
and CPT agents are present? This problem arises naturally as real world ﬁnancial markets
are nothing but a merging of the decisions of diﬀerent types of investors. Experimental
evidence by List [45] conﬁrms that experienced traders ﬁt well the EU paradigm, whereas
unexperienced traders are more subject to behavioral distortions when taking economic
decisions. Just as an example, they are much more aﬀected by the so called endowment
eﬀect and they are more reluctant to bargain. This is why we will look for equilibria where
CPT agents do not invest in risky assets at all.
Another reason to reject the hypothesis of solely EU investors in ﬁnancial markets comes
from the recent survey conducted by Eriksen and Kvaløy, [25], over a pool of ﬁnancial
advisors. As a surprising fact, they exhibited myopic loss aversion; nonetheless, when
compared to a sample of students, those specialized traders exhibited a greater myopic
loss aversion! Finally, the empirical work coming from Hwang and Satchell, [29], not
only conﬁrms a widespread loss aversion in UK and US ﬁnancial markets but even ﬁnds
higher loss aversion than previously expected and/or estimated. Besides this, they stress
that investors become far more loss averse during bull markets than during bear markets,
indicating their more profound disutility for losses when others enjoy gains.
Coming back to our question, our answer is fortunately positive. We are able to prove
the existence (and the robustness) of several types of equilibria in diﬀerent market models.
We remark that our approach distinguishes from the existing literature since we exploit
a game theoretical instead of a CAPM-like notion of equilibrium. For a survey on game
theory issues with CPT participants, we refer the reader to [49].
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2 we recover the setting of the CPT
portfolio choice by He and Zhou [27]; Section 3.3 explains their solution with a particular
attention over the power utility case and the violation of loss aversion. In Section 3.4 we
recall some theoretical results concerning the one-period model and we provide a sensitivity
analysis using numerical methods. Section 3.5 develops a model with a large EU investor,
a large CPT investor and an accommodating market maker, whereas in Section 3.6 the
market is made up of many EU and CPT agents. Finally, Section 3.7 concludes. Involved
proofs are presented in Section 3.8.
3.2 The uniperiodal model
Consider the problem of an investor who decides at time 0 how to allocate her wealth in
a given ﬁnancial market, supposing that the investment horizon is time T > 0 ﬁxed once
82
3.2. The uniperiodal model
for all. Speciﬁcally, let's suppose that the agent owns an initial wealth W0 and she is able
to invest in a risk-free bond which yields r (i.e., one unit of currency eventually returns
r units of currency at time T ) and in a risky asset which yields a random return R. We
further assume that the market is frictionless, short-selling is allowed and the investor has
no bounds on the level of debts that she can bear.
A fundamental (random) variable for such an agent is the stock total excess return,
namely R˜ := R − r; we suppose that the investor is aware of its c.d.f. F (·). From the
no-arbitrage rule (and in order to avoid a trivial model), we assume
0 < F (0) ≡ P{R ≤ r} < 1. (3.2.1)
Our investor is supposed to be a behavioral one, in the sense that she follows CPT theory
à la Kahneman and Tversky, [57], when distorting probabilities (through w±(·)) and when
evaluating her ﬁnal prospect value (through u±(·)) derived by the terminal wealth X (to be
deﬁned in a moment). Mathematically speaking, we will make the following assumptions,
which will be in force throughout this chapter.
Assumption 3.2.1. u±(·) : R+ → R+ are continuous, strictly increasing, strictly concave
and twice diﬀerentiable, with u±(0) = 0.
Assumption 3.2.2. w±(·) : [0, 1] → [0, 1] are non-decreasing and diﬀerentiable, with
w±(0) = 0, w±(1) = 1.
Turning back to the model, we assume that the reference wealth of our agent is ﬁxed
at a given level B ∈ R, hence a terminal position X greater than B has to be considered
as a gain, while it will be a loss in the opposite case. To better understand the underlying
meaning of this setting, we deﬁne x0 := rW0−B; that is, if the agent invest all her wealth
in the risk-free bond, then she will obtain rW0, therefore x0 represents the spread of the
reference point w.r.t. the riskless payoﬀ. In this way, x0 = 0 should be a parameter
commonly observed among householders; on the other hand, x0  0 will be related to
ambitious (or overconﬁdent) investors.
If the agent decides to invest θ units of currency in the risky asset, then her ﬁnal wealth
will be the random variable
X(x0, θ) = x0 +B + θ(R− r). (3.2.2)
According to the CPT paradigm, the ﬁnal value attached to this random variable is deﬁned
as
V (X) =
∫ +∞
B
u+(x−B) d[−w+(1− FX(x))]−
∫ B
−∞
u−(B − x) d[w−(FX(x))], (3.2.3)
where FX(·) is the c.d.f of X and the integral is in the Lebesgue-Stieltjes sense. By straight-
forward computations, one can easily check that (3.2.3) is reduced to a value function U(·)
which depends on θ; in particular, when θ = 0, we have
U(0) =
{
u+(x0) if x0 ≥ 0,
−u−(−x0) if x0 < 0.
(3.2.4)
Moreover, by changing variables, we obtain for θ > 0
U(θ) =
∫ +∞
−x0/θ
u+(θt+ x0) d[−w+(1− F (t))]−
∫ −x0/θ
−∞
u−(−θt− x0) d[w−(F (t))], (3.2.5)
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while for θ < 0 we have
U(θ) =
∫ −x0/θ
−∞
u+(θt+ x0) d[w+(F (t))]−
∫ +∞
−x0/θ
u−(−θt− x0) d[−w−(1− F (t))]. (3.2.6)
The problem of our agent will be:
max
θ∈R
U(θ). (P)
Before ending this section, we note that when there is no distortion, i.e. w±(·) = id(·),
then the value function U(·) is nothing but the common S-shaped utility function, concave
on gains and convex on losses.
3.3 The solution of the problem
In this section we report the results obtained in [27] in order to solve problem (P).1 In
general it is not possible to obtain explicit expressions; however, some reﬁnements are
available in the power value functions case and in the linear value functions case.
As a ﬁrst issue, well-posedness of the model needs to be proved. For this, we make the
following technical assumption.
Assumption 3.3.1 (Assumption 3, [27]). F (·) has a probability density function f(·).
Moreover, there exists 0 > 0 such that w
′±(1−F (x))f(x) = O(|x|−2−0), w′±(F (x))f(x) =
O(|x|−2−0) for |x| suﬃciently large and 0 < F (x) < 1.
Proposition 3.3.1 (Proposition 1, [27]). Under Assumption 3.3.1, U(θ) has a ﬁnite value
for any θ ∈ R, and U(·) is continuous on R.
We note that Assumption 3.3.1 is quite natural, albeit its technicality. Roughly speak-
ing, it expresses a link between the probability distortions of the agent and the underlying
market. To show that this hypothesis is generally unrestrictive, He and Zhou prove the
following result.
Proposition 3.3.2 (Proposition 2, [27]). If the stock return R follows a lognormal or
normal distribution, and w′±(x) = O(x−α), w′±(1 − x) = O(x−α) for suﬃciently small
x > 0 with some α < 1, then Assumption 3.3.1 holds for any 0 > 0.
As already checked in [27], the empirical estimates about w±(·) satisfy the assumption
of the previous proposition for a wide range of parameters' values. On the other hand, the
opposite case can easily occur for ad hoc choices of the same parameters.
The next step is trying to avoid the ill-posedness of the model; unfortunately, this is a
quite hard issue and a full characterization of the well-posedness has not been obtained.
However, a lot can be said about Problem (P) if we rely on the quantity
k := lim
x→+∞
u−(x)
u+(x)
≥ 0, (3.3.1)
assuming that the limit exists. This quantity k is also called large-loss aversion degree
(LLAD for short) and it serves as a measure of the willingness of the agent to bear huge
1We cite the assumptions and results by He and Zhou using the numbering of their working paper
instead of [27]. This is because we became aware of the published version [27] only after the drafting of
this chapter. We apologize for possible misunderstandings.
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losses against huge gains. It is straightforward to see that k = 0 indicates a pleasure for a
substantial gain greater than the pain for a loss of the same magnitude, whereas k = +∞
stands for the opposite case. One of the main ﬁndings in [27] is
Theorem 3.3.1 (Theorem 1, [27]). We have the following conclusions:
(i) If k = +∞, then lim|θ|→+∞ U(θ) = −∞, and consequently Problem (P) is well-posed.
(ii) If k = 0, then Problem (P) is ill-posed.
The remaining case, i.e. when k ∈ (0,+∞) is more intriguing and involving. Moreover,
many of the commonly used value functions u±(·) satisfy this conditions, which amounts
to say that the two value functions increase at the same speed. Therefore this case needs
a special attention and new statistics need to be computed. In particular, we have
Lemma 3.3.1 (see Lemma 3, [27]). Assume
lim
x→+∞
u+(tx)
u+(x)
= g+(t), lim
x→+∞
u−(tx)
u−(x)
= g−(t), ∀ t ≥ 0; (3.3.2)
then the following statistics
a1 :=
∫ +∞
0
g+(t) d[−w+(1− F (t))], (3.3.3)
a2 :=
∫ 0
−∞
g−(−t) d[w−(F (t))], (3.3.4)
b1 :=
∫ 0
−∞
g+(−t) d[w+(F (t))], (3.3.5)
b2 :=
∫ +∞
0
g−(t) d[−w−(1− F (t))], (3.3.6)
are well-deﬁned and strictly positive. If, in addition, 0 < k < +∞, then g+(t) ≡ g−(t).
Now deﬁne the critical value
k0 := max
(
a1
a2
,
b1
b2
)
. (3.3.7)
Thanks to the previous lemma, He and Zhou are able to prove the following well-posedness
result.
Theorem 3.3.2 (Theorem 2, [27]). Assume that 0 < k < +∞, limx→+∞ u+(x) = +∞,
and limx→+∞
u+(tx)
u+(x)
= g(t) ∀ t ≥ 0. We have the following conclusions:
(i) If k > k0, then lim|θ|→+∞ U(θ) = −∞, and consequently Problem (P) is well-posed.
(ii) If k < k0, then either limθ→+∞ U(θ) = +∞ or limθ→−∞ U(θ) = +∞, and conse-
quently Problem (P) is ill-posed.
We observe that the statistics a1, a2, b1, b2 are generalized Choquet expectations of
some functional of the random variable R. Their economical interpretation is quite clear in
the power value functions case as well in the exponential value functions case, in that they
represent distorted preference criteria of the agent w.r.t. huge investment or short-selling in
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the risky asset. The comparison among the values of k and k0 thus explains if the investor
is relatively more attracted by the risk-free asset (and therefore she will choose null stock
investment) or by the risky asset (which in turn leads to ill-posedness). The case k = k0 is
mathematically more subtle but at the same time it is economically quite unrealistic, so it
is not investigated further in [27].
To conclude this section concerning the solution in the general case, we remark that a
detailed analysis can be carried on the sensitivity of the value function U(·) near θ = 0
and its asymptotic properties as θ → ±∞. In particular, one can show that the value
function U(·) has a diminishing marginal value if the value functions u±(·) do. Moreover,
if lim|θ|→+∞ U(θ) = −∞ and limx→+∞ u′±(x) = 0, then U(·) is globally non-concave and
non-convex. This results implies that duality theory or global optimization can not be
exploited here.
3.3.1 The power value functions case when the reference wealth coin-
cides with the risk-free return
Let us suppose that our behavioral investor possesses power value functions, i.e. u+(x) =
xα, u−(x) = k−xβ with k− > 0 and 0 < α, β ≤ 1. We recall that in [57] an empirical study
showed α = β = 0.88. Moreover we assume that the adjusted reference wealth x0 is null;
as already observed, this may be common among ordinary householders. In such a case,
we can explicitly solve problem (P).
Theorem 3.3.3 (Theorem 3, [27]). Assume x0 = 0 and that the value functions are of the
power type. We have the following conclusions:
(i) If α > β, or α = β and k− < k0, then (P) is ill-posed.
(ii) If α = β and k− > k0, then the only optimal solution to (P) is θ∗ = 0.
(iii) If α = β and k− = k0 = a1/a2, then any θ∗ ≥ 0 is optimal to (P).
(iv) If α = β and k− = k0 = b1/b2, then any θ∗ ≤ 0 is optimal to (P).
(v) If α < β, then the only optimal solution to (P) is
θ∗ =

[
1
k−
α
β
a1
a2
] 1
β−α
if aβ1/a
α
2 ≥ bβ1/bα2 ,
−
[
1
k−
α
β
b1
b2
] 1
β−α
if aβ1/a
α
2 < b
β
1/b
α
2 .
(3.3.8)
We end by noting that from the proof of the previous theorem it is immediate to show
that in cases (ii), (iii) and (iv), the optimal value of Problem (P) is U(0) = 0, whereas in
case (v) it is given by
U(θ∗) =

k
− α
β−α
−
[(
α
β
) α
β−α
−
(
α
β
) β
β−α
][
aβ1
aα2
] 1
β−α
if aβ1/a
α
2 ≥ bβ1/bα2 ,
k
− α
β−α
−
[(
α
β
) α
β−α
−
(
α
β
) β
β−α
][
bβ1
bα2
] 1
β−α
if aβ1/a
α
2 < b
β
1/b
α
2 .
(3.3.9)
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3.3.2 Loss averse investors violating loss aversion
The parameter k− which appears in Section 3.3.1 in the particular choice of u−(·) is usually
referred to as loss aversion coeﬃcient. The original idea which underlies this deﬁnition
is that losses loom larger than gains, [36]. Unfortunately, this concept is systematically
violated for every choice of k− ≥ 1 whenever we assume an S-shaped value function of the
power type with α < β. To see this, let x represent the deviation from the reference point
of our investor. Now we can note that
V (x) = u+(x) = x
α, V (−x) = u−(x) = k−xβ, ∀ x ≥ 0.
Thus, a loss is more unpleasant than a gain of the same magnitude if and only if V (−x) ≥
V (x) for x > 0. Now, assuming α < β and setting ζ := k
1
α−β
− , by reversing the previous
inequality we ﬁnd that
Loss aversion violated ⇐⇒ 0 < x < ζ. (3.3.10)
Besides this, it is not clear at all which exact value can be represented by ζ. For example,
if k− = 1, then we have ζ = 1 independently of α and β. But 1 can represent 1 unit of
currency, or 1 billion units of currency! 2
As a consequence, the naming loss aversion coeﬃcient is by no doubt misleading. As
Bernard and Ghossoub point out in [11], Section 2.1, loss aversion should be a behavioral
concept in the sense that the comparison between the pain associated with a loss and the
pleasure connected to a gain should take into account behavioral quantities, e.g. probability
distortions. Therefore, the choice of a speciﬁc value, namely k−, attached to the value
function for losses u−(·) is unable to fully explain the loss aversion of an agent and hence
it is clearly a simplifying assumption.
Secondly, we do not have to forget that a generic utility function u(·) (in our case both
u+(·) and u−(·)) has an ordinal nature and not a cardinal nature, as it reﬂects a speciﬁc
preference ordering. As it is important to stress the independence of u(·) on the magnitude
of the terminal wealth, the same should be true if we consider u+(·) and the magnitude of a
gain or u−(·) and the magnitude of a loss. On the contrary, power value functions constrain
loss aversion only over the interval [ζ,+∞), thus leaving our agent the possibility to cheat
on her own loss aversion. A conﬁrm of this unpleasant fact comes from the analysis of the
results in our Theorem 3.3.3 (or Theorem 3 in [27]):
(i) being (P) ill-posed, loss aversion is violated by deﬁnition. More precisely, in the
case α > β equation (3.3.10) says that violation occurs if our agent selects θ∗ > ζ;
but this is indeed true as limθ→+∞ U(θ) = +∞. A similar phenomenon happens if
α = β and k− < k0. Just as an example, if w+(·) ≡ w−(·) and F (·) is the symmetric
c.d.f. of a centered random variable, i.e. F (t) = 1 − F (−t) ∀ t ≥ 0, then we have
k0 = 1. Thus, k− < 1 ensures violation;3
(iii) by the relation (3.3.10), we have violation whenever a1a2 < 1 and θ
∗ > 0 is chosen;
case (iv) is analogous;
2We can even show that loss aversion is violated whenever α = β and k− < 1 or α > β and x > ζ.
3Things can get even worse if F (·) has a positive skewness; see Section 3.4 and equation (3.3.3) in
particular.
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(v) using (3.3.8) in the case aβ1/a
α
2 ≥ bβ1/bα2 and (3.3.10), we see that
Loss aversion violated ⇐⇒ θ∗ < ζ ⇐⇒ a1
a2
<
β
α
. (3.3.11)
It is important to stress that the previous condition does not depend on k−, the so
called loss aversion coeﬃcient! In particular, whenever a1 ≤ a2 we have violation, as
β is supposed to be greater than α. Not only, we can note that the greater is β/α,
the more probably a violation happens. Even the following easy example shows how
frequent a violation can be.
Example 3.3.1. Assume 0 < α < β ≤ 1, a null risk-free rate of return, i.e. r = 1, and a
stock excess return normally distributed, namely R ∼ N (µ, σ2). It is easy to see that we
have
F (t) = N
(
t− µ+ 1
σ
)
,
where N (·) is the c.d.f. of a standard Gaussian random variable. Let's now ﬁx the expected
stock return, µ = 1.02, and its standard deviation, σ = 0.5. Furthermore, we suppose that
our behavioral investor possesses probability distortions of the Kahneman-Tversky type,
i.e.
w+(p) =
pγ
[pγ + (1− p)γ ]1/γ
, w−(p) =
pδ
[pδ + (1− p)δ]1/δ
, (3.3.12)
with γ = δ = 0.65 as obtained in laboratory experiments.
Thanks to the hypothesis w+(·) ≡ w−(·) and the skewness of F (·), it is immediate
to see that the condition aβ1/a
α
2 ≥ bβ1/bα2 is indeed fulﬁlled. At this point, it remains to
numerically compute the statistics a1 and a2 in order to verify when (3.3.11) is assured. For
a better graphical representation, we computed the quantity z := αβ
a1
a2
; it is straightforward
to check that loss aversion violation is now equivalent to z < 1. Results are shown in Figure
3.1. In particular, in the left-side plot we depicted a surface representing the value of z; for
the sake of clarity, we also reported the vertical plane α = β. Restricting our attention to
the half part with α < β, it is immediate to see that z < 1 is the most common situation,
unless the discrepancy β − α is eﬀectively small. More evidently, the right-side plot of
Figure 3.1 shows the curve given by the intersection between the 3D-surface of z and the
plane z = 1. Ignoring the half-plane with α > β, we can see that only the shaded area
corresponds to a CPT agent who does not violate. Hence, our supposed loss averse agent
can (and often do) violate her own so called loss aversion in order to reach her maximal
prospect value.
To conclude, if we wish to retain the power value functions assumption, we inevitably
have to abandon the belief of being modeling a loss averse agent. Alternatively, we can
modify our concept of loss aversion using a diﬀerent measure for this phenomenon which
undoubtedly aﬀects real economic decisions; see e.g. [39]. As we are not discussing the
best way to model loss aversion, neither if power value functions are able to capture actual
investors' behavior, we continue to use this particular paradigm, paying particular attention
when selecting the parameters α, β and k−, which we will continue to denote as the loss
aversion coeﬃcient.
88
3.4. A sensitivity analysis on the stock return
Figure 3.1: Violation regions of loss aversion in the CRRA case with 0 < α < β ≤ 1 and
Kahneman-Tversky type distortion functions.
3.4 A sensitivity analysis on the stock return
We now address the following question: what happens if another agent possesses diﬀerent
information about the stock return? More precisely, let us suppose that in the same market
as in Section 3.2 a new investor (we will refer to her as to D-agent) disagrees on the risky
asset terminal return distribution; to her, this return is represented by the random variable
RD, so that the stock total excess return is R˜D := RD − r. For such an agent, the c.d.f. of
R˜D will be indicated as FD(·) and its density as fD(·); moreover, we still assume that the
no-arbitrage rule is valid for the D-agent, i.e. 0 < FD(0) < 1.
In order to produce sensible comparisons, we imagine that D-agent's value functions u±(·)
are identical to those of N-agent4, as well as their probability distortions w±(·), their
respective initial wealths W0 and their reference wealths B. Now, it is straightforward to
extend every previous result to this new case just by substituting the updated parameters
RD, FD(·) in the explicit expressions early obtained5; in what follows, the variables for
D-agent will be accompanied by the superscript D.
We state from the beginning that the following results will be in part negative ones,
that is we are going to show that overall robustness is not a feature of this model (and of
course of similar models as the one in [6]). However, this is not a critique addressed to
CPT, neither to the mathematical setting which stands behind this approach. Actually,
this is just something that should make us reﬂect more accurately on the human behavior
and its delicate structure. We also remark that general results can hardly be obtained, due
to the great complexity of Problem (P) and its lack of global concavity/convexity.
4Thus the LLAD for D-agent is the same as for N-agent.
5We must not forget to check the validity of Assumption 3.3.1 with the new c.d.f. and probability
density; however this will be an easy task as in our examples we only carry slight changes.
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3.4.1 CPT and First Order Stochastic Dominance
As Kahneman and Tversky pointed out in [57], one of the main advantages of CPT w.r.t.
to the earlier Prospect Theory is the fact that this preference structure is compatible with
First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD hereafter). In other words, if a portfolio/ﬁnancial
position (strictly) ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates another portfolio, then the CPT value
of the ﬁrst one is (strictly) greater than that of the second one. Within their restricted
settings, this result is also proved in [6], Proposition A1, and in [11], Proposition 4.4.
From the point of view of our D-agent, a similar situation can be modeled assuming that
there exists an a.s. non negative random variable  such that RD = R + . In such a case
it is straightforward to see that FD(t) ≤ F (t) ∀ t ∈ R. Note that  is not required to be
neither independent nor comonotonic w.r.t. R. Under suitable technical conditions we can
prove the following relations.
a1 ≤ aD1 , a2 ≥ aD2 , b1 ≥ bD1 , b2 ≤ bD2 , (3.4.1)
where aD1 :=
∫ +∞
0 g+(t) d[−w+(1−FDT (t))] and the other statistics for D-agent are deﬁned
similarly. To see this fact, simply note that using integration by parts we can write
aD1 =
[−g+(t)w+(1− FDT (t))]t=+∞t=0 + ∫ +∞
0
g′+(t)w+(1− FD(t)) dt.
Now, the conclusion a1 ≤ aD1 is obvious if the boundary term in the previous integration by
part formula vanishes; but this is indeed true in the most common cases. Only to mention a
few, one can think to the power value functions case or the linear value functions case with
normally or lognormally distributed stock returns and the probability distortion empirically
estimated in [57]. Finally, the other relations can be proved analogously.
At this point we are able to compute the critical value for D-agent, namely
kD0 = max
(
aD1
aD2
,
bD1
bD2
)
.
We thus see that if k = 0 (recall that the LLAD is the same for the two agents) the
maximization problem is ill-posed for both types of investor. Otherwise, if k = +∞, then
we have well-posedness in both cases but it remains an open problem to ﬁnd the optimal
solutions θ∗ and θD∗. Finally, if the hypothesis of Theorem 3.3.2 are fulﬁlled then:
- if k0 = a1/a2, then the relations (3.4.1) imply kD0 ≥ k0, thus leading to a more
probable ill-posedness for D-agent's problem;
- if k0 = b1/b2, then we can have kD0 R k0 (see Example 3.4.1).
We remark that every result depends on the hypothesis  ≥ 0 a.s.; in fact, such a situation
reﬂects a certain higher return of the risky asset, which is exploitable only by those agents
who are a priori willing to acquire a long position in the stock; obviously, symmetric
conclusions are valid if we suppose  ≤ 0 a.s..
Example 3.4.1. If we assume the same setting of Section 3.3.1 we are able to prove an
analogous of Theorem 3.3.3. It is interesting to note that cases (iii) and (iv) are not robust
at all, in the sense that it suﬃces a slight change of the c.d.f. to jump from these cases
to (i) or (ii). Moreover, it is quite simple to build a numerical example where N-agent's
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parameters place her in case (ii) (thus well-posedness with null risky investment), whereas
D-agent fulﬁlls the conditions of case (i) (thus her problem is ill-posed). In particular, let's
choose the same preference parameters as in [57] with the empirically observed values, i.e.
α = β = 0.88, k− = 2.25 and probability distortions of the Kahneman-Tversky type (see
equation (3.3.12)) with γ = 0.61 and δ = 0.69. On the other hand, the market parameters
are r = 1.02, R ∼ N (µ, σ2) with µ = 1.10 and σ = 1; ﬁnally D-agent takes her investment
decisions aﬀording on RD = R + , with a constant  = 0.40. Economically speaking, the
risky asset return is normally distributed and it has a higher expected value than the risk-
free bond (a possible explanation could be found in the Equity Premium puzzle, see [48]);
moreover, D-agent is sure that the excess return is not µ− r = 0.08, but µ− r +  = 0.48!
With these choices, it is easy to see that g+(t) ≡ g−(t) = tα ∀ t ≥ 0. Moreover, we can
compute the following statistics:
a1 = 0.534, a2 = 0.455, b1 = 0.474, b2 = 0.522.
It follows that k0 = a1/a2 = 1.174 < k−; thanks to the positivity of , it is suﬃcient to
compute aD1 and a
D
2 in order to obtain k
D
0 . In particular, we have
aD1 = 0.706, a
D
2 = 0.312.
Therefore, kD0 = 2.26 > k−, which implies ill-posedness for D-agent.
Next, we show that if k0 = b1/b2, then we can have kD0 R k0 depending on the magnitude
of a constant  > 0. In particular, we retain the previous assumptions for u±(·) and w±(·)
whereas we change the market parameters, which are now set to r = 1.10, µ = 1.05, σ2 = 1;
at the same time, we let  vary. Now it is immediate to see that for  = 0 we obtain the
statistics a1, a2, b1, b2, while those for D-agent depend on . To better understand this
fact, see the plot in Figure 3.2.
The upward sloping curve is the ratio a1()/a2(), whereas the downward sloping one
is the ratio b1()/b2(). It is clear that we have
k0 ≡ k0(0) = b1(0)
b2(0)
= 1.119,
which is represented by the left-most point in the graph. Then we see that
kD0 =

b1()
b2()
if  ≤ 0.050,
a1()
a2()
if  > 0.050,
where for  = 0.050 there is the only crossing point between the curves a1()/a2() and
b1()/b2(). Moreover, we have kD0 ≤ k0 for  ≤ 0.100 and vice versa for  > 0.100, which
is the crossing point between a1()/a2() and the horizontal line k0 = 1.119. Finally, the
right-most point shows that we can have ill-posedness for suﬃciently high .
We are aware of the fact that this is an ad hoc construction and that it is very far
from reﬂecting real world markets; however, this ﬂaw of the model should be a stimulus to
improve it.
Example 3.4.2. In case (v) of Theorem 3.3.3 it is even possible to explicitly evaluate
the diﬀerence between the optimal values of the two agents. More speciﬁcally, we assume
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Figure 3.2: Sensitivity of kD0 depending on the excess return .
α < β, RD = R+  for some a.s. non negative random variable  and aβ1/a
α
2 ≥ bβ1/bα2 . Note
that we have
aβ1
aα2
≥ b
β
1
bα2
⇒ a
Dβ
1
aDα2
≥ b
Dβ
1
bDα2
,
thanks to the relations (3.4.1). Now, it follows immediately that θ∗ ≤ θD∗ as
θ∗ =
[
1
k−
α
β
a1
a2
] 1
β−α
, θD∗ =
[
1
k−
α
β
aD1
aD2
] 1
β−α
. (3.4.2)
Moreover, we can evaluate the diﬀerence between the prospect values as
UD(θD∗)− U(θ∗) = k−
α
β−α
−
[(
α
β
) α
β−α
−
(
α
β
) β
β−α
](aDβ1
aDα2
) 1
β−α
−
(
aβ1
aα2
) 1
β−α
 , (3.4.3)
which is always greater than 0 6.
However, we now show with a numerical example the not so surprising fact that this
diﬀerence of prospect values can be negative even if  is a.s. non negative. This result is
linked to the strong dependence of CPT w.r.t. the skewness of the stock excess return; see
Section III in [6] and Section 5 in [11].
We assume α = 0.5, β = 0.9 and no probability distortion, i.e. w±(·) = id(·). The market
parameters now are r = 1.10 and the risky asset return is normally distributed with mean
µ = 1.05 and variance σ2 = 1; ﬁnally we suppose a constant  = 0.01. In such a case we
compute
a1 = 0.390, a2 = 0.422, b1 = 0.433, b2 = 0.374,
aD1 = 0.394, a
D
2 = 0.417, b
D
1 = 0.428, b
D
2 = 0.378,
so that
aβ1
aα2
<
bβ1
bα2
,
aDβ1
aDα2
<
bDβ1
bDα2
,
bDβ1
bDα2
<
bβ1
bα2
.
6UD(·) is the value function of D-agent, which is obviously deﬁned analogously to U(·), simply by
substituting for FD(·) instead of F (·).
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It is now straightforward to see that for both agents it is optimal to short-sell the risky
asset; moreover, N-agent chooses an optimal θ∗ which is greater (in absolute value) than
θD∗; this in turn implies U(θ∗) > UD(θD∗) (see equation (3.4.3)) as we wanted.
3.4.2 CPT and Second Order Stochastic Dominance
The construction we used at the end of the previous example to obtain a negative prospect
value variation strongly relies on the relation r > µ. To better understand this fact, it
is important to analyze the relation between CPT decision making and the Second Order
Stochastic Dominance (SOSD hereafter) criterium. Loosely speaking, an EU investor whose
preferences satisfy SOSD always selects the lowest variance portfolio among a class of
admissible ones, as long as their mean value remains the same7. A fundamental result
which links CPT and SOSD is Proposition A2 in [6]. We now frame it adapting their
notation to ours.
Proposition 3.4.1 (Proposition A2, [6]). Let the ﬁnal wealths X1 and X2 be given and
assume the following:
- the value functions are of the power type with α = β, α ∈ (0, 1], k− > 1 and x0 = 0;
- the probability weightings are of the Kahneman-Tversky type (as in equation (3.3.12))
with γ = δ, δ ∈ (0.28, 1) and α < 2δ;
- E[X1] = E[X2] ≥ 0;
- X1 and X2 are symmetrically distributed;
- X1 and X2 satisfy the single-crossing property, so that if P1 and P2 are their respective
c.d.f., there exists z such that P1(x) ≤ P2(x) for x < z and P1(x) ≥ P2(x) for x > z.
Then V (X1) ≥ V (X2) and the inequality holds strictly whenever the single-crossing property
is strictly satisﬁed for some x.
Brieﬂy, the proof of this result strongly depends on most of the hypothesis and it is
based on the fact that the value of a generic prospect X can be written as
V (X) = c(a1 − k−a2),
for a suitable constant c, which in turn can be shown to be negatively dependent w.r.t. a
mean-preserving spread. In particular, if we remove the hypothesis α = β then the SOSD
is deﬁnitely lost, as Bernard and Ghossoub note in their Remark 4.2, [11]. Finally, we recall
that the bound δ ∈ (0.28, 1) is necessary to have strictly increasing probability distortions
over [0, 1].
3.5 An equilibrium model with one EU and one CPT agent
In this section we are going to build, in a game theoretical fashion, a one period equilibrium
model of a single risky asset market where one classical EU agent and one behavioral
CPT agent interact. More precisely, we have in mind an hypothetical situation where
7It is well-known that this is only a consequence (and not a characterization) of SOSD; see Proposition
4.1.2 in [7].
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a non-strategic market maker is willing to buy (or sell) any desired amount of shares
from these two investors; at the same time, the demand level for the stock will aﬀect its
equilibrium yield which in turn will inﬂuence the equilibrium price. We denote with θB
and θC the proportions of wealth invested in shares by the behavioral and the classical
investors respectively; moreover, we suppose that the initial endowments of these agents
are normalized with WB0 = W
C
0 = 1, therefore θB and θC also represent absolute levels
of wealth. As it will be clear by the subsequent analysis, this can be done without loss of
generality for the classical agent in that her maximization problem which has to be solved
later is independent of her initial wealth. On the contrary, the behavioral investor's policy
can be seriously aﬀected by her initial endowment, as her strategy depends on the adjusted
reference wealth level x0; however our opinion is that it seems reasonable to suppose a
common starting wealth equal to 1 (see also the following assumptions and the subsequent
observations).
It is now important to stress that, if not otherwise stated, we impose leverage as well
as short-selling constraints on strategies, i.e. θB ∈ [0, 1] and θC ∈ [0, 1]. On one hand, this
will allow us to make easier computations; on the other hand, in some cases the equilibrium
itself will avoid such a kind of behavior. To be more precise, we will return on this issue
later, when analyzing the strategies of our investors.
Now let's specify the market structure and the preferences of our agents.
Assumption 3.5.1 (Market structure).
- There is a risk-free asset (bond) with null return, i.e. r = 1;
- There is single risky asset (stock) with a normally distributed return R ∼ N (µˆ, σˆ2), where
µˆ = µ(θB, θC) = µ+ (θB + θC), (3.5.1)
σˆ2 = σ2(θB, θC) = σ
2 + η(|θB|+ |θC |). (3.5.2)
The parameters' ranges are as follows:
µ ∈ [1,+∞),  ∈ [0,+∞), σ ∈ (0,+∞), η ∈ [0,+∞). (3.5.3)
We used the symbol µ (σ) to denote both the drift (volatility) impact function and
the constant which appears in that expression; however, we hope that this will cause no
notation problems in what follows.
Some remarks about the previous assumptions are now in order. First of all, r = 1 can be
imposed without loss of generality as the only important variable is the excess of return of
the stock, namely µˆ− r. As µ ≥ 1 and  ≥ 0, it turns out by (3.5.1) that this return spread
is always positive as long as we admit only non negative demand levels. Note that this fact
is also empirically observed in long-term analysis, as the Equity Premium puzzle conﬁrms;
see [48] or [10]. Secondly, a Gaussian distribution of the stock return implicitly makes some
simpliﬁcation when solving maximization problems (just recall the close connection between
normally distributed asset returns and the mean-variance portfolio selection criterion).
Obviously, the absolute values which appear in the volatility impact function (3.5.2) are
not necessary if short-selling is not allowed. Moreover, the parameters  and η should not
be too big w.r.t. µ and σ2 respectively. In fact, a higher value of  would naturally lead
to a higher investment level in the stock caused by the FOSD property shared by both
agents; without imposing short-selling, this could lead to an ill-posed model in the sense
that traders have convenience to invest more and more in the risky asset to self-boost its
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expected return. On the other hand, a higher risky investment also raises volatility which
negatively aﬀects the demand levels for risk-averse agents. In conclusion, the interaction
of these impact functions should generate a natural trade-oﬀ between risky and non-risky
investment.
We stress the fact that the choice of such impact functions, which are obviously unreal-
istic, is for computational convenience. However, a linear impact function on the drift has
also been used in an insider trading inﬂuenced market in [41] and in an optimal liquidation
problem in [54], only to mention a few8. From a theoretical point of view, volatility im-
pact has sometimes been avoided, as it causes severe problems when analyzing equilibrium
models or optimal trading/liquidation strategies with the presence of large traders; see for
example [20] or [41]. On the contrary, some authors allow for an endogenous volatility ([14]
and [50]) and the excess volatility puzzle documented by Shiller in [56] induced us to add
the impact function (3.5.2), where the exogenous constant σ2 represents the volatility in-
duced by noise trading. Summarizing, the two agents are partially price taker, as µˆ and σˆ2
have an exogenous and an endogenous component too. This feature should give our model
the ﬂavor of a ﬁnancial market where the interaction of many small traders is summed
up by the presence of a market maker who provides exogenous parameters, plus two large
traders who are able to inﬂuence the terminal return and the terminal price of the shares.
Assumption 3.5.2 (CARA classical agent). The classical agent's utility function is
uC(x) = 1− exp(−x), (3.5.4)
where the Constant Absolute Risk Aversion coeﬃcient is set to 1.
Note that we could even choose a more general form like uC(x) = 1− exp(−λx), where
λ is the CARA coeﬃcient. In this case, a higher λ implies a more risk-averse agent; for the
moment we shall set λ = 1 as a normalization assumption.
Assumption 3.5.3 (CRRA behavioral agent). The behavioral agent has the following
value functions:
u+(x) = x
α, u−(x) = k−xβ, (3.5.5)
with α, β ∈ (0, 1] and k− > 0. Moreover, her adjusted reference wealth level is x0 = 0 and
her probability weighting functions are of the Kahneman-Tversy type (see equation (3.3.12))
with γ, δ ∈ (0.28, 1).
We do not make further assumptions on the values of α, β, k−, γ and δ. Their values
will be speciﬁed later, depending on the type of equilibrium we wish to select. The pre-
vious hypothesis allows us to use the results of He and Zhou [27] recalled in Section 3.3.1
8In [41], equation (6.4), the linear impact is modeled over the price dynamics of the risky asset, while
we assume a linear impact over returns. However, their equation (6.4) gives
dS(t)
S(t)
= (µ+ bpi(t))dt+ σd−B(t),
where S(·) is the price of the risky asset, pi(·) is the portfolio of the large investor, B(·) is a standard
Brownian motion and d− denotes the forward stochastic integral w.r.t. B(·). We can now interpret the
previous equation as modeling the return of the stock where b can be replaced by our . Moreover, in [41]
it naturally appears the constraint 0 < b < σ2/2 and we remark that we obtained the same condition; see
Proposition 3.5.1 and the subsequent analysis.
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concerning the optimal policy of a behavioral agent. Furthermore, it is easily seen that
thanks to our assumptions, the terminal wealths of our agents can be expressed as
Xi = θi + (W
i
0 − θi)r = θiR+ (1− θi) = 1 + θi(R− 1), (3.5.6)
where i ∈ {B,C} and we recall that the distribution of the random variable R depends
on both θB and θC . These last two variables are those which need to be endogenously
determined by the maximizing policies of our agents; their values will in turn give us the
equilibrium stock return mean and variance as long as we consider the market parameters
µ, , σ2 and η be exogenously given.
3.5.1 Equilibria with no CPT agent's demand
As a ﬁrst (and simpler) case, we would like to ﬁnd some equilibria in which the optimal
policy for the CPT agent is not to invest in the risky stock. Such a type of anomalous
situation is interesting in that it should be a signal of extremely high loss aversion (if
not violated . . . ) and/or risk aversion, which in turn would induce our behavioral agent
to a completely safe investment in bonds; also recall that in [29] it was estimated a loss
aversion coeﬃcient, namely k−, much greater than usually expected. This could lead some
investors to exit the stock market during speciﬁc periods. A null risky investment could
also be the optimal strategy for a CPT agent who experiences a predominant endowment
eﬀect, leading her to avoid any potential loss.
In order to reach this kind of equilibria, we are going to exploit Theorem 3.3.3; in particular,
cases (ii), (iii) and (iv) are those which admit such an optimal strategy. We immediately
see that a necessary condition is to set α = β; moreover, we will suppose that our behavioral
investor's parameters are those empirically obtained in [57], i.e. α = β = 0.88, k− = 2.25,
and the weighting functions are of the Kahneman and Tversky type (see equation (3.3.12)),
which are assumed to be identical with a common exponent γ = 0.65. We remark that our
choice of k− is just to ﬁx ideas, as all the subsequent analytic results of this section will be
proved for every k− > 0. Let's also note that these values fulﬁll the conditions imposed by
Assumption 3.3.1, therefore we can use all the results of Section 3.3.
In what follows, the equilibrium values will be denoted with a ∗; thus our goal is to ﬁnd
equilibria with θ∗B = 0. It is easily seen that in equilibrium, the impact functions (3.5.1)
and (3.5.2) are only inﬂuenced by the classical agent's policy and they will be
µˆ∗ = µ+ θ∗C , σˆ
2∗ = σ2 + ηθ∗C . (3.5.7)
As our model is a game theoretical one, we remark the fact that, with our assumptions,
an equilibrium with θ∗B = 0 exists if and only if we are able to ﬁnd an optimal strategy
θ∗C which maximizes the expected utility for the classical agent given θ
∗
B = 0 and at the
same time the policy θB = 0 is the optimal one for the behavioral agent. But this is indeed
the case if for every θB ∈ [0, 1] we have k− > k0 ≡ k0(θB, θ∗C) (see Theorem 3.3.3, (ii)) or
k− = k0(θB, θ∗C) =
a1(θB ,θ
∗
C)
a2(θB ,θ
∗
C)
and we select θ∗B = 0 (see Theorem 3.3.3, (iii) and similarly
for case (iv), replacing a1 and a2 with b1 and b2 respectively). Unfortunately, this is not an
easy task as the critical statistic k0 has not an explicit representation; moreover, it depends
on the market parameters µ, , σ2, η and on the optimal strategy θ∗C too (which in turn
depends on the market parameters. . . ). Therefore, we are going to follow these steps:
Step 1 Solve the maximization problem for the classical agent with θB = 0, namely
max
θC∈[0,1]
UC(θC) ≡ max
θC∈[0,1]
E[uC(XC)] (3.5.8)
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in order to ﬁnd the candidate optimal strategies (if one exists) θ∗C(µ, , σ
2, η).
Step 2 Fix some or all parameters' values (possibly within reasonable ranges) and check
the optimality conditions of Theorem 3.3.3 to have θ∗B = 0.
If we succeed in solving the two steps, then we can try to enlarge as much as possible
the previous ranges in order to retain the selected equilibrium (θ∗B, θ
∗
C) = (0, θ
∗
C). Now,
the ﬁrst step can be easily implemented; we start by writing equation (3.5.8) explicitly,
substituting for UC(·) and XC and exploiting the normality of the return R:
max
θC∈[0,1]
∫
R
(1− exp (−(θCz + 1− θC))) 1√
2piσˆ
exp
{
−(z − µˆ)
2
2σˆ2
}
dz.
Now, replacing µˆ = µ + θC and σˆ2 = σ2 + ηθC and performing the Lebesgue integration
we obtain9
max
θC∈[0,1]
UC(θC) = max
θC∈[0,1]
1− exp
{
η
2
θ3C +
(
σ2
2
− 
)
θ2C + (1− µ)θC − 1
}
. (3.5.9)
Now, the structure of solution strongly depends on the choice η = 0 or not. The ﬁrst case
correspond to a null volatility impact, i.e. σˆ2 ≡ σ2 and computations are obviously easier.
The case with null volatility impact
Let's start by considering the case η = 0. We recall that the constant part of the drift is
µ ≥ 1 and we suppose a positive drift impact, i.e.  > 0 in order to avoid a trivial model.
Now, equation (3.5.9) is obviously simpliﬁed and the ﬁrst order conditions lead to
dUC
dθC
= 0 ⇐⇒ θC = µ− 1
σ2 − 2 .
Obviously, we have to suppose σ2 > 2; moreover, this solution is admissible if and only
if θC ∈ [0, 1]. By the fact µ ≥ 1, we have to assume the further condition σ2 ≥ 2 + (µ −
1). This inequality has a clear economical explanation, in that the exogenous volatility
parameter on the left-hand-side should be greater than an adjusted excess drift eﬀect on
the right-hand-side in order to discourage heavy risky investment. Moreover, in the special
case µ = 1 we have a null risk premium, which in turn leads to a null risky investment for
the EU agent. We also note that  = 0 reduces the model to a standard portfolio selection
and the optimal θC is nothing but the Sharpe ratio of the risky asset divided by its standard
deviation; recalling the classical Merton portfolio choice problem, µ−1
σ2
represent an index
of the performance of the risky investment.
With these hypotheses on the market parameters, we can set θ∗C =
µ−1
σ2−2 and this is
indeed a maximum, as the second order conditions give
d2UC
dθ2C
∣∣∣∣
θC=θ
∗
C
= − exp
{
− (µ− 1)
2
2(σ2 − 2) − 1
}
(σ2 − 2) < 0.
Note that θ∗C is increasing in both µ and  whereas it is decreasing in σ
2, as expected.
Now it's turn to ﬁnish Step 2, trying to show that θB = 0 can be optimal for the
behavioral agent. We have the following positive result.
9It can be easily shown that similar formula can be obtained if we allow W 0C and λ to take values
diﬀerent from 1; however, the initial wealth adds only a multiplicative factor and this has no inﬂuence over
the extreme points of (3.5.9), whereas λ 6= 1 involves the calculations as it aﬀects the risk-aversion of the
classical agent.
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Proposition 3.5.1. Assume η = 0. If (µ∗, ∗, σ2∗) are such that
σ2∗ > 2∗ ,
σ2∗ ≥ 2∗ + (µ∗ − 1) ,
k0
(
1, µ
∗−1
σ2∗−2∗
)
≤ k− ,
(3.5.10)
then there exists an equilibrium for every choice of (µ, , σ2) ∈ [1, µ∗]× (0, ∗]× [σ2∗,+∞).
Proof. See Section 3.8.
The intuition behind this result is the following: if we are able to ﬁnd a particular
triple (µ∗, ∗, σ2∗) such that it fulﬁlls all the conditions of (3.5.10), then we can even obtain
a non-zero Lebesgue measure set of parameters' values for which the equilibrium exists,
and this (mathematical) robustness property is very pleasant from the point of view of
an economist. In particular, we see that the ﬁrst two conditions in (3.5.10) are necessary
for the admissibility of the optimal θC , whereas the third inequality is the key to exploit
Theorem 3.3.3.
If the last inequality holds strictly, then we are selecting an equilibrium which is con-
ﬁrmed by Theorem 3.3.3, (ii); otherwise, if we have an equality, then we can apply case
(iii) of Theorem 3.3.3 imposing to the behavioral agent the choice θB = 0. However, we
remark that the second type of equilibrium is in fact an unrealistic one, as a very slight
change in market parameters would destroy it. Mathematically speaking, they are unsta-
ble equilibria; in particular, for them there is lack of robustness as we are lying on the
boundary of a subset of the 3-dimensional space (µ,,σ2). In both cases, we can compute
the equilibrium stock return R∗; this will be a random variable with Gaussian distribution
N (µˆ∗, σˆ2∗), where
µˆ∗ = µ∗ + ∗
(
µ∗ − 1
σ2∗ − 2∗
)
, σˆ2∗ = σ2∗,
and it is easily seen that µˆ∗ is increasing in both µ∗ and ∗ and decreasing in σ2∗.
We have now to rely on numerical analysis in order to ﬁnd our starting equilibrium triple
(µ∗,∗,σ2∗). We can ﬁx some of these three parameters and see what happens when letting
the other(s) vary. Before starting, we note that a value of  = 0.01 implies that if both
agents invest the totality of their respective wealths in the risky asset, then the equilibrium
expected return (if the equilibrium exists) increases by 2%; moreover, µ = 1.10 means
that investing in stocks provides an expected additional yield by 10% w.r.t. the risk-free
bond. Therefore, we choose to sensibly ﬁx the values µ∗ = 1.10 and ∗ = 0.01; from the no-
leverage condition for the EU agent, namely the second inequality of (3.5.10), we obtain the
constraint σ2∗ ≥ 0.12. A standard quadrature formula10 gave us k0(1, 1) = 1.7506 < 2.25.
Therefore, Proposition 3.5.1 suggests the following ranges:
µ ∈ [1, 1.10],  ∈ (0, 0.01], σ2 ∈ [0.12,+∞).
It is interesting to compute k0 as a function of σ 11; results are shown in Figure 3.3. First
of all we see that the right-most point corresponds to σ2 = 0.12; moreover k0(σ) ≥ 1 and
it is decreasing in the exogenous volatility, as we already saw in the proof of Proposition
10If not otherwise stated, we used the Simpson quadrature for the numerical approximation of our
integrals, as it revealed faster convergence w.r.t. adaptive method, such as the Lobatto quadrature method.
11We use σ and not σ2 in our graphics; therefore, its lower bound becomes
√
0.12 ≈ 0.346.
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Figure 3.3: Existence and σ-stability of the equilibrium with µ = 1.10,  = 0.01, η = 0.
3.5.1. Obviously, σ ≥ √0.12 guarantees the existence of the equilibrium; not only, we see
that an equilibrium would exist even for lower values (σ2 ≥ 0.068, which is identiﬁed by
the left-most point in the plot)12. An explanation of this fact is that allowing the classical
agent to exploit leverage, thus raising the expected return of the stock, is not suﬃcient to
induce a non-zero risky investment for the behavioral agent.
At this point we have seen the stability of the existence of the equilibrium when σ is
allowed to vary in a suitable range. What happens if we ﬁx just one parameter and let the
other two vary? Using graphical analysis, we obtain the following results.
- Figure 3.4, top-left plot : µ = 1.05. We can see that the equilibrium is surely
attainable as long as  takes reasonable values, even for very little volatilities; when 
becomes greater, we need to choose also greater σ. However, it seems that k0 steeply
decreases as the volatility increase.
- Figure 3.4, top-right plot :  = 0.01. Similar results are obtained when we held a
ﬁxed ; this time only very high drift values can destroy the equilibrium and this can
even be restored by choosing a moderate exogenous volatility.
- Figure 3.4, down-center plot : σ =
√
0.09. In this case a no-leverage equilibrium can
be obtained by properly selecting a trade-oﬀ between the constant drift µ and the
impact parameter .
The case with volatility impact
In this section we are going to see what are the main changes on the results previously
obtained if we allow for a positive impact on the volatility to be endogenously determined,
i.e. this time we have η > 0. The analysis for the classical agent in Step 1 can be carried
quite similarly, whereas diﬃculties arise in Step 2. First order conditions deduced from
12Low values of σ2 seem to be more realistic; just as an example, with µ = 1.05, σ2 = 0.09 implies a 20%
probability of observing a maximal ±7% excess return and a 90% probability of a maximal ±50%. On the
contrary, σ2 = 1 implies a 20% probability of a maximal ±25% excess return and a 90% probability of a
maximal ±165%!
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Figure 3.4: Existence and stability of the equilibrium depending on the market parameters.
equation (3.5.9) imply
dUC
dθC
= 0 ⇐⇒ θC = −(σ
2 − 2)±√(σ2 − 2)2 + 6η(µ− 1)
3η
,
where we implicitly suppose σ2 ≥ 2. As we do not allow short-selling, we have to imme-
diately discard the negative solution, thus the only candidate remains
θ∗C =
−(σ2 − 2) +√(σ2 − 2)2 + 6η(µ− 1)
3η
. (3.5.11)
Second order conditions show that
d2UC
dθ2C
∣∣∣∣
θC=θ
∗
C
= − exp {· · · }
√
(σ2 − 2)2 + 6η(µ− 1) < 0,
where the dots substitute a cumbersome expression. Note that µ = 1 again produces a
null risk premium, which implies an admissible θ∗C = 0; otherwise, we have to impose
further assumptions on the market parameters in order to have θ∗C ≤ 1. Straightforward
calculations show that the correct condition is
3η + 2
(
σ2 − 2− (µ− 1)) ≥ 0,
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which is equivalent to impose upper bounds on the drift parameters µ and  or lower bounds
on the volatility parameters σ2 and η; this conﬁrms once again economic intuition, as the
classical agent will avoid leverage when the market behaves normally. It is important to
stress the fact that we do not have to set any a priori condition over the parameters; the
previous inequality simply speciﬁes a coordination that our market must have to possibly
admit an equilibrium without leverage by the EU investor. We also note that this condition
is just a generalized version of the second inequality in (3.5.10); this time the additional
parameter η is taken into account. Finally, from (3.5.11) one can compute the derivatives
of θ∗C w.r.t. market parameters and it is easily seen that θ
∗
C is still increasing in both µ
and , whereas it is decreasing in both σ2 and η.
It remains to show that θB = 0 can be optimal for the behavioral agent. Proceeding
similarly to the previous case, we state the following result in the particular case of null
drift impact.
Proposition 3.5.2. Assume η > 0 and  = 0. If (µ∗, σ2∗, η∗) are such that3η
∗ + 2
(
σ2∗ − (µ∗ − 1)) ≥ 0 ,
k0
(
0,
−σ2∗+
√
(σ2∗)2+6η∗(µ∗−1)
3η∗
)
≤ k− ,
(3.5.12)
then there exists an equilibrium for µ = µ∗ and every choice of (σ2, η) ∈ (σ2∗,+∞) ×
[η∗,+∞).
Proof. See Section 3.8.
Apart the presence of η > 0, which obviously makes computations more diﬃcult, the
interpretation of Proposition 3.5.2 is similar to that of case η = 0. There are two main
diﬀerences which worth a deeper explanation. Firstly, the second inequality in (3.5.12)
contains k0 (0, θ∗C) instead of k0 (1, θ
∗
C); the reason is that now low investment values by
the CPT investor can violate the existence condition k0 ≤ k−. Secondly, once a particular
triple (µ∗, σ2∗, η∗) is found, then µ can not be arbitrarily lowered, as a variation of this
parameter increases the drift as well as the volatility(and this is also why we need  = 0).
Finally, the way to select the equilibrium is the same as explained in the case with null
volatility impact and the equilibrium stock return can be computed similarly. In particular,
we have
µˆ∗ = µ∗, σˆ2∗ =
2
3
σ2∗ +
1
3
√
(σ2∗)2 + 6η∗(µ∗ − 1),
and it is easily seen that the equilibrium volatility is increasing in µ∗, σ2∗ and η∗.
Graphical analysis shows in Figure 3.5 that, while keeping µ = 1.2 ﬁxed, the equilib-
rium existence condition (3.5.12) is fulﬁlled unless volatility parameters σ and/or η are
suﬃciently close to 0. Note that in this case the value of µ is exceptionally high; even if we
were not able to prove that k0 is increasing in µ, numerical simulations suggests that with
lower µ there would still be an equilibrium, even for lower σ and/or η. Similar surfaces can
be obtained if we ﬁx one of these two parameters; moreover, non-zero Lebesgue measure
sets of parameters which support the equilibrium can be easily computed.
At least, we turn back to the general case with  > 0 and η > 0. The technical problem
that arises now is the fact that there is no more a monotonic dependence of k0 in θB; to
see this, note that an increase in the behavioral agent's demand produces at the same time
greater endogenous drift and volatility. The resulting combined eﬀect is hard to estimate
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Figure 3.5: Existence and stability of the equilibrium depending on volatility parameters.
with analytical techniques; therefore, we will limit ourselves to numerical and graphical
analysis. First of all, let's set the market values as
µ = 1.05,  = 0.01, σ2 = 0.09, η = 0.3.
In such a case it is easy to represent k0 as a function of θB (recall that we are looking for
equilibria with θ∗B = 0; therefore, using game-theory jargon, the classical agent's optimal
strategy must be based on this conjecture). In particular we obtain Figure 3.6, from which
we see that the behavioral investor will indeed select θ∗B = 0 as long as she can not get
an approximate leverage of 740 times her initial wealth! Finally, a magniﬁcation of Figure
3.6 with θB ∈ [0, 1] shows that k0 is decreasing, thus conﬁrming the absence of global
monotonicity. With the previous parameters, it is easy to compute the equilibrium values
as
θ∗B = 0, θ
∗
C ≈ 0.265, µˆ∗ ≈ 1.05265, σˆ2∗ ≈ 0.1695. (3.5.13)
The classical agent will thus invest about a quarter of her wealth in stocks, whereas the
remaining amount is used to buy risk-less bonds.
At this point one can wonder if the parameters we selected are ad hoc; fortunately, the
answer seems to be: No. A possible way to show this is to ﬁx from time to time three of the
four parameters to the values appearing in (3.5.13) and see how k0 behaves depending on
the remaining free parameter and θB. Graphical analysis is provided in Figure 3.7, where
at a ﬁrst sight we see that the existence regions are wide in the sense that the equilibrium
can be sustained for non-negligible ranges.
- Figure 3.7, top-left plot : µ ∈ [1, 1.4],  = 0.01, σ2 = 0.09, η = 0.3. When µ is
allowed to vary, we numerically computed that for µ < 1.266 (i.e. more than 26%
expected excess return) the equilibrium always exists.
- Figure 3.7, top-right plot : µ = 1.05,  ∈ [0, 0.3], σ2 = 0.09, η = 0.3. Here  is the
free parameter and existence is guaranteed for  < 0.193, which is indeed a very high
value.
- Figure 3.7, down-left plot : µ = 1.05,  = 0.01, σ2 ∈ [0, 0.25], η = 0.3.
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Figure 3.6: Existence and stability of the equilibrium depending on the behavioral agent's
demand.
- Figure 3.7, down-right plot : µ = 1.05,  = 0.01, σ2 = 0.09, η ∈ [0, 1]. Finally,
and more interestingly, volatility parameters can even be arbitrarily small if we set
µ = 1.05 and  = 0.01. This can be explained analyzing the combined eﬀect of θB
over the drift and the volatility. On one hand, a growth in the expected return makes
risky investment more attractive; however, at the same time volatility increases and
the overall eﬀect on k0 is compensated (at least for θB ∈ [0, 1]). Furthermore, as the
classical agent's demand is decreasing in both σ2 and η and one of these volatility
parameters is kept ﬁxed (and strictly positive), we see that the equilibrium exists
even if we allow leverage for such investor. Not only, numerical estimates suggest
that the behavioral agent always prefers not to invest in the risky asset unless she
can exploit a huge leverage (see again Figure 3.6).
At this point we should make a step back. From the beginning of Section 3.5, we
assumed as given the preferences of our investors, letting the market adjust in order to
have equilibria. A natural question now is: what happens if those preferences change? Or,
which is equivalent, what if we wrongly estimated value function parameters or probability
distortions? In order to avoid another cumbersome graphical analysis and just to give
an idea, we performed calculations slightly changing some preference parameters and it is
not surprising at all that results are qualitatively the same and they quantitatively only
changed a few. To convince yourself, it would be suﬃcient to see what happens to the
critical statistics k0 if we make some perturbations.
First of all, changing α (or β, they must be equal) only aﬀects the magnitude of
a1(θB, θ
∗
C), a2(θB, θ
∗
C) and their ratio k0, not its shape. Secondly, we modiﬁed probability
distortions by choosing γ = 0.61 and δ = 0.69 in (3.3.12), as estimated in [57]. This time
we had an additional diﬃculty in that a1(θB, θ∗C) 6= b2(θB, θ∗C), a2(θB, θ∗C) 6= b1(θB, θ∗C)
and a1(θB, θ∗C) ≥ a2(θB, θ∗C) does not always hold. However, this was not very problematic
as the values of γ and δ were quite similar and they are not suﬃcient to heavily distort our
analysis.
Finally, we recall that one assumption was λ = 1 for the CARA utility function of the
classical agent; that was necessary in order to simplify calculations and comparisons. As
this coeﬃcient is a measure of risk aversion, we expect it to have a role similar to those of
σ2 or η; therefore, we now let it vary over (0,+∞). At ﬁrst, we have to solve Step 1 in a
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Figure 3.7: Existence and stability of the equilibrium with a free parameter.
more general version and this time the optimal strategy will depend on λ too. Choosing
, η > 0 and discarding the negative solution, we ﬁnd
θ∗C(λ, µ, , σ
2, η) =
−(λσ2 − 2) +√(λσ2 − 2)2 + 6λη(µ− 1)
3λη
.
Comparing the previous equation with (3.5.11), it is immediate to see that
θ∗C(λ, µ, , σ
2, η) = θ∗C(1, µ, , λσ
2, λη), ∀ λ ∈ (0,+∞).
Therefore, adding the parameter λ amounts to perform a positive homogeneous transfor-
mation over the volatility parameters. Obviously, second order conditions are still fulﬁlled
and the no-leverage constraint becomes
3λη + 2
(
λσ2 − 2− (µ− 1)) ≥ 0,
thus incorporating the same transformation. Straightforward calculations show that θ∗C is
decreasing in λ as expected; ﬁnally, graphical analysis over λ gives us the same qualitatively
results as the lower plots of Figure 3.7.
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Remark 3.5.1. Our analysis has been conducted under a no-leverage and a no-short selling
constraint. Removing the ﬁrst one, i.e. allowing θ∗B, θ
∗
C > 1, has no dramatic consequences.
In fact, by the side of the EU agent we just have to properly modify the ﬁrst inequality in
(3.5.12), whereas her optimal strategy remains unchanged. Therefore, in the case  = 0 the
argument that prove Proposition 3.5.2 is still valid; on the other hand, in the case  > 0
we can rely on Figure 3.6 which shows that the behavioral agent should be able to borrow
huge amounts of money13 in order to deviate from θ∗B = 0. Furthermore, some graphics we
provided also contain parameters' values that do not satisfy the no-leverage condition for
the classical agent and we observed that an equilibrium is still attainable.
We also note that the no-short selling constraint is substantially unbinding as long as
our investors are of the mean-variance type; loosely speaking, θB < 0 or θC < 0 would
decrease the drift and increase the volatility at the same time thanks to Assumption 3.5.1.
More speciﬁcally, a rapid look at equation (3.5.9) shows that allowing for negative θC would
simply add a modulus in the third degree term. By the second order conditions, this implies
a unique maximum point θ∗C > 0 for suitable choices of the market parameters satisfying
the ﬁrst inequality of (3.5.12) (or a diﬀerent inequality if we allow taking leverage). Given
this, the CPT agent would behave in the same way for θB ≥ 0; furthermore, she will
never choose a moderate θB < 0 under normal market conditions as she is substantially
a mean-variance maximizer; in fact, θB < 0 would produce lower expected return and
higher volatility. Finally, graphical analysis shows that for negative θB the shape of k0 is
qualitatively specular to that of Figure 3.6, thus she would short sell (if possible) only huge
amounts of the risky asset in order to manipulate the market.
3.5.2 Other equilibria
The remaining equilibria which are sustainable within our framework are those with θ∗B 6= 0.
With Assumption 3.5.3 and recalling Theorem 3.3.3, for the existence of such equilibria
it is necessary that the behavioral agent has preferences fulﬁlling cases (iii), (iv) or (v)14.
However, we already observed that the ﬁrst two cases possess undesirable features; in
particular, they are unstable and not realistic at all. Moreover, if we are looking for a non-
zero demand of the behavioral agent, there is an additional internal problem concerning
this kind of equilibrium. In fact, θB 6= 0 implies that θC depends on θB too; therefore, the
statistics a1, a2, b1 and b2 are diﬃcult to control in the sense that a little variation of one's
demand will surely destroy the equilibrium as k− = k0(θ∗B, θ
∗
C) is a necessary condition in
cases (iii) and (iv).
The same problem arises even in case (v), but it has diﬀerent consequences. Apart
from being computationally more diﬃcult, we see that if we assume α < β, then there can
be another source of ill-posedness; the explanation relies on the fact that we can not use
(3.3.8) to compute θ∗B. Actually, equation (3.3.8) can be exploited only if we have a1 and
a2 which do not depend on θB! In our case, those statistics are indeed inﬂuenced by the
demand level of the behavioral investor, therefore we have to use a diﬀerent argument in
order to ﬁnd the optimal θB. Moreover, we will show later that in many circumstances the
CPT agent has an incentive to invest as much as possible in the risky asset, i.e. θ∗B tends
13She would gamble using the wealth of someone else trying to manipulate the market . . .
14Imposing the no-short selling constraint, case (iv) is excluded and case (v) is allowed only with
a
β
1
aα2
≥ b
β
1
bα2
;
see equation (3.3.8). However, we will show that with our assumptions on the market structure, this
inequality is automatically satisﬁed.
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to explode, thus leading to an ill-posed problem if we do not impose some restrictions on
her leverage.
After this introductory discussion, let's specify well the hypothesis under which we will
work. We retain Assumption 3.5.1 on the market structure with the same parameters'
ranges if not otherwise stated and Assumption 3.5.2 on the CARA utility function of the
EU investor with λ = 1 as a normalization. Concerning our behavioral agent, there are
some important issues which deserve an explanation. We choose for her a typical S-shaped
power value function, this time with 0 < α < β ≤ 1, a loss aversion coeﬃcient k− = 1 and
probability distortions w+(·) and w−(·) of the Kahneman-Tversky type in (3.3.12), with
γ = δ = 0.65 as empirically estimated in [57].
Remark 3.5.2. As is known, in [57] the laboratory observations gave α = β = 0.88; however,
we must distort them in order to fulﬁll our assumptions. We also note that those values were
obtained analyzing a sample of students and not a pool of professional ﬁnancial investors.
Nonetheless, this values are prone to errors, as every estimation is; thus it is plausible to
observe diﬀerent CRRA coeﬃcients for gains and losses, expecially in real world ﬁnancial
markets. A conﬁrm comes from the paper by Hwang and Satchell [29], where the diﬀerence
β − α is estimated using US and UK market data. In particular, they ﬁnd the values 0.2
and 0.25 respectively; moreover, they suggest α = 0.7, β = 0.9 for the US investors and
α = 0.7, β = 0.95 for the UK investors.15 To begin, we will arbitrarily set α = 0.80 and
β = 0.95, as we expect them to be quite close each other and not so diﬀerent w.r.t. the
original estimates. Obviously, in what follows we shall also analyze the eﬀects that diﬀerent
values of those parameters have on the market equilibria.
Remark 3.5.3. Our arbitrary choice of k− = 1 serves as a normalization and it can be
convincingly motivated recalling our analysis contained in Section 3.3.2. In fact, with α < β
we saw that loss aversion violation can be a feature of this kind of models. Speciﬁcally,
this time we have ζ = 1, so that the violation range is given by (0, 1) for any choice of
0 < α < β ≤ 1. Within our setting, we note that a ﬁxed amount of money x represents
a deviation from the reference point which in our model was set as the risk-free return on
the initial wealth, namely WB0 r = 1. Therefore, any optimal terminal wealth XB ∈ (1, 2)
is the result of a violation happened during the maximization procedure of our CPT agent.
As expected, this condition will be veriﬁed with high probability and this phenomenon is
retained even if we change the value of k−. To explain this fact, let's choose a k− > 1 to ﬁx
ideas; consequently, ζ is reduced and the violation range shrinks but at the same time the
optimal demand level θ∗B is drastically reduced, as k− negatively aﬀects the prospect value
V (·) (see equation (3.2.3)). Hence, the ﬁnal wealthXB will be lower too and the probability
of a violation will still be elevated. In conclusion, letting k− vary only has quantitative
and not qualitative eﬀects on our equilibrium model. Nonetheless, analytical results of
this section have been proved for every choice of k− > 0, thus ensuring mathematical
correctness.
Another important issue concerns the constraints that we are going to impose on the
strategies of our agents. We will always admit only θB > 0 as we want to avoid market
manipulation with heavy short selling which could be exploited in order to reach equilibrium
return and volatility favorable to the CPT agent. At the same time, the no-leverage
constraint θB ≤ 1 is not imposed because one of our goals is to see what happens if she is
15In the light of Figure 3.1, we can not conclude that in real ﬁnancial markets we have a violation of loss
aversion. This is because we do not know what are the real probability distortions w+(·) and w−(·) and,
more importantly, stock excess return is not normally distributed.
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able to (moderately) borrow money from the bond market. However, an upper bound will
be ﬁxed to make the model sensible and it is sometimes necessary to have an equilibrium;
see Lemma 3.5.2. On the contrary, we are not imposing any restriction to the classical
agent, as they will be speciﬁed in time to time.
The equilibrium values (if they exist) will be denoted with a ∗, as usual. In particular,
if the investors select the pair (θ∗B, θ
∗
C), then we will have
µˆ∗ = µ+ θ∗B + θ
∗
C , σˆ
2∗ = σ2 + ηθ∗B + η|θ∗C |. (3.5.14)
Recalling the game theoretical nature of our model, to discover equilibria we shall imple-
ment the following procedure:
Step 1 Solve the maximization problem for the classical agent given any strategy θB of
the behavioral investor, namely
max
θC∈D
UC(θB, θC), (3.5.15)
where D ⊆ R is a suitable set of admissible strategies.
Let θ∗C(θB) := θ
∗
C(θB, µ, , σ
2, η) be a maximizer of (3.5.15), if one exists.
Step 2 Fix the market parameters (µ, , σ2, η) and for any θ∗C(θB) previously obtained,
solve the optimization problem for the behavioral agent, namely
sup
θB>0
V (XB (θB, θ
∗
C(θB))) , (3.5.16)
where the value function V (·) is given by (3.2.5) and the terminal wealth XB is given
by (3.5.6).
Step 3 If (3.5.16) actually is a maximum, then compute θ∗C(θ
∗
B), µˆ
∗ and σˆ2∗ in order to
obtain the equilibrium strategies and the equilibrium market parameters; else restrict
the set of admissible strategies for the CPT agent imposing a sensible upper bound
and solve (3.5.16) once more. If the sup in (3.5.16) is attained for θB ↓ 0, then there
are no equilibria.
Step 1 is not diﬃcult to implement as it is a generalization of its counterpart in the case
θ∗B = 0. Performing similar calculations, we see that (3.5.15) is equivalent to
max
θC∈D
1− exp
{
η
2
|θC |3 +
(
σ2
2
− + η
2
θB
)
θ2C + (1− µ− θB)θC − 1
}
. (3.5.17)
Therefore, we have the modulus in the third degree term as θC is not necessarily positive;
moreover, there are two additional terms which depends on θB. As our goal is to minimize
the exponential argument, we see that the quadratic term acts negatively and it is more
inﬂuent as η and θ2C become greater. On the contrary, the linear term acts positively
together with  and θC . Thus, their overall eﬀect has to be analyzed and we shall again
distinguish between the cases of totally exogenous or endogenous volatility.
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The case with null volatility impact
In the simpler case with given exogenous volatility σ2 > 0, we see that equation (3.5.17)
reduces to
max
θC∈D
1− exp
{(
σ2
2
− 
)
θ2C + (1− µ− θB)θC − 1
}
.
Therefore it remains just one additional term depending on θB and there is no more dis-
tinction between a positive or negative θC . First order conditions give
∂UC
∂θC
(θB, θC) = 0 ⇐⇒ θC = (µ− 1) + θB
σ2 − 2 . (3.5.18)
With the usual parameters assumptions σ2− 2 > 0,  > 0 and having imposed θB > 0, we
see that θ∗C(θB) =
(µ−1)+θB
σ2−2 is the unique strictly positive global maximizer as the second
order conditions are
∂2UC
∂θ2C
(θB, θ
∗
C(θB)) = − exp {· · · } (σ2 − 2) < 0.
As a consequence, we can even choose D = R as the set of admissible strategies. Clearly,
since  > 0, θ∗C is increasing in θB; this positive dependence is no surprising if one thinks to
the positive impact of someone's demand on the equilibrium drift µˆ∗ and the null impact
over the volatility. However, for the moment we can not state how θ∗C varies depending on
the market parameters, as we do not know how θ∗B behaves. We will analyze these facts
later.
Before ﬁxing market parameters, we state some general facts about the maximization
problem of the behavioral agent in Step 2. The following two lemmas are indeed valid for
every choice of the preference parameters 0 < α < β ≤ 1 and λ > 0 16; the proofs can be
adjusted in a straightforward way.
Lemma 3.5.1. Assume η = 0 and σ2 > 2 > 0. Then we have a1(θB)
β
a2(θB)α
≥ b1(θB)βb2(θB)α for every
θB > 0.
Proof. Using integration by parts formula, it is immediate to see that we have
a1(θB) =
∫ +∞
0
αtα−1w(1− F (t)) dt ≥
∫ 0
−∞
α(−t)α−1w(F (t)) dt = b1(θB),
a2(θB) =
∫ 0
−∞
β(−t)β−1w(F (t)) dt ≤
∫ +∞
0
βtβ−1w(1− F (t)) dt = b2(θB),
which holds for every θB > 0 thanks to the positive skewness of the distribution of the
risky asset return. The fact α < β concludes.
Remark 3.5.4. We note that even with a positive η, as long as µ ≥ 1,  > 0 and the agent's
demands are positive, the c.d.f. F (·) which appears in the previous proof maintains its
asymmetry.
As we focus on equilibria with θB > 0, by Lemma 3.5.1 we see that we recover case
(v) of Theorem 3.3.3. However, we can not use (3.3.8) to ﬁnd the optimal strategy of the
behavioral agent, as observed at the beginning of this section.
16Using a λ 6= 1 amounts to replacing σ2 with λσ2 in (3.5.18). Thus, the qualitative eﬀects on the
equilibria can be simply analyzed.
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Lemma 3.5.2. With the same assumptions of Lemma 3.5.1, the optimization problem
(3.5.16) of the behavioral agent is equivalent to
sup
θB>0
θαBa1(θB)− k−θβBa2(θB). (3.5.19)
Moreover, Problem (3.5.19) is ill-posed and we have
lim
θB↓0
θαBa1(θB)− k−θβBa2(θB) = 0. (3.5.20)
Proof. See Section 3.8.
We immediately observe that the equivalence between the two problems and equation
(3.5.20) holds true even with η > 0 but the arguments must be changed (for more details,
we refer the interested reader to the proof). The previous lemma will now be exploited to
numerically implement Step 2.
Due to the ill-posedness result, we see that there can not be an equilibrium unless we
restrict θB over a rightward closed interval, e.g. θB ∈ (0, L]. In such a case, we can modify
(3.5.19), obtaining
sup
θB∈(0,L]
θαBa1(θB)− k−θβBa2(θB). (3.5.21)
Note that we can have two distinct types of equilibria:
- (internal equilibrium) in this case, an equilibrium exists if there is at least one local
maximizer of (3.5.21); obviously, θ∗B will be the best maximizer of (3.5.21) only
if the respective prospect value for the behavioral investor is greater than the value
obtained when selecting θB = L .
- (boundary equilibrium) if there are no local maximizers of (3.5.21), we can choose
θ∗B = L.
We observe that this last case will always produce an equilibrium unless the supremum
of (3.5.21) is zero. Our opinion is that it seems to be somewhat unrealistic that the
behavioral agent invest all her wealth in the risky asset (or she get as much leverage as she
can). Typically, householders prefer to invest all their wealth in bonds instead of risking
everything in the stock market. However, if one thinks to a behavioral fund manager who
is trying to beat the benchmark through massive stock investment, then it would be more
plausible to observe such an extreme optimal policy.
For the sake of clarity, let's arbitrarily ﬁx θB ∈ (0, 2], thus the CPT investor is allowed to
borrow as much as her initial wealth. At this point, (3.5.21) results in a function depending
on the market parameters (µ,,σ2) with the constraints µ ≥ 1, σ2 > 2 > 0. Therefore, we
need to ﬁx two of these three values in order to obtain 3D-pictures and see if there exists
a maximum point over θB as long as the free parameter varies; in such cases, we are also
able to depict 2D-graphs representing the implicit maximum curve, i.e. θ∗B(·) where the
dot represents one market parameter. Then, we will plot those curves for scattered values
of one remaining parameter.
We discuss the main results, depending on the free parameter. With an abuse of
notation, we will denote with V (θB) the prospect value V (XB(θB, θ∗C(θB))), dropping the
dependence on (µ,,σ2).
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Figure 3.8: Prospect value depending on the exogenous constant drift µ.
- Figure 3.8: µ ∈ [1, 1.25],  = 0.005, σ2 = 0.49. From the 3D-surface it is immediate
to see that internal equilibria exist only if µ is suﬃciently low; otherwise, we will have
boundary equilibria as V (·) is strictly increasing for every θB ∈ [0, 2].
- Figure 3.9, left plot : µ ∈ [1, 1.25],  = 0.005. Graphical analysis suggests
∂θ∗B
∂µ
> 0,
∂θ∗B
∂σ2
< 0.
We also note that σ2 has to be suﬃciently high in order to have an internal equilibrium
and if we wish no leverage for the behavioral agent, i.e. θ∗B ≤ 1, then we must choose
an even higher variance. The explanation of these facts is obvious if one thinks that
our behavioral investor is willing to invest more as the volatility decreases or as the
expected return increases.
- Figure 3.9, right plot : µ ∈ [1, 1.2], σ2 = 0.49. This time we have
∂θ∗B
∂µ
> 0,
∂θ∗B
∂
> 0.
It is interesting to observe that for suﬃciently high values of  we are able to ﬁnd
two distinct levels of demand which are stationary points, where the lowest one, θB1,
is a local maximum and the higher one, θB2 is a local minimum (in the plot they
are depicted with dashed lines). Thus, the CPT investor has to compare V (2) with
V (θB1), i.e. she evaluates if it is more convenient to totally exploit the leverage and
set θ∗B = 2 or to choose the local maximizer and select θ
∗
B = θB1. We note that this
comparison is unnecessary for lower values of  as we only ﬁnd one stationary point
θB1 which is a local maximum; hence the prospect value V (·) is strictly decreasing
over (θB1, 2] and the optimal strategy is θ∗B = θB1.
- Figure 3.10: µ = 1.05,  ∈ [0, 0.02], σ2 = 0.49. The 3D-surface shows that we have
an internal equilibrium for low values of , whereas there are boundary equilibria for
high value of the drift impact constant.
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Figure 3.9: Implicit maximum curves depending on the exogenous constant drift µ.
Figure 3.10: Prospect value depending on the drift impact constant .
- Figure 3.11, left plot : µ = 1.05,  ∈ [0, 0.025]. While keeping µ ﬁxed, we have
∂θ∗B
∂
> 0,
∂θ∗B
∂σ2
< 0,
as expected. Once again we can note that θ∗B is decreasing in the volatility level
and for suﬃciently high σ2 the sensibility on  is substantially lost (see the curve for
σ2 = 2.25). We ﬁnally remark that choosing a very low volatility, e.g. σ2 = 0.09,
implies no stationary points to be plotted. This is due to the fact that V (·) becomes
strictly increasing, thus implying θ∗B = 2.
- Figure 3.11, right plot :  ∈ [0, 0.025], σ2 = 0.49. It is now evident that
∂θ∗B
∂µ
> 0,
∂θ∗B
∂
< 0,
This time, for a suﬃcient high drift constant we do not have stationary points, i.e.
θ∗B = 2. Furthermore, for low values of µ we must make a comparison similar to the
one previously described (again local minimum points are represent with a dashed
line), as the double reversion of V (·) can lead to a boundary equilibrium.
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Figure 3.11: Implicit maximum curves depending on the drift impact constant .
- Figure 3.12: µ = 1.05,  = 0.005, σ ∈ [0.12, 1.5] 17: it is immediate to see from the
3D-surface that internal equilibria are compatible with higher σ, instead of boundary
equilibria with lower σ.
Figure 3.12: Prospect value depending on the constant exogenous volatility σ2.
- Figure 3.13, left plot :  = 0.005, σ ∈ [0, 1.6]. Numerical analysis conﬁrms the
intuition:
∂θ∗B
∂µ
> 0,
∂θ∗B
∂σ2
< 0.
- Figure 3.13, right plot : µ = 1.05, σ ∈ [0, 1.6]. Once again we ﬁnd
∂θ∗B
∂
> 0,
∂θ∗B
∂σ2
< 0.
As  grows, we observe a higher θ∗B for a given volatility level and keeping ﬁxed ,
a higher optimal demand is associated with a lower σ2 as expected. Moreover, we
can see that for suﬃciently high volatility level, the eﬀect of the endogenous drift
over θ∗B is substantially null because the implicit maximum curves tends to merge.
Finally, for  suﬃciently elevated it is necessary to proceed to the usual comparison
V (2) R V (θB1).
17This is to say that σ2 ∈ [0.0144, 2.25]. Recall that we must have σ2 > 2 and we chose not to depict
the surface for σ2 ≈ 0.01 because V (·) tends to explode, thus rendering the plot unusable.
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Figure 3.13: Implicit maximum curves depending on the constant exogenous volatility σ2 .
Before concluding Step 3, it remains to see what happens if we change the preference
parameters of our behavioral investor; the motivation comes from [29], where we recall that
β − α was highlighted as an important quantity in real world ﬁnancial markets. Hence,
having ﬁxed µ = 1.05,  = 0.005, σ2 = 0.49, we performed a graphical and numerical
analysis whose main results are shown in Figure 3.14.
- Figure 3.14, left plot : α ∈ [0.55, 0.95), β = 0.95. The 3D-surface represents the
prospect value for the CPT agent. It is immediate to see that such an investor
has substantially diﬀerent reactions depending on the diﬀerence between β and α.
Recalling equations (3.5.20) and (3.5.21), we observe that for α ≈ 0.95 (i.e. when
the diﬀerence tends to be null) we do not have a local maximum, thus it is optimal
θ∗B = 2. On the other hand, a greater discrepancy has the notable eﬀect to produce
stationary points; in particular, we obtain local maxima for lower θB1 and local
minima for higher θB2.These last type of stationary points has not been represented
because with our choice of the market parameters we have θB2 > 2. Furthermore, if
we select a diﬀerent β and let vary α < β, then we get qualitatively identical plots.
- Figure 3.14, right plot : α = 0.8, β ∈ (0.8, 1]. A somewhat similar result can
be observed; once again the important quantity is the diﬀerence β − α, which can
produce the local maxima or not. Finally, with a lower α, the surfaces we obtained
for β ∈ (α, 1] are very similar to the one we depicted.
To conclude Step 3, we propose a particular equilibrium. Note that if we ﬁx a triple
(µ,,σ2), then it is easy to numerically compute θ∗B and then replacing its value in the
explicit expression of θ∗C(·). After that, one can ﬁnd the equilibrium drift and volatil-
ity simply using (3.5.14). Just as an example, choosing the triple (1.06, 0.005, 0.64) and
approximating with order 10−5 we obtain
(θ∗B, θ
∗
C) = (0.67110, 0.10056), µˆ
∗ = 1.0638, σˆ2∗ = 0.64; (3.5.22)
hence, the behavioral agent will risky invest about two thirds of her wealth, whereas the
classical agent will choose only an approximate 10% of stock buying. Obviously, these
optimal strategies does not reﬂect the typical policies observed in the real world. As a
matter of fact, we were able to show that it is easy to provide existence of an equilibrium
despite its unattractive properties.
A more interesting analysis can be made by depicting on the plane (θ∗C , θ
∗
B) some
equilibrium curves, i.e. we can ﬁx two market parameters and compute the equilibrium
pair (θ∗C , θ
∗
B) which depends on the remaining free parameter. These results are shown in
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Figure 3.14: Prospect value depending on the CRRA coeﬃcients of the CPT agent.
Figure 3.15 18, where calculations have been made with the parameters speciﬁed as above
and the particular equilibrium (3.5.22) is highlighted with the big rounded dot.
- Figure 3.15, top-left plot : µ ∈ [1, 1.25],  = 0.005, σ2 = 0.64. We chose µ discretized
with a 0.01 step length. An immediate result is the monotone dependence of both
θ∗B and θ
∗
C on the exogenous drift constant µ. In particular, for µ ≥ 1.13 we see that
we have a boundary equilibrium and θ∗C is still increasing for growing µ as expected.
- Figure 3.15, top-right plot : µ = 1.06,  ∈ [0, 0.025], σ2 = 0.64. This time  varies
with step length 0.001. We can observe once again a positive dependence of both
demand levels on the drift impact coeﬃcient and an internal equilibrium can be
reached only for  < 0.02. We also note that θ∗C is much less sensible to  than θ
∗
B
and the classical agent's demand is bounded in a smaller range than in the top-left
ﬁgure.
- Figure 3.15, down-center plot : µ = 1.06,  = 0.005, σ2 ∈ [0.04, 2.25]. We made
the standard deviation vary over [0.2, 1.5] with constant step length equal to 0.05
(equivalently, σ2 ∈ [0.04, 2.25] but with a variable mesh size). It is interesting to note
that with suﬃciently low volatility levels we can observe θ∗C > 1, i.e. the classical
agent exploits leverage opportunities. Furthermore, we have boundary equilibria for
σ2 < 0.25 and a negative dependence on the volatility of both demand levels, as
expected.
The case with volatility impact
Turning back to equation (3.5.17) with η 6= 0, the optimal strategy for the classical investor
can be computed distinguishing the cases θC ≥ 0 or θC < 0. Using ﬁrst and second order
18These plots were performed in a discrete version because these computations are heavier than the
preceding ones; just to give an idea, using a dual-core 1.83GHz PC with 2GB RAM it takes about two
hours to get one curve with approximating order by 10−5. This is substantially due to the presence of four
indeﬁnite integrals to be evaluated into a numerical scheme that looks for a zero of dV
dθB
.
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Figure 3.15: Equilibrium curves depending on one market parameter with null volatility
impact.
optimality conditions, given any positive behavioral agent's demand level θB > 0, it is
straightforward to obtain
θ∗C(θB) =
−(σ2 − 2+ ηθB) +
√
(σ2 − 2+ ηθB)2 + 6η(µ− 1 + θB)
3η
. (3.5.23)
Recalling Assumption 3.5.1 on the ranges of our market parameters and the no-short selling
constraint that binds the CPT investor, we see that θ∗C ≥ 0 and the equality holds if and
only if µ = 1 and  = 0, i.e. when the stock expected excess return is null and there is no
drift impact. Hence, we can choose once again D = R as there is only one global maximizer
for (3.5.17).
Just like we did in the case η = 0, we now analyze the dependence of θ∗C(·) on θB. It is
interesting to observe that for every θB > 0 we have
∂θ∗C
∂θB
(θB) R 0 ⇐⇒ 2 − 2σ2 + 2η(µ− 1) Q 0. (3.5.24)
Therefore, we can have positive, negative or null derivative and this will only depend on
an exogenous condition over market parameters. Moreover, as  reasonably assumes small
values, we can ignore the term 2 and (3.5.24) reduces to
∂θ∗C
∂θB
(θB) R 0 ⇐⇒ (µ− 1)

Q σ
2
η
,
where we can see a comparison between the ratios of the constant parts of the market
drift and volatility, and the impact parameters. In conclusion, a positive dependence takes
place whenever the relative impact eﬀect on the variance is greater than the relative impact
eﬀect on the drift and vice versa. An economical interpretation is immediate if one thinks to
the consequences of a greater volatility impact coeﬃcient η; in fact, the more η is elevated,
the more risky investment hurts and it is more probable to have a negative derivative.
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On the other hand, a greater drift impact coeﬃcient  implies higher expected utility, thus
probably leading to a positive dependence. These results are quite obvious if we think to
the FOSD and the SOSD which stands behind this model; however, we can not conclude
anything about what may happen in equilibrium because for the moment we do not know
how θ∗B changes when we vary market parameters. We refer the reader to the end of this
section for a more detailed analysis, when we will depict some equilibrium curves just like
we did in the case with null volatility impact.
Now we shift our attention to Step 2, namely the behavioral investor's problem. We
recall that in the previous case with η = 0, we were able to prove Lemma 3.5.1 and Lemma
3.5.2. In particular, we remarked that even if we assumed η > 0 all their conclusions
were still valid, but the ill-posedness of (3.5.19) could not be proved in the same way.
Analyzing the proof of Lemma 3.5.2, we see that a crucial role was played by the relation
∂θ∗C
∂θB
(θB) > 0 for every θB > 0. Unfortunately, we have just seen that this fact does not
hold true anymore! However, we can prove the following result which strongly separates
the cases  = 0 and  > 0, i.e. when there is or not a positive drift impact.
Lemma 3.5.3. Under Assumption 3.5.1 with η > 0,
- if  = 0, then for every θB > 0 we have
∂µˆ
∂θB
(θB, θ
∗
C(θB)) = 0,
∂σˆ2
∂θB
(θB, θ
∗
C(θB)) > 0. (3.5.25)
Moreover,
lim
θB→+∞
V (θB) = −∞, (3.5.26)
therefore Problem (3.5.19) is well-posed;
- if  > 0, then for every θB > 0 we have
∂µˆ
∂θB
(θB, θ
∗
C(θB)) > 0,
∂σˆ2
∂θB
(θB, θ
∗
C(θB)) > 0. (3.5.27)
Moreover,
lim
θB→+∞
V (θB) = +∞, (3.5.28)
therefore Problem (3.5.19) is ill-posed.
The proof is relegated to Section 3.8, as it is quite technical and cumbersome; now we
give an interpretation of the previous results and their consequences. First of all, recall
that µˆ and σˆ2 are the overall market drift and volatility; in the case  = 0 we have no
drift impact, which obviously implies the ﬁrst equality of (3.5.25) and even produces well-
posedness thanks to the SOSD which aﬀects the preferences of our behavioral agent. In fact,
we have already seen that a higher θB only produces an increase in the overall volatility
and its main consequence is the disadvantage caused by huge investment in the stock.
The case  > 0 is sharply diﬀerent and equation (3.5.27) means that a higher demand of
the behavioral agent will lead to an increase in the global drift and volatility of the market,
independently on the dependence of θ∗C(·) on θB. This was quite obvious in the case
η = 0 but it was not in the present situation, as a growth of θB leads to greater drift and
variance, which partly encourages and partly discourages risky investment. Fortunately,
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this combined eﬀect can be shown to be favorable to our behavioral investor, as the ill-
posedness of (3.5.19) states. This is equivalent to say that limθB→+∞ V (θB) = +∞; on
the other hand, numerical simulations show that even for very high levels of θB we can
have V (θB) < 0, thus massive risky investment can be necessary before V (·) undertakes
a monotone increasing phase. These results motivate our choice of allowing θB ∈ (0, 2] as
we did before and we will subsequently look for internal and boundary equilibria, which
always exist unless supθB∈(0,2] V (θB) = 0.
At this point nothing more can be said from an analytical point of view and we have
to rely on numerical simulations. As a ﬁrst step, we provide 3D-plots which represent
the prospect value V (·) of our behavioral agent, depending on θB ∈ (0, 2] and one market
parameter, where the other three are kept ﬁxed. As our aim is to show the inﬂuence of
η 6= 0 on the existence and on the properties of equilibria that we could obtain, we decided
to maintain the same drift parameters as in Section 3.5.1, namely µ = 1.05 and  = 0.005;
on the other hand, we chose σ2 = 0.09 and η = 0.2. Note that in the previous analysis
we selected σ2 = 0.49, i.e. a higher exogenous volatility arising from noise trading, simply
because the equilibrium results were more interesting. Nonetheless, in this new setting
a lower σ2 is suﬃcient, as the eﬀect of a positive volatility impact is to raise the overall
variance thanks to the fact that θ∗C(θB) ≥ 0 and θ∗B > 019. Moreover, recall that lower
values of σ correspond to more realistic scenarios, as we noted in Section 3.5.1.
- Figure 3.16, top-left plot : µ ∈ [1, 1.25],  = 0.005, σ2 = 0.09, η = 0.2. At a ﬁrst
glance we note the similarity with the 3D-surface in Figure 3.8, hence the additional
parameter η > 0 seems to have no qualitative eﬀect on the exogenous drift µ.
- Figure 3.16, top-right plot : µ = 1.05,  ∈ [0, 0.02], σ2 = 0.09, η = 0.2. This
time too we note a strong similarity with Figure 3.10. Furthermore, we see that the
distinction between the cases  = 0 or  > 0 is not signiﬁcant locally, but only from
an asymptotic point of view, as Lemma 3.5.3 states.
- Figure 3.16, down-left plot : µ = 1.05,  = 0.005, σ2 ∈ [0, 1.44], η = 0.2. If we let
σ vary, we note a substantial diﬀerence between the down-left plot of Figure 3.16
and Figure 3.12. In fact, the last one exhibits a monotone increasing shape for low
values of σ, whereas the ﬁrst one not. This is due to the fact that in the case η = 0
we had to impose σ2 − 2 > 0; hence, as this quantity approached 0, we observed
something like a singularity. On the other hand, when η > 0 we have no more such
a constraint and even for σ ≈ 0 we can observe a positive (and suﬃciently elevated)
global volatility; this in turn produces the tunnel shape of the down-left surface of
Figure 3.16.
From a theoretical point of view, we could even suppose σ = 0; economically speaking,
this would mean absence of noise trading, or equivalently no other agent is inﬂuencing
the market price except for our classical and behavioral investors. This setting is by
no doubt interesting as it could represent an hypothetical competitive bargaining
model between our two agents; we note that the exogenous drift constant µ is not
forced to assume a particular value, as it arises from the fundamentals of the ﬁrm
whose stocks are priced (or the fundamentals of the underlying economy, if our risky
asset replicates some ﬁnancial index). From (3.5.24) we see that
∂θ∗C
∂θB
≥ 0, i.e. we
always have a higher θ∗C whenever the behavioral agent invests more.
19Recall that θ∗C = 0 if and only if µ = 1 and  = 0; see equation (3.5.23).
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- Figure 3.16, down-right plot : µ = 1.05,  = 0.005, σ2 = 0.09, η ∈ (0, 0.4]. The right-
down plot of Figure 3.16 shows that the dependence of V (·) on η would qualitatively
resemble Figure 3.12, as the singularity appears for η → 0 if a very low exogenous
variance is given. Finally, we see that for low values of η we ﬁnd once again a
monotone growth of the prospect value, whereas suﬃciently high η provides a unique
local maximum as expected. Therefore, a parameter which is important in order
to determine the optimal strategy of our behavioral agent and to produce internal
or boundary equilibria is the summed eﬀect of σ and η, as they both inﬂuence the
equilibrium volatility.
Figure 3.16: Prospect value depending on θB and one market parameter.
An immediate consequence of these facts is the similarity of the implicit maximum
curves which can be obtained in the case η > 0 with those depicted in Figure 3.9, Figure
3.11 and Figure 3.13. Moreover, scattering η with a ﬁxed exogenous volatility is quite the
same thing that scattering σ in the case η = 0.
To conclude, we show some equilibrium curves in Figure 3.17, where we let one pa-
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rameter vary and the other three are kept ﬁxed; in particular, the big rounded dot in the
plots represent the equilibrium obtained with the following parameters' values: µ = 1.02,
 = 0.005, σ = 0.6 and η = 0.1. Hence, approximating with order 10−5, we have
(θ∗B, θ
∗
C) = (0.50097, 0.05511), µˆ
∗ = 1.02278, σˆ2∗ = 0.41561.
On each plot we reported the lower and the upper bound of the range of the free parameter,
which is scattered with a constant mesh size. As expected, Figure 3.17 shows that greater
drift parameters imply a growth in the optimal demand levels of both investors, whereas
an increase in the volatility parameters has an opposed eﬀect. Quite interestingly, from the
down-left plot we see that as σ varies it seems that the equilibrium curve is convex, whereas
it was concave in the case η = 0; see the downward plot of Figure 3.15. Furthermore, the
down-right plot shows that with this choice of market parameters, the eﬀect of η on θ∗C is
very weak.
In order to avoid misunderstanding of these results, we recall that equation (3.5.24)
speciﬁes the way θ∗C reacts on θB (but not the reaction on θ
∗
B when we vary one or more
parameters!). Therefore, we can observe positive correlation among the optimal demand
levels even if
∂θ∗C
∂θB
< 0. Just as an example, we have
∂θ∗C
∂θB
< 0 if and only if σ < 0.6344
but at the same time a decrease in σ pushes up θ∗C(·) thanks to the SOSD. In our case,
it turns out that the overall eﬀect of a decrease in σ is to raise θ∗B and θ
∗
C(θ
∗
B) also for
σ < 0.6344.
Figure 3.17: Equilibrium curves depending on one market parameter with positive volatility
impact.
3.5.3 The model with two EU agents
We now perform a detailed analysis of a model analogous to the previous one, but this
time we consider the case of two interacting classical agents, both characterized by CARA
utility functions. The aim of this section is to highlight similarities and diﬀerences w.r.t. to
the preceding framework, also clarifying some aspects of our setting thanks to the greater
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availability of explicit formulas. However, we will see that in the general case graphical
analysis still remains the best tool; in fact the complexity due to the presence of many
parameters makes it diﬃcult to obtain friendly expressions.
To begin, we keep the same hypothesis on the market structure, i.e. Assumption 3.5.1
will be in force throughout this section. Concerning our traders, we will identify them with
the subscripts 1 and 2; we suppose a common initial endowment W0,1 = W0,2 = 1 and their
strategies will be denoted as θ1 and θ2. Moreover, regarding their preferences we have
Assumption 3.5.4 (CARA classical agents with no-short selling). The classical agents'
utility functions are
u1(x) = 1− exp(−λ1x), (3.5.29)
u2(x) = 1− exp(−λ2x), (3.5.30)
where λ1, λ2 > 0 are the constant absolute risk aversion coeﬃcients. Moreover, we assume
min {λ1, λ2} > 2
σ2
. (3.5.31)
Finally, short-selling is not allowed, i.e. θ1, θ2 ≥ 0.
Assumptions 3.5.1 and 3.5.4 are imposed to retain a framework as much as possible
similar to the previous one; in particular, we will partially recover analogous results. We
observe that the constraint (3.5.31) is nothing but a second order condition which ensures
the well-posedness of our model; in particular, it is imposed to have a maximum for the
objective functions of our investors, similarly to what we did in the case of one EU and one
CPT trader. Nonetheless, the presence of two possibly distinct CARA coeﬃcients makes
the analysis more involved (and interesting). Finally, w.l.o.g. we restrict our attention to
equilibria with (θ1, θ2) ∈ R2+. Intuitively, this can be done as our investors are substantially
of the mean-variance type, thus short-selling would induce a lower mean and a higher
variance. In fact, the reason is similar to that explained at the beginning of the case
with positive volatility impact in Section 3.5.2: under reasonable market conditions, if one
agents selects θ∗i ≥ 0, then for the other trader it is never optimal to choose a negative
risky investment level. However, we are not able to exclude a priori the existence of an
equilibrium with both negative θi; of course, this can be considered a pathological situation
as Assumptions 3.5.1 imposes a non negative exogenous risk premium; hence it will not
receive our attention.
We now proceed as usual; at ﬁrst, we write down the objective functions of the two
investors. Then, we look for pure strategy equilibria and this will be done by using ﬁrst
and second order optimality conditions, also providing explicitly the equilibrium strategies
in some particular cases. We remark the importance of the symmetry that underlies our
model; this fact allow us to develop the analysis only for one trader, the other being almost
identical as it is suﬃcient to interchange subscripts. The main result concerning this model
is the following proposition, whose proof can be found in Section 3.8 together with those
of the subsequent corollaries.
Proposition 3.5.3. Under Assumptions 3.5.1 and 3.5.4, for every choice of the parameters
(µ, , σ2, η) and (λ1, λ2) the model is well-posed and there exist an equilibrium. Moreover,
there are only two types of equilibria, namely:
- boundary equilibria with θ∗1 = θ∗2 = 0;
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- internal equilibria with (θ∗1, θ∗2) ∈ R2++ := (0,+∞)2.
To better understand the conclusions of this model, it is necessary to split the cases
with (η > 0) or without (η = 0) volatility impact. We begin with the easier one.
Corollary 3.5.1. Assume η = 0. Then the equilibrium strategies are
θ∗1 =
(µ− 1)(λ2σ2 − )
(λ1σ2 − 2)(λ2σ2 − 2)− 2 , θ
∗
2 =
(µ− 1)(λ1σ2 − )
(λ1σ2 − 2)(λ2σ2 − 2)− 2 . (3.5.32)
Consequently, we have the following characterizations:
- θ∗1 = θ∗2 = 0 ⇐⇒ µ = 1;
- if µ > 1, then θ∗1 R θ∗2 ⇐⇒ λ1 Q λ2.
Before passing to the case with positive volatility impact, there are some interesting
facts to highlight. First of all, the case  = 0 usually reduces to the classic results. Secondly,
these equilibria can be represented as straight lines on the plane (θ1, θ2). In fact, it is
immediate to see that if µ ≥ 1, then we have
θ∗1 =
(
λ2σ
2 − 
λ1σ2 − 
)
θ∗2,
which obviously implies the preceding characterization. Now, a straightforward sensitivity
analysis gives these results:
∂θ∗1
∂µ
> 0,
∂θ∗1
∂
> 0,
∂θ∗1
∂σ2
< 0,
∂θ∗1
∂λ1
< 0,
∂θ∗1
∂λ2
< 0.
In particular, the last inequality can be interpreted in this way: the more agent 2 is risk-
averse, the less she will invest in stock; as a consequence, agent 1 will lower her risky
exposure too.
Note that we can also explicitly compute a no-leverage condition; speciﬁcally, agent 1 will
not borrow money if and only if
λ1 ≥ λNL1 :=
(µ− 1)(λ2σ2 − ) + (2λ2σ2 − 3)
σ2(λ2σ2 − 2) ,
and a similar expression can be obtained for agent 2. Standard computations imply
∂λNL1
∂µ
> 0,
∂λNL1
∂
> 0,
∂λNL1
∂σ2
> 0,
∂λNL1
∂λ2
< 0.
Therefore, if the return parameters µ and  increase, then our investor is more favorable
to exploit leverage. Hence, she behaves in this way because she tries to reach a higher
terminal wealth by gambling with the money of someone else. Note that this policy is
adopted even if the exogenous volatility grows; thus, risky investment is more attractive
when someone else bears negative results!
To conclude, we make a comparison to the case with one CPT trader and no volatility
impact. At a ﬁrst sight, Figure 3.15 shows that equilibrium curves were not straight lines;
actually, they exhibited a concave shape while maintaining the same parameter sensitivi-
ties. Obviously, quantitative conclusions are not useful as they depend on the magnitude
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of preference parameters. However, it is important to stress that the existence of the equi-
librium was not always ensured and it also depended on µ, whereas in this case (3.5.31)
does not and well-posedness always conﬁrms existence. This observation applies to the
case η > 0 as well, because Proposition 3.5.3 imposes no restrictions on η.
Finally, we note that equilibria with null risky investment by both EU and CPT agents
were available when µ = 1, as it happens now. Nonetheless, we had to impose the additional
necessary condition α = β, which can now be removed. In fact, in this model zero-demand
levels can be simply characterized by a market parameter condition, thus ignoring the
preferences of our investors.
Passing to the endogenous volatility case, we obtained the subsequent result.
Corollary 3.5.2. Assume η > 0. We have the following facts:
(i) if λ1 = λ2 = λ, then
θ∗1 = θ
∗
2 =
−(λσ2 − 3) +√(λσ2 − 3)2 + 10ηλ(µ− 1)
5ηλ
; (3.5.33)
in particular, θ∗1 = θ∗2 = 0 ⇐⇒ µ = 1;
(ii) if λ1 6= λ2, then θ∗1 = θ∗2 = 0 =⇒ µ = 1 but not viceversa;
(iii) if µ > 1, then θ∗1 R θ∗2 ⇐⇒ λ1 Q λ2.
In the case λ1 = λ2, the equilibria always lie on the bisector of the plane (θ1, θ2).
Thanks to the explicit expression (3.5.33), we are able to perform a sensitivity analysis
over θ∗1, obtaining the same results as before. On the contrary, it is interesting to compute
the updated no-leverage condition, which becomes
λ1 ≥ λNL1 :=
2(3+ µ− 1)
5η + 2σ2
;
in turn, this gives a negative dependence on σ2.
Remarkably, in the case µ > 1 the characterization of the demand levels is still valid and
it only depends on the comparison between CARA coeﬃcients. This property is exactly
the same which can be found in a standard portfolio selection problem, i.e. when  = η = 0,
so the model reduces to a non-impact version. In case (ii) of Corollary 3.5.2, we do not
have the reversed implication; this is simply due to the possible presence of such an impact,
which may induce non-zero risky investment.
We conclude our analysis showing some graphical results in Figure 3.18. We select the
same market parameters that we used when drawing the equilibrium curves in Figure 3.17:
µ = 1.02,  = 0.005, σ = 0.6, η = 0.1. Moreover, we ﬁx λ1 = 1 as a normalization and, for
each varying parameter, we plot two curves, one with λ2 = 0.7 and the other with λ2 = 1.3;
they lie above and below the bisector respectively.
Quite surprisingly, equilibria seems to lie on straight lines even when λ1 6= λ2; however,
a simple calculations shows that using a 10−10 error approximation, the ratio θ∗1/θ∗2 is not
constant.
A ﬁnal observation concerns the joint behavior of the optimal policies. It is not diﬃcult
to ﬁnd two numerical examples20 which show that they can reveal diﬀerent trends. In
Figure 3.19 we can see that the most-left curve exhibit both decreasing investment levels
as λ2 grows, whereas in the right-most curve we have an increasing θ∗1.
20In the left-most curve we selected µ = 1.01,  = 0.03, σ = 0.2, η = 0.05 and λ1 = 1, whereas in the
right-most it is µ = 1.07,  = 0.01, σ = 0.02, η = 0.05 and λ1 = 1.
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Figure 3.18: Equilibrium curves depending on one market parameter.
Figure 3.19: Diﬀerent joint behavior of equilibrium strategies depending on λ2.
3.6 An equilibrium model with many heterogeneous investors
In the previous section we analyzed an hypothetical ﬁnancial market where only two active
agents were allowed to place orders, and those investors could be thought as large traders,
in that they aﬀected the equilibrium stock return. Implicitly, we hid a number of small
traders behind the action of a single market maker who was able to absorb every demand
or oﬀer level. Now, we would like to give an interpretation of what happens behind the
curtains ; in other words, we are going to build a model where many small EU agent and
many small CPT agents have access to a ﬁnancial market. Then, we will try to merge
the economic decisions of all these investors and this should engender an equilibrium with
endogenous prices or returns. An interesting feature of our model is that it resembles a
pure competition scenario but at the same time every agent is supposed to be price maker.
However, we will see that in equilibrium only the classical agents play a role in determining
the equilibrium quantities, whereas the behavioral traders stay out of the risky asset market.
Consequently, when the number of EU investors grows we expect to see something similar
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to a pure competition economy with price taking agents, and this is indeed the case (see
Remark 3.6.1).
Now, we introduce the main hypotheses regarding the traders and the ﬁnancial market.
Assumption 3.6.1 (CARA classical agents). There are I classical agents, each of them
endowed with an initial wealth W i > 0, i = 1, . . . , I, and a utility function
uiC(x) = 1− exp(−λix), i = 1, . . . , I , (3.6.1)
where λi > 0 is the constant absolute risk aversion coeﬃcient of the i-th agent.
Assumption 3.6.2 (Risk-neutral loss-averse behavioral agents). There are H behavioral
agents, each of them endowed with an initial wealth W h > 0, h = 1, . . . ,H and value
functions
uh+(x) = x, u
h
−(x) = k
h
−x, h = 1, . . . ,H, (3.6.2)
with kh− ≥ 1 for h = 1, . . . H. Moreover, the adjusted reference wealth is x0 = 0 for every
behavioral agent and the probability weighting functions wh+(·) and wh−(·) satisfy Assumption
3.2.2 and the hypothesis of Proposition 3.3.2 for h = 1, . . . ,H.
Note that we are going to use absolute wealth and investment levels instead of per-
centage levels. Moreover, we suppose risk-neutrality for the CPT agents in order to avoid
loss-aversion violation and, at the same time, to retain some analytic tractability. In fact,
as long as kh− ≥ 1, loss aversion is now a property of these preferences and the unpleasant
consequences of CRRA value functions that we saw in Section 3.3.2 are ruled out21. Besides
this, we do not assume Kahneman-Tversky type probability distortions, as we will prove
our main results under more general hypotheses. Finally, when maximizing their respective
objective functions, our agents take into consideration that a lot of small traders are active
in their market. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time that many EU and
many CPT investors, both with heterogeneous preferences, are considered in the literature.
Assumption 3.6.3 (Market structure).
- There is a risk-free asset (bond) in perfectly elastic supply with unit price set equal to 1
and a deterministic return r > 0;
- There is a risky asset (stock) with n > 0 outstanding shares and a per-share dividend
normally distributed, namely D ∼ N (µ, σ2), with µ > 0, σ > 0.
It is clear that normal market conditions require r ≥ 1, i.e. a non negative interest rate.
However, we do not impose any other restriction over these parameters. Moreover, we will
allow nor short-selling neither taking leverage by our agents and we suppose that there are
not trading frictions or other constraints. Importantly, this is a game-theoretical model
too. To better understand it, we propose a speciﬁc pure strategy equilibrium and we will
check that this equilibrium can be sustained by a system of conjectures where every agent
considers as given the strategy of every other agent. Obviously, all the traders must share
the same beliefs about the return of the risky asset in order to avoid as much as possible
computational diﬃculties. On one hand, we are able to provide suﬃcient conditions and
an analytic proof for the existence of such equilibrium. Not only, we will see that it is
indeed robust, in the sense that removing some constraints or varying some parameters
is substantially innocuous, as well as a coalition proofness analysis reveals that it can be
21Obviously, we lose the overall S-shaped form of the value function.
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resistant to multiple deviations. On the other hand, we were not able to prove that our
suggested equilibrium is unique and we still rely on numerical and graphical analysis when
doing some comparative statics.
Now, we need some further notations. Firstly, θiC and θ
h
B denote the risky investment
level of i-th EU agent and h-th CPT agent respectively. Hence, the no short-selling and
no leverage constraints can be easily written as
θiC ∈ [0,W i], θhB ∈ [0,W h], i = 1, . . . , I, h = 1, . . . ,H. (3.6.3)
Other quantities that will result useful are:
WC :=
I∑
i=1
W i, WC−i := WC −W i; (3.6.4)
in other words, WC is the total wealth at disposal of the pool of classical agents, whereas
from the point of view of the i-th agent, WC−i is the total wealth of the other EU investors
joined together.
Given this, market clearing condition imply that the unitary price p of the risky asset is
determined by the following condition:
I∑
i=1
θiC +
H∑
h=1
θhB = np, (3.6.5)
i.e. the overall demand must equal the total supply. Thus, once every optimal strategy is
known, it is straightforward to compute the equilibrium price. Whatever the price is, we
are able to ﬁnd the risky asset return R, namely
R :=
D
p
, R ∼ N
(
µ
p
,
σ2
p2
)
. (3.6.6)
Let's specify the suggested equilibrium and the suﬃcient conditions that ensure its sus-
tainability. As usual, equilibrium quantities will be denoted with a ∗.
Equilibrium conjecture. There exists an equilibrium with trading strategies
θi∗C = W
i, i = 1, . . . , I, (3.6.7)
θh∗B = 0, h = 1, . . . ,H. (3.6.8)
A sensible economic interpretation of these strategies is that the representative small CPT
trader behaves like a typical householder who assigns all her savings to bonds, whereas the
small EU agent makes a totally risky investment. 22
Now, if our conjecture leads to an eﬀective equilibrium, then we would have
p∗ =
WC
n
, R∗ ∼ N
(
µ
p∗
,
σ2
p∗2
)
. (3.6.9)
We will prove its existence under the following assumption.
22We note that this policy is indeed consistent with the classical theory of portfolio selection if we think
to our two assets as of two mutual funds (e.g. our risky asset can represent some index-linked derivative)
and EU agents seeking an expected return equal to that of the tangency portfolio in an eﬃcient frontier
framework. In fact, this would imply null investment in the risk-free asset and a mean-variance eﬃcient
frontier portfolio selection, as expected by the EU nature of those traders.
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Assumption 3.6.4 (Suﬃcient condition for the existence of the equilibrium).
- the equilibrium risk premium is strictly positive, i.e.
µ
p∗
> r. (3.6.10)
Intuitively, condition (3.6.10) assures a positive risky investment in equilibrium by the
representative EU agent; next, we look for ranges of the initial wealths of the EU traders
and for the loss aversion coeﬃcients for which the conjecture reveals true. We can prove
the following result.
Proposition 3.6.1. Under Assumptions 3.6.1 - 3.6.4, there exists a threshold
W i =

2
√
3
3
√
nWC−i(µ−λinσ2)
r sin
(
pi
3 +
1
3asin
(
3
√
3λiσ2
2
√
rnWC−i
(µ−λinσ2)3
))
−WC−i if λi< µ
nσ2
,
3
√
µnWC−i2
r −WC−i if λi= µnσ2 ,
−2
√
3
3
√
nWC−i(µ−λinσ2)
r sin
(
1
3asin
(
3
√
3λiσ2
2
√
rnWC−i
(µ−λinσ2)3
))
−WC−i if λi> µ
nσ2
,
(3.6.11)
where asin(·) denotes the principal arcsine, such that ∀ W i ∈ (0,W i] the optimal strategy
for the i-th classical agent is the conjectured one, namely θi∗C = W
i, i = 1, . . . , I.
Proof. See Section 3.8.
The meaning of the bound imposed byW i is that ifW i is small enough not to excessively
distort the risky asset return, then it will be optimal for the i-th agent to select θi∗C =
W i. Moreover, W i usually represent a non-negligible fraction of the overall wealth of the
economy, thus the representative EU investor is not necessarily too small. In the particular
case of uniformly distributed endowments, we are able to provide further details.
Remark 3.6.1. If we further assume the same initial endowment W i for every EU agent,
then it is straightforward to see that WC = IW i and WC−i = (I − 1)W i. In this case, we
obtain the upper bound
W i =
n(I − 1)(Iµ− λinσ2)
rI3
, i = 1, . . . , I. (3.6.12)
To see this, simply replace WC−i with (I − 1)W i in (3.8.17) and solve the polynomial
equation P (W i) = 0. For W i to be strictly positive, we have to impose an additional
condition over the preferences of our classical agent; more speciﬁcally, we have
W i > 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , I ⇐⇒ max
i=1,...I
λi <
Iµ
nσ2
. (3.6.13)
Given this, we can select any positive initial wealth level W i ∈ (0,mini=1,...,IW i] and then
compute the equilibrium price p∗ and the corresponding return R∗ as indicated by (3.6.9).
In particular, we see thatW i positively depends on µ, whereas it depends negatively on
r, σ2 and λi. Moreover, as the number of EU agents becomes larger and approaches inﬁnity,
condition (3.6.13) is automatically satisﬁed. At the same time, we have limI→+∞W i = 0;
hence, we recover a setting very similar to a perfect competition framework, where every
trader has a negligible impact over the equilibrium price due to her vanishing inﬂuence
over the market.
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An even more interesting analysis can be made if we restrict our attention to the case
with homogeneous preferences, i.e. λi = λ for i = 1, . . . , I, and we choose the maximum
initial endowment, that is to say
W i = W :=
n(I − 1)(Iµ− λnσ2)
rI3
.
Hence, we are able to explicitly compute
p∗ ≡ IW
n
=
(I − 1)(Iµ− λnσ2)
rI2
;
by straightforward computations, we can see that
∂p∗
∂I
=
(Iµ− λnσ2) + (I − 1)λnσ2
rI3
> 0.
Besides this, we have
lim
I→+∞
p∗ =
µ
r
,
lim
I→+∞
E [R∗] = r.
Otherwise stated, the equilibrium risk premium of the stock asymptotically tends to vanish
in a monotone decreasing way, as the number of EU agents increases. This is just another
conﬁrm of the perfect competition scenario that appears in the limit, where expected proﬁts
are reduced to zero and each agent simply becomes price taker. Finally, we note that p∗ is
increasing in µ and decreasing in σ2, n, r and λ, as economic intuition suggests.
Example 3.6.1. We end the analysis for the EU agents by giving a numerical example
which may resemble a realistic situation. Obviously, we are aware of the fact that no such
actual market exists and we do not have any idea about the magnitude of its parameters.
Let's assume n = 103, I = 200, r = 1.02 and λ = 0.2; using this choice we ﬁnd
W =
995
204
(µ− σ2).
If we desire an equilibrium price p∗ = 1 (in order to haveD = R and simplify computations),
then a necessary condition is W = 5. Substituting in the previous expression and solving
for µ, we obtain
µ = σ2 +
204
199
,
which gives a coordination between the expected return of the stock and its volatility.
Fortunately, we recover sensible values for this model, e.g. for σ = 0.2 we have µ ≈ 1.065;
more importantly, these variables move accordingly to economic intuition: if the variance
increases, then it is necessary a growth in the expected payoﬀ in order to maintain the
price p∗ at the same level.
Turning back to the existence problem, we now have to show that our Equilibrium
Conjecture indeed suggests the best strategies for the CPT agents too. In other words, we
must check that every behavioral investor optimally chooses θhB = 0, given that θ
i
C = W
i,
i = 1, . . . , I, and θkB = 0, k = 1, . . . , h − 1, h + 1, . . . ,H. Formally, we state the following
result.
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Proposition 3.6.2. Under Assumptions 3.6.1 - 3.6.4, there exists a threshold
kh− :=
∫ +∞
0
wh+
(
1−N
(
(x+ r)p∗ − µ
σ
))
dx∫ r
0
wh−
(
N
(
(−x+ r)p∗ − µ
σ
))
dx
. (3.6.14)
such that ∀ kh− ∈ [kh−,+∞) the optimal strategy for the h-th behavioral agent is the conjec-
tured one, namely θh∗B = 0, h = 1, . . . ,H.
Proof. See Section 3.8.
We note the range imposed in (3.6.14) ensures θh∗B = 0 for the h-th CPT investor. Now,
it is clear that if these bounds are too restrictive, then the existence result will be weak in
the sense that reality hardly matches our requirements. However, we will see later that kh−
is near to 1, hence we do not require strong loss aversion, which intuitively guarantees a null
risky investment. Furthermore, the analytically derived bound kh− reveals very accurate;
that is to say that numerical evidence shows that even for kh− really close but lower than
kh−, we no more have the equilibrium. The subsequent graphical analysis will highlight this
fact.
Finally, combining Proposition 3.6.1 and Proposition 3.6.2, we can analytically state
the existence of our proposed equilibrium. Once again, we observe that all the suﬃcient
hypotheses are nothing but Assumption 3.6.4 and the two bounds given by (3.6.11) and
(3.6.14).
Remark 3.6.2. We note that in the Appendix we also prove with equation (3.8.20) that the
stock price p does not inﬂuence the policy of the behavioral investor, who is only interested
in the terminal return. This fact completely agrees with economic intuition and it seems a
quite natural requirement. However, we also note that in the CRRA case this is no longer
true unless α = β (and this is one reason why we discarded power value functions).
Furthermore, Property (iii) in the proof of Proposition 3.6.2 shows that the value func-
tion is strictly increasing in the dividend µ and strictly decreasing in the risk-free return r.
Consequently, if we are able to ﬁnd a particular set of values which support the equilibrium,
then we still have an equilibrium ceteris paribus but decreasing µ (or increasing r) as long
as (3.6.10) is fulﬁlled. Once again, this reﬂects economic intuition, as a higher r makes
risk-free investment more favorable for a FOSD agent, hence making our equilibrium with
θh∗B = 0 resist. Numerical evidence suggests that this is also true for higher levels of the
volatility σ2; however, we were not able to provide an analytic proof.
Finally, the argument for the existence of the equilibrium admits any positive wealth level
W h for the h-th behavioral trader; this is because we made our proof taking the supremum
over θhB ∈ (0,+∞). Therefore, the no-leverage constraint for the CPT agents can even be
removed as it is not binding at all.
Now it's time to make some graphical analysis in order to see what happens when we
change preference and/or market parameters. We start by choosing the usual Kahneman-
Tversky probability distortions as in equation (3.3.12) and by arbitrarily ﬁxing a particular
set of values in the light of Example 3.6.1; then we provide 3D plots where all but one
parameter are kept ﬁxed and the selected one is allowed to vary together with θhB. Results
are shown in Figure 3.20. We represent on the z-axis the prospect value Uh(·) of the h-th
CPT investor and we can verify the existence of our equilibrium by depicting the plane
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Uh = 0: if for a parameter's value the surface lies below that plane for all θhB > 0, then
the equilibrium exists; otherwise, our agent has an incentive to deviate by choosing the
maximizing θhB. In particular, market parameters are
n = 103, WC = 103, r = 1.02, µ = 1.06, σ = 0.2,
whereas those of the h-th behavioral trader are
kh− = 1.5, γ
h = 0.65, δh = 0.65.
- Figure 3.20, top-left plot : r ∈ [1, 1.06). We sensibly choose r ≥ 1 to have a non
negative interest rate and r < 1.06 to have a positive risk premium in equilibrium.
As the prospect value Uh(·) is strictly decreasing in r for every ﬁxed θhB > 0, we can
see that for r > 1.012 the equilibrium can be substained.
- Figure 3.20, top-right plot : µ ∈ [1.02, 1.16]. The lower bound for µ follows from
equation (3.6.10), as p∗ = 1 in this case. As noted before, lower levels of µ are
acceptable, whereas a higher payoﬀ of the risky asset attracts investment in the
stock. The range of the parameter for which we have the equilibrium is approximately
µ < 1.0676;
- Figure 3.20, center-left plot : σ ∈ [0.02, 0.5]. Economic intuition is conﬁrmed by the
fact that a higher volatility makes risk-free investment more desirable, thus forcing
the surface below the horizontal plane Uh = 0. We computed a standard deviation
σ = 0.1688 as the lowest value which ensures equilibrium;
- Figure 3.20, center-right plot : kh− ∈ [1, 2]. We clearly see that for a suﬃciently high
loss-averse investor, equilibrium existence can be retained; this perfectly agrees with
our analytic result that a higher kh− are still selectable. In this particular case, we
computed kh− = 1.400699015, whereas graphical experiments show that kh− = 1.40069
is a suﬃcient lower bound with a 10−30 error. Hence, our estimation for kh− reveals
very accurate;
- Figure 3.20, down-left plot : γh ∈ (0.28, 1]. Quite surprisingly, the shape of proba-
bility weighting of the Kahneman-Tversky type for the gains that we choose does not
aﬀect the existence result, as long as we maintain the same wh−(·) for the losses. We
recall that γh > 0.28 is necessary in order to have wh+(·) strictly increasing over [0, 1];
moreover, for γh = 1 we can not perform the integration by parts used in the proof of
Proposition 3.6.2. This is because wh+(·) does not fulﬁll the hypothesis of Proposition
3.3.2. However, the proof can be slightly changed and numerical computations can
still be performed, clearly leading to existence.
- Figure 3.20, down-right plot : δh ∈ [0.28, 1]. On the contrary, changing δh has
remarkable consequences, in that only for δh < 0.7264 the equilibrium is retained.
This is due to the fact that a higher δh amounts to smaller distortions for extreme
probabilities, which translates in a more objective perception of losses. This in turn
leads our agent to increase her risky exposure, as she becomes more risk-neutral.
A ﬁnal observation concerns the so called coalition proofness of our equilibrium. Loosely
speaking, what happens if two or more agent cooperate in order to deviate from their
respective optimal strategies? We already know that the no-leverage constraint for the
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Figure 3.20: 3D-plots of the prospect value for the h-th CPT agent; the surface below the
horizontal plane represents existence of the equilibrium.
behavioral agents can be removed without aﬀecting our results. Thus, even if two or
more CPT investors agree to merge their initial endowments, they will not able to ﬁnd a
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better policy as long as the market parameters remain the same. Things become far more
complicated if we allow cooperation among EU traders. In fact, once a speciﬁc pool of those
agents is selected, we could repeat from the beginning the argument which discovers the
optimal strategy θi∗C = W
i. The problem now is that the price that each agent of this pool
has to consider depends on every demand level of themselves; moreover, the conjectured
invested wealth becomes WC minus their total initial endowments. Consequently, the
analysis become extremely involved and an easy solution can hardly be found. Similar
conclusions are valid if we allow cooperation among the two types of investor. On a heuristic
basis, we can say that if the total endowments of the cooperating agents is small w.r.t. the
conjectured invested wealth, then they are not able to distort the equilibrium price; as a
consequence, every member of this coalition will not have the incentive to deviate.
3.7 Conclusions
This chapter is primarily concerned with the problem of assessing the existence of equilibria
in simple ﬁnancial markets where multiple and possibly heterogeneous agents are allowed
to interact. Our main results give a positive answer to this question. Firstly, in the case
of a market-maker driven scenario, if we model investment decisions by one large classical
and one large behavioral agent, then several types of equilibria are shown to be sustainable.
Secondly, when many small EU and many small CPT traders enter the market, then an
equilibrium is still attainable even with heterogeneous preferences within each pool. The
game theoretical approach to the problem is innovative and leads to robustness of equilibria.
Notably, in our second model, each agent is supposed to be price maker but in equilibrium
she substantially becomes price taker, thus accurately mimicking actual ﬁnancial markets.
Furthermore, economic intuition is conﬁrmed in both models and numerical as well as
graphical investigation complete our analysis.
3.8 Proofs of the main results
Proof of Proposition 3.5.1. We start by explicitly writing the relevant statistic a1(θB, θ∗C)
for our CPT agent; using the integration by parts formula and the Gaussian distribution
of the stock return we have:
a1(θB, θ
∗
C) =
∫ +∞
0
αtα−1w
(
1−
∫ t
−∞
1√
2piσ
exp
{
−(z − µ− θ
∗
C − θB + 1)2
2σ2
}
dz
)
dt,
(3.8.1)
where we recall θ∗C =
µ−1
σ2−2 ; the other statistics can be explicitly similarly written. Thanks
to the assumption α = β and w+(·) ≡ w−(·), it is immediate to see that
a1(θB, θC) ≡ b2(θB, θC), a2(θB, θC) ≡ b1(θB, θC), ∀ θB, θC ∈ R. (3.8.2)
Moreover, the skewness of our Gaussian distribution implies a1(θB, θ∗C) ≥ a2(θB, θ∗C) for
every θB ∈ [0, 1], with equality if and only if µ = 1, i.e. when there is no skewness. To see
this, just note that with a change of variable we can write
a2(θB, θ
∗
C) =
∫ 0
−∞
α(−t)α−1w
(∫ t
−∞
1√
2piσ
exp
{
−(z − µ− θ
∗
C − θB + 1)2
2σ2
}
dz
)
dt
=
∫ +∞
0
αtα−1w
(∫ −t
−∞
1√
2piσ
exp
{
−(z − µ− θ
∗
C − θB + 1)2
2σ2
}
dz
)
dt,
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and we have the result thanks to the monotonicity of w(·)23. Hence, using (3.8.2) we have
k0(θB, θ
∗
C) = max
(
a1(θB, θ
∗
C)
a2(θB, θ∗C)
,
b1(θB, θ
∗
C)
b2(θB, θ∗C)
)
=
a1(θB, θ
∗
C)
a2(θB, θ∗C)
≥ 1,
therefore equilibria with θ∗B = 0 in case (iv) of Theorem 3.3.3 are ruled out.
Now, the only relation that remains to verify in order to have an equilibrium is k− ≥
k0(θB, θ
∗
C) for every choice of θB ∈ [0, 1]. Fortunately, calculations are somewhat simpliﬁed
thanks to the ﬁrst order stochastic dominance which stands behind the portfolio selection
criteria in CPT. More speciﬁcally, we have already seen in Section 3.4.1 that the higher is
the expected stock excess return, the higher is the statistic a1 (and vice versa for a2, as it
is a measure of losses). But in our situation, a higher return can be simply obtained by
raising the investment in the risky asset, namely θB, therefore we have the relations
∂a1
∂θB
(θB, θ
∗
C) > 0,
∂a2
∂θB
(θB, θ
∗
C) < 0, ∀ θB ∈ [0, 1],
which in turn imply
∂k0
∂θB
(θB, θ
∗
C) > 0, ∀ θB ∈ [0, 1]. As a consequence of this monotonicity
property, it suﬃces to check the inequality k− ≥ k0(1, θ∗C). Replacing the parameters with
their respective values and substituting the expression of θ∗C , the right-hand side becomes
a complicated function of µ,  and σ2, involving the c.d.f. of a Gaussian random variable.
A reasoning similar to the previous one shows that k0(1, θ∗C) is increasing even in the
second argument, because a higher θ∗C shifts the c.d.f. to the right. Recalling the depen-
dences of θ∗C on the market parameters, we immediately see that
∂k0(1,·)
∂µ > 0 ∀µ ∈ [1,+∞), ∂k0(1,·)∂ > 0 ∀  ∈ [0,+∞), ∂k0(1,·)∂σ < 0 ∀σ ∈ (0,+∞).
While the ﬁrst and the second relations are obvious, the last one follows by a combined
ﬁrst order and second order stochastic dominance argument (i.e. a mean-variance one).
In fact, an increase in σ2 leads to a lower mean and a higher variance in the c.d.f. which
appears in the expression of a1 and a2; therefore we deduce a negative dependence of k0
on the exogenous volatility parameter.
In conclusion, we are done once we have found a triple (µ∗,∗,σ2∗) such that
k0
(
1,
µ∗ − 1
σ2∗ − 2∗
)
≤ k−,
as this inequality implies existence of the equilibrium for (µ∗,∗,σ2∗) and any lower µ or 
is still compatible, just like any higher σ2.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.2. We start by explicitly writing the statistic a1(θB, θ∗C) for our
CPT agent with the assumption  = 0:
a1(θB, θ
∗
C) =
∫ +∞
0 αt
α−1w
(
1− ∫ t−∞ 1√2pi(σ2+ηθB+ηθ∗C) exp
{
− (z−µ+1)2
2(σ2+ηθB+ηθ
∗
C)
}
dz
)
dt,
(3.8.3)
23For more information about the skewness eﬀects on this kind of portfolio selection model and the
relative equilibria, see [6] and [11].
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where we recall
θ∗C =
−σ2 +√(σ2)2 + 6η(µ− 1)
3η
.
Similar expressions can be found for a2, b1 and b2. Now, the conclusion k0(θB, θ∗C) =
a1(θB ,θ
∗
C)
a2(θB ,θ
∗
C)
is still valid and we can exploit second order stochastic dominance results. In-
tuitively, a raise in θB will only produce a volatility increase, thus reducing the prospect
value of any selected terminal wealth; this is why we employ k0 (0, θ∗C). Mathematically
speaking, while holding θ∗C ﬁxed we would like to have
∂k0
∂θB
< 0 ⇐⇒ ∂a1
∂θB
a2 − a1 ∂a2
∂θB
< 0, (3.8.4)
where we suppressed the arguments for notational convenience. However, we already know
that a1(θB, θ∗C) ≥ a2(θB, θ∗C) for every θB ∈ [0, 1] thanks to the skewness of the Gaussian
stock return; furthermore, Proposition 3.4.1 implies
∂a1
∂θB
(θB, θ
∗
C) ≤
∂a2
∂θB
(θB, θ
∗
C),
∂a2
∂θB
(θB, θ
∗
C) > 0,
for every θB ∈ [0, 1], as θB positively aﬀects the overall variance. Therefore, inequality
(3.8.4) is indeed fulﬁlled and the monotonicity of k0 on θB implies that the existence of the
equilibrium is ﬁnally reduced to show that
k− ≥ k0(0, θ∗C) = k0
(
0,
−σ2∗ +√(σ2∗)2 + 6η∗(µ∗ − 1)
3η∗
)
(3.8.5)
holds for some choice of the market parameters (µ∗, σ2∗,η∗) in their respective ranges and
satisfying the simpliﬁed no-leverage condition 3η∗ + 2
(
σ2∗ − (µ∗ − 1)) ≥ 0. Once such a
particular triple is found, µ can not be arbitrarily decreased because it would produce a
drop in both the mean and the variance of the c.d.f. included in a1 and a2. However, σ2
and η can be arbitrarily increased as they do not aﬀect the mean of the c.d.f. but at the
same time they increase the overall volatility. In fact, this last quantity is given by
σˆ2 = σ2 + ηθB + ηθ
∗
C =
2
3
σ2 + ηθB +
√
σ4 + 6η(µ− 1)
3
,
and by straightforward computation we obtain
∂σˆ2
∂σ2
=
2
3
+
σ2√
σ4 + 6η(µ− 1) > 0,
∂σˆ2
∂η
= θB +
2(µ− 1)√
σ4 + 6η(µ− 1) > 0.
Proof of Lemma 3.5.2. The equivalence of the problems (3.5.16) and (3.5.19) follows from
equation (3.2.5) replacing the power utility functions and using integration by parts formula
as in Lemma 3.5.1. For completeness, we recall that a1(θB) is given by (3.8.1), simply
replacing θ∗C(θB) =
(µ−1)+θB
σ2−2 ; a2(θB) can be similarly obtained.
To show the ill-posedness, it is suﬃcient to note that as θB increases we have an upward
shift in the drift of the excess risky asset return, which amounts to a right shift of the CDF
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that appears in the expressions of a1 and a2; this fact is a consequence of the relation
∂θ∗C
∂θB
>
0. Therefore, a monotone convergence argument can be used to prove that a1(θB) ↑ +∞
as θB ↑ +∞, whereas a2(θB) → 0 as θB ↑ +∞. Moreover, a2 tends to zero faster than a
power function of order β, thanks to the explicit choice of the probability distortion w(·)
as in (3.3.12) and the fact that we are working with Gaussian random variables. Hence
θβBa2(θB) tends to zero as well and this concludes the ill-posedness argument.
To prove (3.5.20), we observe that a1 and a2 are continuous functions of θB. Therefore,
as θB ↓ 0, the c.d.f. that appears in those statistics converges; note that also θ∗C converges
to a constant depending on the market parameters. To conclude, we use Lemma 3.3.1
which states that a1 and a2 are well-deﬁned and strictly positive, if considered as functions
of the market parameters.
Proof of Lemma 3.5.3. We show (3.5.27) only for µˆ, the other for σˆ2 being similar. Recall-
ing equation (3.5.1) and using (3.5.23) we obtain
∂µˆ
∂θB
(θB, θ
∗
C(θB)) = 
(
1 +
∂θ∗C
∂θB
(θB)
)
= 
(
2
√
(σ2 − 2+ ηθB)2 + 6η(µ− 1 + θB) + ηθB + + σ2
3
√
(σ2 − 2+ ηθB)2 + 6η(µ− 1 + θB)
)
,
which is always positive thanks to Assumption 3.5.1 as long as  > 0 and it is null when
 = 0.
To prove equations (3.5.26) and (3.5.28), we recall that V (θB) = θαBa1(θB)−k−θβBa2(θB)
and
a1(θB) =
∫ +∞
0 αt
α−1w
(
1− ∫ t−∞ 1√2piσˆ2(θB ,θ∗C(θB)) exp
{
− (z−µˆ(θB ,θ∗C(θB))+1)2
2σˆ2(θB ,θ
∗
C(θB))
}
dz
)
dt,
a2(θB) =
∫ 0
−∞ β(−t)β−1w
(∫ t
−∞
1√
2piσˆ2(θB ,θ
∗
C(θB))
exp
{
− (z−µˆ(θB ,θ∗C(θB))+1)2
2σˆ2(θB ,θ
∗
C(θB))
}
dz
)
dt.
The case  = 0 can be proved following a monotone convergence argument similar to the
one previously used for Lemma 3.5.2. However, we will follow a slightly diﬀerent approach,
analyzing V (·) for any  ≥ 0 and ﬁnally seeing what happens when we have an equality.
At ﬁrst, we note that the c.d.f. which appears in a1(·) (and similarly for a2(·)) can be
written as ∫ t−(µˆ(θB,θ∗C (θB))−1)√
σˆ2(θB,θ
∗
C
(θB))
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
z2
2 dz.
Now, replacing θ∗C(θB) by using (3.5.23), for any given t ≥ 0 we can explicitly compute the
upper extreme of the previous integral as
ζ(θB) ≡ −
√
3
(
∆(θB) + (2ηθB + 2− σ2) + 3η(µ− 1)− 3tη
)
3η
√
∆(θB) + 2(ηθB + + σ2)
,
where ∆(θB) :=
√
(σ2 − 2+ ηθB)2 + 6η(µ− 1 + θB).
It is easy to see that for any ﬁxed t, limθB→+∞ ζ(θB) = −∞ if  > 0, whereas
limθB→+∞ ζ(θB) = 0 if  = 0. Intuitively, using a monotone convergence argument, one can
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argue that a1(θB) → +∞ and θβBa2(θB) → 0 as θB → +∞ (the presence of the factor θβB
is not relevant thanks to the explicit choice of the probability distortion w(·) as in (3.3.12)
and the fact that we are working with Gaussian random variables).
Now, let's ﬁx a diverging sequence {θnB}n∈N and let's compute limn→+∞ a1(θnB, θ∗C(θnB)).
Note that this is just a sequence of well-deﬁned strictly positive real numbers, as Lemma
3.3.1 states. Moreover, the previous limit exists because the sequence {a1(θnB, θ∗C(θnB))}n∈N
becomes eventually monotone increasing. To prove this fact, one can compute
dζ
dθB
(θB) = −
√
3(2∆(θB)+ηθB++σ2)[∆(θB)+(2ηθB+2+5σ2)−3η(µ−1)+3ηt]
6∆(θB)[∆(θB)+2(ηθB++σ2)]
3/2 .
Hence we can choose n¯ ∈ N such that ∀ n > n¯, ∀ t ≥ 0 we have dζdθB (θnB) < 0. Now we
can conclude that a1(θB)→ +∞ for any choice of  ≥ 0, whereas θβBa2(θB)→ +∞ if  = 0
and θβBa2(θB) → 0 if  > 0. Therefore, (3.5.28) follows immediately; on the other hand,
(3.5.26) holds because 0 < α < β ≤ 1 and ζ(θB)→ 0 as θB → +∞ if  = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.3. Suppose that the market parameters as well as λ1, λ2 are ﬁxed
accordingly to Assumptions 3.5.1 and 3.5.4. Now we restrict our attention to the case
η > 0, the case η = 0 being fully analyzed in the proof of Corollary 3.5.1.
Let agent 2 select a speciﬁc θ2 ≥ 0 as her investment level; using (3.5.6) as the expression
of the terminal wealth of agent 1, standard computations lead to the following optimization
problem for our EU agent 1:
max
θ1∈[0,+∞)
1− exp
{
ηλ21
2
θ31 +
(
λ21(ηθ2 + σ
2)
2
− λ1
)
θ21 + (−λ1 (θ2 + µ− 1)) θ1 − λ1
}
,
(3.8.6)
which is obviously equivalent to minimize the third-degree polynomial which appears as the
argument of the exponential. Note that at the same time, agent 2 faces a similar problem
and ﬁrst order conditions for internal equilibria can be easily obtained:{
f1(θ1, θ2) := 3ηλ1θ
2
1 + 2θ1
[
λ1(σ
2 + ηθ2)− 2
]− 2(µ− 1 + θ2) = 0,
f2(θ1, θ2) := 3ηλ2θ
2
2 + 2θ2
[
λ2(σ
2 + ηθ1)− 2
]− 2(µ− 1 + θ1) = 0. (3.8.7)
Now, for any ﬁxed θ2 ≥ 0 there exists a unique minimum point θ1 ≥ 0 for the afore-
mentioned third-degree polynomial; this follows by the fact that f1(θ1, ·) is nothing but a
convex parabola with f1(0, ·) ≤ 0. Not only, we can also explicitly compute that global
minimum point over [0,+∞) as
θ1(θ2) =
− [λ1(σ2 + ηθ2)− 2]+√[λ1(σ2 + ηθ2)− 2]2 + 6ηλ1(µ− 1 + θ2)
3ηλ1
≥ 0,
(3.8.8)
which represents our candidate equilibrium strategy for θ1. Therefore, we can re-
place θ1 with θ1(θ2) in the second equation of (3.8.7) to obtain the necessary condition
f2(θ1(θ2), θ2) = 0. The existence of a non negative root to this equation is clearly guar-
anteed if we observe that f2(θ1, ·) is a continuous function as well as θ1(·); besides this,
f2(θ1(0), 0) ≤ 0 and limθ2→+∞ f2(θ1(θ2), θ2) = +∞. Hence, repeating the same argument
reversing the roles of θ1 and θ2, we have proved well-posedness and the consequent existence
of an equilibrium.
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Next, we are going to prove that if one agent's risky demand is null, then the only
strategy of the other trader (possibly) compatible with an equilibrium is not to invest too.
To ﬁx ideas, suppose θ∗2 = 0. Then, by (3.8.8) it is immediate to see that θ∗1 > 0 only if
µ > 1. At this point, we have to check if θ∗2 = 0 is the best reply to θ∗1(0). However, this
can not be true as f2(θ∗1(0), 0) < 0. Hence, equilibria with only one null demand are ruled
out and the remaining equilibria are just the internal or the boundary ones.
Proof of Corollary 3.5.1. For the sake of clarity, we will conduct our analysis by the side
of agent 1. From the ﬁrst order conditions in (3.8.7) it is easily obtained
θ1(θ2) =
µ− 1 + θ2
λ1σ2 − 2 , (3.8.9)
which is always non negative thanks to our assumptions. Now, if θ∗2 = 0 then a necessary
and suﬃcient condition to have an equilibrium with θ∗1 = 0 is µ = 1. In fact, ﬁrst order
condition becomes
(µ− 1) + θ1(0) = 0;
hence, θ∗1 > 0 is not compatible with such an equilibrium and θ∗1 = 0 requires µ = 1.
Finally, by the second order conditions we ﬁnd that (3.5.31) eﬀectively ensures that the
objective functions are indeed maximized for both investors. On the other hand, if θ∗2 > 0
then the equilibrium is the solution of the following linear system{
θ∗1(λ1σ2 − 2)− (µ− 1 + θ∗2) = 0,
θ∗2(λ2σ2 − 2)− (µ− 1 + θ∗1) = 0,
(3.8.10)
which simply gives the optimal policies of (3.5.32).
Proof of Corollary 3.5.2. If λ1 = λ2 = λ, then (3.8.7) shows that f1(θ1, θ2) = f2(θ2, θ1)
for any choice of θ1, θ2. At the same time, for (θ∗1, θ∗2) to be an internal equilibrium,
we must have f1(θ∗1, θ∗2) = f2(θ∗1, θ∗2) = 0; hence, it follows that a necessary condition is
f2(θ
∗
1, θ
∗
2) = f2(θ
∗
2, θ
∗
1) = 0, which in turn implies θ
∗
1 = θ
∗
2 because f2(·, ·) is not symmetric
in its arguments. As a consequence, the equilibrium strategy for both agents will be the
positive root of f1(θ∗1, θ∗1) = 0, which is nothing but (3.5.33). In particular, if µ = 1 it
reduces to the null-investment solution.
The next step is to show that θ∗1 = θ∗2 = 0 implies µ = 1; but this follows immediately
by (3.8.8), as µ > 1 would surely induce a positive risky investment. The converse is
obviously not true as (3.8.8) shows, e.g. in the case of strictly positive  and η.
Finally, if µ > 1 we look at the dependence of the demand from the CARA coeﬃcient.
We have already seen that λ1 = λ2 implies θ∗1 = θ∗2. Now, suppose λ1 > λ2 and θ∗1 ≥ θ∗2,
the opposite case being almost identical. As µ > 1, we will have θ∗1, θ∗2 > 0, i.e. internal
equilibria; therefore, (3.8.7) must hold. Moreover, thanks to (3.5.31) we can compute
(f1 − f2) (θ1, θ2) = 3η(λ1θ21 − λ2θ22) + 2ηθ1θ2(λ1 − λ2) + 2σ2(λ1θ1 − λ2θ2)− 2(θ1 − θ2)
> 2(θ1 − θ2)(σ2λ2 − ) > 0
which is not compatible with an equilibrium. Hence, it follows θ∗1 < θ∗2 as we wanted.
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Proof of Proposition 3.6.1. To ﬁx ideas, let's choose the i-th agent as our representative
EU investor. Her goal is to maximize the expected utility of her terminal wealth, which as
usual is given by
XiC = (W
i − θiC)r + θiCR = W ir + θiC
(
D
p
− r
)
. (3.8.11)
Note that the unitary price p that the i-th agent has to take into consideration is determined
by the market clearing condition combined with the Equilibrium Conjecture; more precisely,
it must be true that
WC−i + θiC = np.
Now we can substitute for p in (3.8.11), use the explicit form of uiC(·) and the Gaussian
distribution of the risky asset dividend to obtain
E
[
uiC
(
XiC
)]
= E
[
1− exp
{
−λiW ir − λiθiC
(
Z
σ
p
+
µ
p
− r
)}]
, (3.8.12)
where Z ∼ N (0, 1). Let's ignore for the moment the constraint on the initial endowment
given by (3.6.11). Then, the optimization problem of our trader becomes
max
θiC∈[0,W i]
E
[
uiC
(
XiC
)]
;
after tedious (but not diﬃcult) computations, the previous objective function reduces to
1− exp
{
−λinWC−i[2θiC(λinσ2−µ)+WC−i(λinσ2−2µ)]
2(θiC+W
C−i)2 − λi
(
W ir − θiCr − λ
in2σ2
2 + nµ
)}
.
(3.8.13)
At this point we have to check that our conjecture leads to a sustainable equilibrium; for
this, we have to show that
∂E
[
uiC
(
XiC
)]
∂θiC
> 0, ∀ θiC ∈ (0,W i). (3.8.14)
Using (3.8.13), we can explicitly compute
∂E
[
uiC
(
XiC
)]
∂θiC
= − exp {· · · }
[
λir +
λinWC−i
(
θiC(λ
inσ2 − µ)− µWC−i)
(θiC +W
C−i)3
]
, (3.8.15)
where the dots substitute a cumbersome expression. After some manipulation, we ﬁnd that
the condition which assures the existence of the suggested equilibrium becomes
P (θiC) > 0, ∀ θiC ∈ (0,W i), (3.8.16)
where P (·) is a third degree polynomial deﬁned by
P (x) := −rx3 − 3rWC−ix2 −WC−i(λin2σ2 − nµ+ 3rWC−i)x+WC−i2(nµ− rWC−i).
(3.8.17)
Now, it is immediate to check that P (0) > 0. In fact, we have
P (0) = WC−i2(nµ− rWC−i)
= WC−i2(nµ− rWC + rW i)
> WC−i2rW i > 0,
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thanks to (3.6.10). Furthermore, we state that P (W i) ≥ 0 is necessary and suﬃcient in
order to verify (3.8.16). To see this, we note that limx→+∞ P (x) = −∞; combining this
with P (0) > 0, we deduce the existence of at least one strictly positive real solution to
the equation P (x) = 0. Let W i > 0 be that solution; it is now suﬃcient to note that W i
actually is the unique strictly positive solution. In fact, it is straightforward to compute
the unique inﬂexion point of P (·) as −WC−i < 0. Hence, the other two roots of P (·)
are real and negative or they are complex conjugate. Consequently, we have P (θiC) > 0
∀ θiC ∈ [0,W i] and repeating all the previous argument adding the constraint W i ∈ [0,W i]
concludes. To obtain the upper bound W i it is suﬃcient to explicitly compute the positive
root of P (·); using the ad hoc formula for cubic equations, we ﬁnd (3.6.11).
Proof of Proposition 3.6.2. Let's ﬁx the h-th behavioral investor as our representative
agent. For completeness, we now write down the analogous to (3.8.11) for the terminal
wealth XhB:
XhB = (W
h − θhB)r + θhBR = W hr + θhB
(
D
p
− r
)
; (3.8.18)
however, in this case the price p is given by the condition
WC + θhB = np,
which takes into account the Equilibrium Conjecture. What really cares to our trader is
the c.d.f. of the excess risky return; thanks to the Normal distribution of R it can be
written as
F (x) = P {R− r ≤ x} = N
(
(x+ r)p− µ
σ
)
,
where N (·) is the c.d.f. of a standard Gaussian random variable. The next step is to
use equation (3.2.5) in order to obtain her value function; exploiting the risk-neutrality
assumption in (3.6.2) and the usual integration by parts, we have
Uh(θhB) =
∫ +∞
0
θhBx d[−wh+(1− F (x))]−
∫ 0
−∞
(−kh−θhBx) d[wh−(F (x))]
= θhB
[∫ +∞
0
wh+(1− F (x)) dx− kh−
∫ +∞
0
wh−(F (−x)) dx
]
= θhB f
h
(
r, µ, σ,WC , n, θhB, k
h
−
)
,
where fh(· · · ) is obviously deﬁned by the last equality. Therefore, the problem of the h-th
behavioral agent is nothing but
max
θhB≥0
θhB f
h
(
r, µ, σ,WC , n, θhB, k
h
−
)
. (3.8.19)
Now, the following properties are easy to check:
(i) the value function is null for the choice θhB = 0;
(ii) fh(· · · ) is strictly decreasing in kh−;
(iii) fh(· · · ) is strictly decreasing in r, whereas it is strictly increasing in µ;
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(iv) for every choice of c > 0, we have
fh
(
r, cµ, cσ, cWC , cn, cθhB, k
h
−
)
= fh
(
r, µ, σ,WC , n, θhB, k
h
−
)
. (3.8.20)
Brieﬂy, (i) and (ii) are straightforward by the deﬁnition of the value function and fh(· · · ).
Then, (iii) is a direct consequence of the monotone increasing property of the probability
weightings w±(·); ﬁnally, the positive homogeneity property (iv) can be directly veriﬁed
using the explicit expression of F (·). We recall that the economic interpretation of (iii)
and (iv) can be found in Remark 3.6.2.
Thanks to (i) and (ii), our result will be proved if we show the existence of a lower
threshold kh− > 0 such that
sup
θhB>0
fh
(
r, µ, σ,WC , n, θhB, k
h−
)
≤ 0. (3.8.21)
To better understand the way kh− can be computed, let's ﬁx a particular kh−. Using the
explicit form of fh(· · · ), our requirement becomes
sup
θhB>0
fh+(· · · )− kh−fh−(· · · ) ≤ 0, (3.8.22)
where we have implicitly deﬁned
fh+ =
∫ +∞
0
wh+
(
1−N
(
(x+r)
WC+θhB
n
−µ
σ
))
dx ,
fh− =
∫ +∞
0
wh−
(
N
(
(−x+r)W
C+θhB
n
−µ
σ
))
dx .
Now, one can check that
∂fh+
∂θhB
= −
∫ +∞
0
wh+
′
[1−N (· · · )]φ(· · · )
(
x+ r
nσ
)
dx < 0, (3.8.23)
where the dots substitute the arguments ofN (·), and φ(·) is the probability density function
of a standard Gaussian random variable. Obviously, the previous inequality implies that
fh+ as a function of θhB attains its supremum at θ
h
B = 0. Moreover, for any ﬁxed θ
h
B > 0,
we have∫ r
0
wh−
(
N
(
(−x+r)WC
n
−µ
σ
))
dx <
∫ r
0
wh−
(
N
(
(−x+r)W
C+θhB
n
−µ
σ
))
dx
<
∫ +∞
0
wh−
(
N
(
(−x+r)W
C+θhB
n
−µ
σ
))
dx = fh−(· · · ).
(3.8.24)
139
3.8. Proofs of the main results
Turning back to the original estimation (3.8.21), we ﬁnd
sup
θhB>0
fh(· · · ) = sup
θhB>0
[
fh+(· · · )− kh−fh−(· · · )
]
≤ sup
θhB>0
fh+(· · · )− kh− inf
θhB>0
fh−(· · · )
≤ fh+(· · · )
∣∣∣
θhB=0
− kh− inf
θhB>0
∫ r
0
wh−
(
N
(
(−x+r)WC
n
−µ
σ
))
dx
=
∫ +∞
0
wh+
(
1−N
(
(x+r)W
C
n
−µ
σ
))
dx− kh−
∫ r
0 w
h−
(
N
(
(−x+r)WC
n
−µ
σ
))
dx
(3.8.25)
where we recall that W
C
n = p
∗. In conclusion, (3.8.21) will be assured if we choose kh− ≥ kh−
as expressed in (3.6.14).
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